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Jews in the United States: Perspectives from Demography

by SIDNEY GOLDSTEIN

AT A TIME WHEN THE demographic, social, and perhaps even economic structure of the American Jewish community is undergoing rapid change, there is a crucial need for a continuous monitoring of the situation and an assessment of its implications for the future. Changes in size, composition, and distribution, as well as in the patterns and levels of births and deaths, have tremendous significance on both the local and national levels. Knowledge of demographic factors is clearly essential for purposes of planning whether a community should provide certain services, where facilities should be located, how they should be staffed, and who should bear the funding burden. Moreover, the demographic structure of the Jewish community greatly affects its social, cultural, and religious viability, whether this is judged by the ability to support an educational system, to organize religious life, or to provide sufficient density of population to insure a sense of community. Because the socio-demographic structure of the Jewish community, like that of the larger American community, is both a product and a cause of change, we clearly need to have current data available. Unfortunately, however, such data are often lacking.[1]

The absence of a question on religion in the United States decennial census precludes tapping the wealth of information that would otherwise be available from that source on the religious characteristics of local populations. The need for comprehensive data on religious identification is indicated by the fact that perhaps the best single source of information available on the size and composition of Jews and other religious groups remains that collected by the Bureau of the Census in the 1957 Current

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Note: This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Colloquium on Jewish Life in the United States: Perspectives from the Social Sciences, sponsored by the YIVO Institute for Jewish Research, May 28–29, 1978. The study draws heavily on material previously published by the author in "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB, Vol. 72, 1971, pp. 3–88.

[1] An excellent review of the varied efforts undertaken between 1818 and 1977 to gather and assess statistics on the American Jewish community appears in Jack Diamond, "A Reader in the Demography of American Jews," AJYB, Vol. 77, 1977, pp. 251–317.

Population Survey.[1a] Because answers were voluntary, the survey was able to include a question on religion. But 1957 is long past, and much has happened to the American population and to American Jewry since then. The 1957 data, therefore, relatively rich though they are, can serve only as a bench mark against which changes can be measured, rather than as an indication of the current situation. Unfortunately, we have few new sets of comprehensive data.

The National Jewish Population Study (NJPS) was an important and promising attempt to conduct a nationwide survey representative of the United States Jewish population. As a report in the 1973 AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK (AJYB) indicates: "The study, sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, now has completed data collection and other tasks prerequisite to analysis, and constitutes a repository of information that will require 'mining' and interpretation for many years to come."[2] The NJPS remains largely just that—to date only a few published reports on the number and basic characteristics of the Jewish population have appeared. This overview will make use of the limited information that is available, but in the absence of a comprehensive evaluation of the NJPS data, such information must be used with caution.

Other nationwide demographic statistics containing information on religious identification are available from various surveys undertaken by public opinion polls and other organizations.[3] Some of these surveys have been used to gain insights on American Jewish fertility,[4] but because they include a very small number of Jews, detailed analysis for general purposes is greatly restricted.

Aside from the 1957 Current Population Survey and the data from the NJPS, locally sponsored community surveys still provide the best sets of data on the characteristics of American Jews. These studies differ considerably in quality, depending in particular on the manner in which the sample populations were selected, but also on the quality of the interviewers, the response rates, and the sophistication of the analyses. Since some of the surveys rely exclusively on lists of families available to the local federations, serious doubts are raised about the representativeness of the samples covered; they are usually strongly biased in favor of individuals and families who contribute to fund-raising efforts. In some communities, the federations have made concerted efforts before undertaking surveys to insure coverage of donors and non-donors, as well as of both affiliated and non-affiliated families. The success of such attempts varies both with community size and with the ease of identifying non-affiliated households. In the limited instances where these efforts have been successful, the resulting samples provide a good basis for studying the entire population; in other cases, the findings about the extent and nature of Jewish identification, intermarriage, and demographic characteristics and behavior are probably seriously biased.

[1a] U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States, March 1957," *Current Population Reports,* Series P-20, No. 79, 1958.

[2] Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p. 264.

[3] As, for example, the annual General Social Survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Corporation (NORC).

[4] Ronald Freedman, Pascal K. Whelpton, and Arthur A. Campbell, *Family Planning, Sterility, and Population Growth* (New York, 1959); Norman B. Ryder and Charles F. Westoff, *Reproduction in the United States, 1965* (Princeton, 1971); Charles F. Westoff, Robert Potter, Jr., and Philip Sagi, *The Third Child* (Princeton, 1963); Charles F. Westoff, Robert Potter, Jr., Philip Sagi, and Eliot Mishler, *Family Growth in Metropolitan America* (Princeton, 1961); Pascal K. Whelpton, Arthur A. Campbell, and John E. Patterson, *Fertility and Family Planning in the United States* (Princeton, 1966).

Beyond these concerns the findings from community surveys must be used with great caution for generalizing to the national community, since other considerations affect how representative the local sample will be for such broader purposes. Most of the surveys conducted in local communities have been for moderate-sized Jewish populations of 25,000 or less; Boston, Los Angeles, Washington, Detroit, Baltimore, and San Francisco are exceptions. Legitimate questions must be raised about the extent to which findings based on moderate-sized communities are typical of the total American Jewish population. Yet, these studies appear to display impressively similar patterns for the varied locations that have been surveyed.[5] Variations can generally be explained by the nature of the communities themselves, that is, whether they are older communities or newer suburban areas, and in which region of the country they are located. The relatively high degree of homogeneity that characterizes the patterns of these communities suggests that the underlying demographic profile of American Jewry as a whole probably does not deviate significantly from that depicted by already existing sources, incomplete as they are. The fact that the findings which are available to date from the NJPS also conform to the general patterns, provides some additional basis for confidence in both the community studies and in the NJPS itself.

In undertaking this review, the focus, within the limits of available information, will be on the major areas of concern to demographers—size, composition, distribution, and the components of change (fertility, mortality, and migration). The presentation would not be complete, however, without some attention to intermarriage. Throughout the discussion, the implications of the current situation for future patterns of growth and identification will be explored.

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[5] Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB, Vol. 72, 1971, pp. 17–19.

POPULATION GROWTH

At no time in American history has there been a complete enumeration of the nation's Jewish population. Whether referring to the population in 1790 or in the 1970's, the statistic is an estimate, and therefore subject to question. For example, in 1972 the AJYB[6] reported a total Jewish population of 6,115,320, while in 1974 it cited a considerably lower figure of 5,732,000. The drop reflected the findings of the NJPS, and particularly the reassessment of Greater New York's population, which had been reported by the AJYB at 2,381,000 between 1962 and 1973, but which was estimated by the NJPS to be only 1,998,000 as of 1971.[6a] As the latest AJYB stressed, at least two factors continue to make even the most recent estimates problematic—the difficulty in documenting the extent of the shift to the "sunbelt" states, and continuing doubts as to the accuracy of the New York City estimate, which may still be too high.[7]

Even the NJPS estimate of a 5,800,000 total American Jewish population in 1971 needs qualification. The statistic refers to individuals residing in Jewish households, exclusive of the institutional population, and as such includes both Jews and non-Jews. If non-Jews are excluded, again based on information gathered in the NJPS, the total number of Jewish residents in households is 5,370,000. If added to that estimate is an estimated 50,000 Jews in institutions, the total population in 1971 would be 5,420,000, still some half million less (a 10 per cent differential) than the previous estimates cited by the AJYB. This is far too great a range of difference to allow strong confidence in the estimates which have been provided.[8]

A set of annual estimates by Ira Rosenwaike of the American Jewish population for the period 1940 to 1975, based on use of the 1957 Bureau

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[6] The U.S. Jewish population estimates which appear in the AJYB are prepared by staff members of the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds.

[6a] Cf., Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1972," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 307–309, and Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1974," AJYB, Vol. 76, 1976, pp. 229–236.

[7] Alvin Chenkin and Maynard Miran, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1979," AJYB, Vol. 80, 1980, p. 159.

[8] Given the nature of the sampling procedures employed in the NJPS and resulting potential biases, the "official" NJPS estimate of the U.S. Jewish population of 5,780,000 is actually the middle of three estimates that range from a low of 5,560,000 to a high of 6,000,000. Each of these statistics has its own standard error, so that the 95 per cent confidence limit for the respective estimates would be

High	6,000,000	±	1,175,000
Medium	5,780,000	±	884,000
Low	5,560,000	±	763,000

The wide range encompassed by these estimates, especially when their sampling errors are taken into account, provides further evidence of the absence of exact statistics describing the Jewish population. See Bernard Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group: The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography*, August 1978, pp. 389–394.

of the Census estimates, indicates that the U.S. Jewish population in 1970 was 5,550,000—very close to the estimate emanating from the NJPS. Rosenwaike estimated a 1975 population of 5,619,000, only 69,000 greater than in 1970.[9] This estimate takes account of levels of fertility, mortality, and immigration, but does not incorporate estimates of losses resulting from intermarriage and assimilation. While all estimates are subject to question, the close correspondence between Rosenwaike's 1970 estimate and the NJPS figure, and the small growth since then, point to the strong likelihood that the total population in 1970 was well below the 6 million mark, and that it has remained so. The AJYB estimate that the 1979 Jewish population totaled 5,860,900 conforms to this expectation.[10]

The Jewish population of the United States has clearly experienced tremendous growth between the time of the formation of the United States and the 1970's. From a community estimated to number only slightly above 1,000 in 1790, the Jewish population had passed the 1 million mark by the end of the next century. Over three-quarters of that growth occurred, however, in the last two decades of the century, reflecting the onset of massive immigration from Eastern Europe in the 1880's. Between 1881 and 1902 almost 800,000 Jews entered the United States. By the beginning of the 20th century, Jews constituted 1.4 per cent of the total American population (Table 1). Immigration continued to augment the Jewish population even more substantially in the first decades of the 20th century; between 1902 and 1924 over 1.5 million Jews immigrated, and all but a small percentage remained in the United States, in contrast to high return rates among other ethnic groups. By 1927 Jews were estimated to number 4.2 million persons. The fourfold increase in an interval of less than three decades was far greater than the increase of the total population of the United States; during the same interval the American population grew by about only 60 per cent. Reflecting this differential rate of growth, Jews more than doubled their proportion of the total population—from 1.4 per cent in 1900 to 3.6 per cent in 1927.

Thereafter, the imposition of immigration quotas slowed the rate of growth. What is often overlooked, however, is that between 1925 and World War II about 250,000 Jews immigrated to the United States, and that another 320,000 did so between the end of the war and 1975. Despite its reduced volume compared to the 1881–1924 peak period, immigration has therefore continued to be an important component of growth. Without it, the American Jewish population today would be substantially smaller in size, particularly given the low rates of natural increase, losses through intermarriage and assimilation, and a small loss through emigration, especially to Israel and Canada.[11] What is interesting is that despite this immigration, only one-half million persons are estimated to have been added overall to the Jewish population between 1927 and 1937, and only one-quarter million more by 1950. Such slow growth, with comparatively minor exception, has persisted to the present, and the Jewish population has increased at a much slower rate than the population as a whole. Whereas the total U.S. population increased by just over three-fourths in the 50 years between 1930 and 1980, the Jewish population grew by about only one-third in the same interval.

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[9] Ira Rosenwaike, "A Synthetic Estimate of American Jewish Population Movement Over the Last Three Decades," paper presented at the Seventh World Congress of Jewish Studies, Jerusalem, August 1977.

[10] Chenkin and Miran, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

Estimates[12] of the net effects of international migration on the growth of the Jewish population in the 1970's suggest that net immigration has contributed about 8,000 persons per year. If estimates of the near-equal number of births and deaths during this period are correct, net immigration may thus have accounted for as much as 60 per cent of the small growth of the American Jewish population between 1970 and 1975. By contrast, in the early 1950's net immigration is estimated to have accounted for only one-fifth of total growth. With the increase in the influx of Russian Jews in the 1970's, amounting to approximately 58,700 persons between 1975 and 1979,[13] supplemented by what may be a substantial immigration of Israelis, immigration undoubtedly has persisted as the most important component of growth.

Reflecting the long-term reversal in rates of growth between the Jewish and the total population, the proportion of Jews in the total population, after peaking at 3.7 per cent in 1937, has undergone a steady decline to 2.7 per cent in 1979—about the same percentage as around 1910. Given the low Jewish birthrate, the losses sustained through intermarriage and assimilation, and what may well be higher levels of mortality due to the aging of the population, there seems little prospect of a reversal in the slower rates of growth that have come to characterize recent years. If anything, the growth rate is likely to continue to decline, and may even become negative in the not too distant future.

Consideration of the joint impact of the above factors has led to dire predictions about the virtual extinction of the American Jewish population

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[11] Simon Kuznets, "Immigration of Russian Jews to the United States: Background and Structure," *Perspectives in American History,* 1975, pp. 35–124; Jacob Lestchinsky, "Jewish Migrations, 1840–1956," in Louis Finkelstein, (ed.), *The Jews* (New York, 1960), pp. 1536–1596; Calvin Goldscheider, "The Demography of Jewish Americans: Research Findings, Issues, and Challenges," paper presented at Brandeis University Planning Conference for Modern Jewish Studies, Waltham, October 21–24, 1979.

[12] Rosenwaike, *op. cit.,* pp. 6–7.

[13] Personal communication from HIAS, March 11, 1980. The number includes only those Russian immigrants who were assisted by HIAS.

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION GROWTH, UNITED STATES, 1790–1979

Year	Number	Percent of Total U.S. Population
1790[b]	1,200	0.03
1818[a]	3,000	0.03
1826	6,000	0.06
1840	15,000	0.1
1848	50,000	0.2
1880	230,000	0.5
1888	400,000	0.6
1897	938,000	1.3
1900	1,058,000	1.4
1907[b]	1,777,000	2.0
1917	3,389,000	3.3
1927	4,228,000	3.6
1937	4,771,000	3.7
1950[c]	5,000,000	3.5
1960	5,531,000	3.1
1970	5,870,000	2.9
1975	5,732,000	2.7
1979	5,860,900	2.7

[a] Estimates for 1818–1899 are based on "Jewish Statistics," AJYB, Vol. 1, 1900, p. 623.

[b] Estimates for 1790 and 1907–1937 are from Nathan Goldberg, "The Jewish Population in the United States," *The Jewish People, Past and Present,* Vol. 2 (New York, 1955), p. 25.

[c] The 1950–1979 estimates are taken from AJYB, Vols. 70–80, 1969–1980.

within the next 100 years. One forecast suggests that "when the United States celebrates its tricentennial in 2076, the American Jewish community is likely to number no more than 944,000 persons and conceivably as few as 10,420."[14] While this prediction is overly pessimistic, in the absence of a drastic reversal in ongoing patterns, a decline does seem probable; the projections by Lieberman and Weinfeld of a Jewish population of 3–4 million by the end of the 21st century seem much more likely.[15]

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[14] Elihu Bergman, "The American Jewish Population Erosion," *Midstream,* October 1977, p. 9.

[15] Samuel S. Lieberman and Morton Weinfeld, "Demographic Trends and Jewish Survival," *Midstream,* November 1978, pp. 9–19.

The decline in relative numbers may not be very significant in view of the fact that Jews have never constituted a numerically large segment of the American population. Despite their small numbers, Jews are generally considered the third *major* religious group in the country. There seems little reason to expect that this situation will change, even should the Jewish percentage of the total population decline further. As long as Jews, both as a group and individually, continue to play significant roles in the cultural, educational, political, and economic life of the country, more important factors than sheer numbers may influence the position of the Jewish community within the total American community. These factors include changes in Jewish geographical concentration, as well as in Jewish representation in selected socioeconomic strata of the population. Only when the change in total numbers is accompanied by significant changes in distribution and composition which are deleterious to the prominent role Jews have played on the American scene will the change in numbers itself take on a new significance.

MORTALITY

Better health and longer life have characterized the Jewish population in the Western world since at least the mid-17th century.[16] Factors contributing to this favorable differential have included the positive effect of religious observance on health conditions; the relatively longer exposure which Jews have had to "civilized" environments and urban settings, resulting in higher levels of immunity against certain contagious diseases; and the higher-than-average socioeconomic status which Jews have enjoyed, permitting them thereby to obtain more and better medical attention, and to live in a better environment. Because of the low mortality levels and the generally good health conditions which have characterized American society in recent years, minimum attention has been paid by Jewish scholars to the mortality experience of the American Jewish population. In part this also reflects the difficulty of obtaining the necessary data in the absence of direct information on religion on death certificates. No study on Jewish mortality levels appears to have been conducted since 1970. The few studies undertaken before 1970 were limited both because of their restriction to a small number of communities, and because they were cross-sectional and did not, therefore, provide trend data that might be useful for projections.

Although the specific findings differ somewhat among communities, the general conclusion seems warranted that as recently as the 1960's some differences existed between Jews and the total white population in age specific death rates, life expectancy, and survival patterns—generally more so for males than for females.[17] Jewish age specific death rates were below those of the white population at younger ages, possibly because of a combination of the conditions already outlined which have lowered the susceptibility of Jews to contagious diseases. The particularly lower mortality among Jewish babies under one lends support to this interpretation. Older Jews have a higher mortality than the total white population, which may reflect the possibility that, given the better medical attention they receive at earlier ages and their better ability to survive contagious diseases, more Jews with physically impaired lives survive until later years, when the effects of chronic diseases produce higher death tolls. Data for Providence, R.I., by cause of death, support such an interpretation.[18]

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[16] Salo Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews,* Vol. II (New York, 1937), p. 169.

Again, it is necessary to use caution in interpreting these data, because of their limited coverage of the American Jewish population, as well as their outdated character. It is especially important to recognize that the cross-sectional character of the data provides no basis for projecting future patterns, particularly about the mortality experience of older persons. In the United States in general, minimal changes in mortality are expected. The fact that relatively small differences already existed between Jews and non-Jews in the 1960's, and that these have most likely diminished still further as the socioeconomic environment of Jews and non-Jews and their utilization of health services have become more similar, probably means that future mortality will be even more similar than that observed here. Certainly, the differences observed for the 1960's are not large enough to account for the overall differences in the rate of natural increase of the Jewish population compared to the total population. At the same time, the aging of the Jewish population means that the number of Jewish deaths is likely to rise. To the extent that this happens, the rate of natural increase is likely to decline in the absence of a corresponding rise in births, all the more so if the birthrate should decline. Given these patterns, whatever differential in natural growth characterizes Jews and non-Jews in the future will be largely attributable to variations in levels of fertility.

FERTILITY

The available evidence clearly indicates that throughout American history Jews have had a lower birthrate than non-Jews. Yet, only in very recent years has lower fertility become an openly discussed concern of the Jewish community. In part, this reflects the fact that Jewish fertility, like that of the larger society, has recently declined to a point where continuation at its current levels would lead to zero population growth (ZPG) or possibly even negative population growth (NPG)—reflecting situations wherein births are either equal to or below the number of deaths, thereby leading to stability or decline in population size in the absence of reenforcement from international migration. For Jews this threat of population decline is particularly serious, since it can be exacerbated by losses resulting from intermarriage and assimilation.

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[17] Goldstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 12–15.

[18] Sidney Goldstein, "Jewish Mortality and Survival Patterns: Providence, Rhode Island, 1962–1964," *Eugenics Quarterly*, March 1966, pp. 48–61.

Despite the Biblical injunction to be fruitful and multiply, Jews have had the smallest families of virtually all ethnic and religious groups. As early as the late 19th century, available evidence pointed to a Jewish birthrate which was lower than that of the non-Jewish population; this differential, although narrowing, has persisted to the present.

In the Rhode Island census of 1905, the only state census that obtained information on religion and related it to family size, the average family size of native-born Jewish women was 2.3, compared to an average of 3.2 for native-born Catholics, and 2.5 for native-born Protestants.[19] Studies in the 1930's found Jews to have not only lower fertility, but also higher proportions using contraceptives, planning pregnancies, and relying on more efficient methods to achieve that goal.[20] The 1941 Indianapolis fertility study, a milestone in demographic research in the United States, found the fertility of Jews, controlling for age differences, to be 25 per cent lower than that of Protestants, whereas that of Catholics was about 15 per cent higher.[21]

The results of the 1957 population survey conducted by the United States Bureau of the Census also confirmed the lower fertility of Jews.[22] The cumulative fertility rate (children ever born) of Jewish women 45 years of age and over was 2.2, compared to 3.1 for Catholic women and 2.8 for Protestant women. Lower fertility also characterized Jewish women at younger ages. Moreover, controlling for area of residence, the fertility rate for Jewish women in urban areas was 14 per cent below that of all urban women.

Beginning in the 1950's, a series of surveys was undertaken to investigate the fertility behavior of the American population. Although Jews constituted only a small portion of each of the samples in these surveys, the data clearly pointed to lower Jewish fertility. The 1965 Growth of American Families study showed that the average number of children born by that year to women under age 44 was 2.3 for Protestants and 2.8 for Catholics, compared to only 2.1 for Jews.[23] By the end of childbearing, Jews also expected to have a smaller total number of children (2.9) than either Protestants (3.0) or Catholics (3.9). The similarity between the Protestant and Jewish expected averages is particularly noteworthy in view of earlier observed differences, but expectations may not be fully realized. In a 1970 study, Westoff and Ryder found that among women 35–44 years of age, those at the end of the reproduction period, sharp religious differentials existed.[24] Restricting the comparison to white women, Catholics averaged 3.6 children compared to only 2.9 for Protestants and 2.1 for Jews—a level equivalent to ZPG. The authors also made a distinction between wanted and unwanted children. Only 3 per cent of the Jewish children were reported as unwanted, by far the lowest percentage for all religious groups—a fact that reflects successful fertility control.

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[19] Calculated from *Rhode Island Census of 1905,* "Conjugal Conditions, Maternity Tables," Bulletin IV, part one of the annual report for 1907, Table VII, p. 551.

[20] R.K. Stix and Frank Notestein, *Controlled Fertility* (Baltimore, 1940), p. 29; Raymond Pearl, *The Natural History of Population* (New York, 1939), pp. 241–242.

[21] Pascal K. Whelpton and Clyde V. Kiser, "Differential Fertility Among Native White Couples in Indianapolis," *Social and Psychological Factors Affecting Fertility, I, Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly,* July 1943, pp. 226–271.

[22] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*

Although focusing on a somewhat different population, and using a follow-up approach to their original sample rather than an independent cross-section of the population in successive rounds of interviews, the Princeton Fertility Studies of 1957 and 1960 reached the same conclusions as those reported by GAF.[25] Jews, when compared to Protestants and Catholics, desired fewer children and more successfully planned their pregnancies.

Since the late 1960's, a new set of statistics allows national comparison of the current fertility of Jews and non-Jews.[26] The data collected in the National Natality Surveys of 1967, 1968, and 1969 by the National Center for Health Statistics are based on follow-up interviews with samples of mothers of legitimate births reported on birth certificates in those three years. By combining the data from the three years, it was possible to assemble a sample of 167 Jewish women who gave birth during that period; they constituted 2 per cent of the total sample. Omitted are all childless married women, all mothers of illegitimate children, and all women who did not have a child during 1967–1969. The latter restriction means that the respondents are younger than all married women and that they probably average somewhat more children than the total married.

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[23] Ryder and Westoff, *op. cit.*

[24] Charles F. Westoff and Norman B. Ryder, *The Contraceptive Revolution* (Princeton, 1977).

[25] Westoff, Potter, and Sagi, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Westoff, Potter, Sagi, and Mishler, *op. cit.*, pp. 72–92.

[26] Sidney Goldstein, "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America," in Paul Ritterband, (ed.), *Modern Jewish Fertility* (Leiden, in press).

Use of these data does have the advantage of allowing assessment of current fertility, whereas most of the surveys focus on cumulative fertility. In conjunction with the estimates of Jewish women by age from the NJPS, a variety of basic fertility measures could be computed; these were, in turn, compared with those of the U.S. white population. It must be stressed that the fertility rates calculated represent only very crude estimates, since they are subject to wide sampling errors. However, even when these sampling errors are taken into account, the evidence clearly documents the low fertility of Jews.

During 1967–1969, the crude birthrate for total U.S. whites was 16.8, but only 9.6 for the Jewish population (middle estimates will be used throughout the discussion). Because the age composition of the Jewish and total population is quite different, a better comparison of Jewish and total fertility can be made if age is controlled. As the data in Table 2 show, with the exception of the 25–29 age group, Jewish fertility is consistently below that of the total white population, and usually substantially so. Probably reflecting the later age of marriage of Jewish women, related in part to their tendency to stay in school longer, the birthrate of Jewish women aged 15–19 is only 7.2 per thousand, compared to 59.9 per thousand for the total white population. This differential narrows in the next age group, but the birthrate remains very low for Jewish women. Because of the delay in marriage and consequent delay in fertility, the age specific fertility rate for Jewish women in the 25–29 year age group is actually slightly above that of the total white population. About half of all Jewish births occur to women aged 25–29, and almost three-quarters of total fertility is completed by age 29. Corresponding percentages for the total white population are only 25 and 63 per cent, respectively. The Jewish fertility rate drops precipitously for women aged 30–34, and continues the decline for higher aged groups.

The cumulative effect of these age differences leads to an estimate of an average of 1,468 children per thousand Jewish women at the end of their reproductive cycle, assuming that the 1967–1969 age specific patterns persisted. This contrasts to 2,388 for the total white group. To the extent that 2.1 is the average number of births per woman required for replacement level, these data make it very clear that, unless there are drastic errors in either the birth data or the base population data, Jewish fertility levels were already below replacement during the early 1960's, whereas those for the total whites in those years were still above replacement level. The tremendous differential between the two, approaching the ratio of 2 to 1, is substantial enough to confirm that the difference in the crude rate is not strictly a matter of age composition, but also reflects a very real difference in fertility behavior between Jews and the total population.

Replacements can be measured more clearly through use of the net reproduction rate, which shows the number of daughters who would be

TABLE 2. COMPARATIVE MEASURES OF FERTILITY, JEWISH AND TOTAL WHITE UNITED STATES POPULATIONS, 1967–1969

	Jewish Population*			
	Low Population Base	Medium Population Base	High Population Base	U.S. White Population
Crude Birthrate	9.9	9.6	9.2	16.8
General Fertility Rate	48.1	46.2	44.5	82.3
Total Fertility Rate	1,527.5	1,467.5	1,412.5	2,388.0
Net Reproduction Rate	722.5	694.2	668.2	1,143.6
Age Specific Birthrates				
15–19	7.5	7.2	6.9	55.9
20–24	63.2	60.8	58.4	164.1
25–29	153.0	147.0	141.5	141.0
30–34	60.3	57.9	55.8	73.7
35–39	17.5	16.8	16.2	34.0
40–44	4.0	3.8	3.7	8.9

*Based on population estimates from National Jewish Population Study, 1970–1971, and on fertility estimates from the 1967–1969 National Natality Surveys.

Low Population Estimate = 5,550,000
Medium Population Estimate = 5,775,000
High Population Estimate = 6,000,000

born to a thousand women passing through their reproductive years, subject to both current age specific fertility rates and current mortality patterns. In general, a net reproduction rate of a thousand indicates that the women will produce enough daughters to exactly replace themselves; a rate below a thousand is indicative of inadequate replacement. Based on the assumption that Jewish mortality and that of the U.S. white population are quite similar, the net reproduction rate for Jews is shown to be between 668 and 722 per thousand, compared to 1,144 per thousand for the total white population. The net reproduction rate thus confirms what has already been indicated by the other measures, i.e., that the replacement level of Jews is far below that of the total white population, and also considerably below the level needed to insure growth if 1967–1969 rates persist.

The restriction of the National Natality Survey data to women actually having children during the specified years argues for the exploitation of complementary data which allow assessment of cumulative fertility. Some limited insights into this can be obtained from data available from the

National Opinion Research Census (NORC) annual surveys. By combining the data from the 1972 through 1975 surveys, it was possible to obtain 89 ever married Jewish women in all age groups over 18.[27] These women had averaged 2.0 children up to the time of the survey, compared to 2.7 for both Protestants and Catholics. Among women aged 40–49, the age group at the end of childbearing, corresponding averages were 2.4, 3.4, and 3.6 for Jews, Protestants, and Catholics, respectively. The pattern of lower Jewish fertility is reflected dramatically in the parity data. About equal percentages of all religious groups were childless, but 70 per cent of the Jewish women had 2 or fewer children, compared to only 53 per cent of the Protestants and 52 per cent of the Catholics. By contrast, 16 and 17 per cent, respectively, of Protestant and Catholic women had 5 or more children, compared to only 1 per cent of the Jews. Regardless of the index used, therefore, the NORC data, which reflect cumulative fertility behavior rather than current performance or expected future levels, point to consistently lower Jewish fertility compared to that of non-Jews.

The evidence available from 15 Jewish community studies encompassing the period 1953–1976 also points to lower Jewish fertility (Table 3). These data measure fertility by comparing the number of children under 5 years of age per 1,000 women aged 20–44. Particularly noteworthy is the observation that five of the seven communities which took surveys before 1960 reported child-woman ratios above 500, whereas none of the surveys taken since 1960 have done so; and the ratios for three of the four communities surveyed in the 1970's display the lowest of all, below 400, and in the case of Greater Kansas City only 231. That this low fertility is typical of the national scene is indicated by the NJPS data for 1970–1971 which reveal a child-woman ratio for Jews of only 352, some 27 per cent below the 1970 national average of 485 for the white 1970 urban population.

Also using data from the NJPS, Della Pergola has undertaken what constitutes one of the most comprehensive assessments yet completed of fertility patterns among the Jewish population of the United States as a whole.[28] The large sample size, consisting of 5,303 ever married females age 15 and over, allows much more in-depth study, despite some concern about the coverage of the NJPS, than any other national sample. The exploitation of the retrospective fertility history information collected in the survey enhances the richness of the analysis undertaken. The findings of the analysis basically confirm the insights gained in other studies.

Throughout the period covered by the analysis, Jewish fertility was consistently lower than among total whites, varying from a ratio of 69 Jewish

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[27] General Social Surveys, 1972 through 1975, conducted by National Opinion Research Center, Roper Research Center, Inc., Williamstown, Mass.

[28] Sergio Della Pergola, "Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," mimeographed paper, Jerusalem, 1979.

TABLE 3. JEWISH CHILD-WOMAN RATIO: NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER AGE 5 TO NUMBER OF WOMEN AGED 20–44, SELECTED COMMUNITIES

Community	Year	Fertility Ratio
New Orleans, La.	1953	496
Lynn, Mass.	1955	528
Canton, Ohio	1955	469
Des Moines, Iowa	1956	596
Worcester, Mass.	1957	525
New Orleans, La.	1958	510
Los Angeles, Calif.	1959	560
South Bend, Ind.	1961	494
Rochester, N. Y.	1961	489
Providence, R. I.	1963	450
Camden, N. J.	1964	480
Springfield, Mass.	1966	418
Columbus, Ohio	1969	444
Dallas, Texas	1972	304
Minneapolis, Minn.	1972	436
Houston, Texas	1975	342
Greater Kansas City	1976	231
National Jewish Population Study	1971	352
U.S. white urban population	1960	635
U.S. white urban population	1970	485
U.S. white metropolitan population	1975	360

Sources: Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB, Vol. 72, 1971.

Betty J. Maynard, *The Dallas Jewish Community Study* (Dallas, 1974).

Judith B. Erickson and Mitchel J. Lazarus, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis* (Minneapolis, 1973).

Sam Shulman, David Gottlieb, and Sheila Sheinberg, *A Sociological and Demographic Survey of the Jewish Community of Houston, Texas* (Houston, 1976).

The Jewish Population Study of the Greater Kansas City Area (Kansas City, 1977).

births per 100 white births in about 1930, to a high of 87 in 1945, and declining thereafter to only 68 in 1965, when the total Jewish fertility rate was again below replacement level. As Della Pergola notes, "Jewish fertility levels basically followed over time the general fluctuations of the total whites, but patterns of response to period societal change were relatively earlier, sharper, and faster as appropriate to a nearly perfectly contracepting population."[29] The most recent cohorts were unmistakably directed towards increasingly lower fertility, even though young ever married women indicate an expectation to slightly surpass replacement levels; these expectations seem unrealistically high, given other patterns observed.

Della Pergola also notes considerable variation in fertility levels of different marriage and birth cohorts, but these generally occur within the boundaries of lower fertility. He also suggests, however, that there may be a "minimum" level below which families are unwilling to lower their fertility, providing societal circumstances are not too exacting. What seems to vary more among cohorts than the absolute differences in average number of children born (which generally varies within a range of one child) is the tempo of childbearing which is affected by age of woman at marriage, duration of marriage, and societal circumstances.

The detailed analysis leads Della Pergola to conclude that "long-term American cycles of socio-demographic change stimulated a multi-faceted Jewish demographic response. This included, during the more adverse years, non-marriage, later marriage, more frequent childlessness, fewer children per mother, longer birth intervals, and later termination of childbearing. After World War II, trends were quite similarly reversed for the different components of Jewish family formation, although relatively late marriage and low fertility generally characterize the entire period."[30]

A final set of data, whose major attractiveness is its currency and national coverage, but which includes only a small number of Jews, is the National Survey of Family Growth sponsored by the federal government.[31] The results of the first survey, conducted in 1973–1974, showed that for the white population of the United States the number of children ever born was 2,180, but the average for Jews was only 1,914 (Table 4). If the comparison is in terms of total children expected, the Jewish average of 2,356 per thousand was 15 per cent below the total white average of 2,783. Perhaps more significantly, Jewish women aged 20–24 expected to have 1,569 children per thousand women, a number 32 per cent below the 2,313 expected by all white women, and well below replacement level. Only among women aged 35 and older was the average number of children expected above replacement level; yet even these averages were only 0.4 to 0.6 children above replacement level, and well below the averages of the total population.

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[29] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

[31] Gordon Scott Bonham, "Expected Size of Completed Family Among Currently Married Women 15–44 Years of Age: United States, 1973," *Advancedata*, August 1977.

Lower Jewish fertility is also reflected by the fact that only 15 per cent of all Jewish women aged 15–29 were pregnant, seeking to become pregnant, or in a post-partum status at the time of the survey, compared to 23 and 26 per cent, respectively, of the white Protestant and Catholic married women in the same age range.[32] These data indicate, too, the high levels of fertility control characterizing Jews: 91 per cent of all currently married Jewish women 15–44 years of age were practicing contraception or were

TABLE 4. TOTAL NUMBER OF CHILDREN EVER BORN AND TOTAL BIRTHS EXPECTED PER 1,000 CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN AGED 15–44, BY AGE AND RELIGION: UNITED STATES, 1973

Religion	15–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	All Ages
			Children Ever Born				
Protestant	482	928	1,670	2,548	2,993	3,169	2,158
Catholic	471	888	1,773	2,727	3,273	3,546	2,359
Jewish	*	*	994	2,058	2,510	2,733	1,914
Other, none	*	1,035	1,025	2,103	2,471	2,510	1,467
All women	479	921	1,651	2,575	3,054	3,251	2,180
			Births Expected				
Protestant	2,246	2,260	2,402	2,798	3,088	3,198	2,710
Catholic	2,790	2,514	2,650	3,138	3,476	3,632	3,057
Jewish	*	1,569	2,094	2,058	2,583	2,771	2,356
Other, none	2,020	2,117	2,002	2,553	2,680	2,586	2,257
All women	2,376	2,313	2,445	2,879	3,183	3,297	2,783

*Figure does not meet standards of reliability.

Source: Gordon Scott Bonham, "Expected Size of Completed Family Among Currently Married Women 15–44 Years of Age: United States, 1973," *Advancedata*, August, 1977.

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[32] Kathleen Ford, "Contraceptive Use in the United States, 1973," *Vital and Health Statistics*, Series 23 (forthcoming).

sterilized at the time of the 1973 survey. This level contrasted to 79 per cent of the white Protestant women and 73 per cent of the white Catholic women.

The low levels of Jewish fertility observed in these various studies strongly suggest that Jews continue to have highly favorable attitudes toward family planning, and to be highly successful in the use of contraceptives. In a period of generally declining fertility, the fertility of Jews may be lower still. Goldscheider and Uhlenberg have argued that the "characteristics" approach, which attempts to explain the lower Jewish fertility by the social and economic characteristics that distinguish Jews from non-Jews, falls short of supplying a full explanation for the differential.[33] They maintain that attention must also be given to the minority position of Jews and to the cross-culturally shared Jewish values that have helped to account for lower Jewish fertility in the past and in widely different societies. Perceptions of discrimination, feelings of insecurity, and values particularly conducive to fewer children may continue to contribute to lower Jewish fertility.

Thus, although Jewish fertility may foreshadow the patterns of other groups as we move into the era of the perfect contraceptive population, Jews may still continue to be characterized by lower levels of fertility because of other social-psychological factors associated with the still unique position of Jews in the larger society. That the already low Jewish fertility levels have evidently declined even further as part of the national pattern suggests that the motives for small families reflect a complex combination of factors involving both conditions unique to the Jews and those shared with the larger population. Even though Jewish community leaders have spoken out against ZPG and in favor of higher Jewish fertility in order to compensate for losses through intermarriage and avoid declines in aggregate numbers, American Jews have shown little evidence of reversing their exceptionally low fertility levels.

At the same time, it seems apparent that, as among the general population, the number of Jewish singles has increased in recent years. In part this reflects higher levels of enrollment in college and graduate school, later age at marriage, changes in life style that involve more frequent sharing of households while unmarried, and higher divorce rates. This comparatively new development has implications both for fertility levels and for the vitality of the Jewish family, which has been a mainstay of the community's strength and survival. To date, the community and its institutions continue to experiment with various methods by which to insure maintenance of

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[33] Calvin Goldscheider and Peter R. Uhlenberg, "Minority Group Status and Fertility," *American Journal of Sociology*, January 1969, pp. 361–372.

Jewish identification on the part of this segment of the population.[34]

It will be interesting to observe, if general fertility levels should rise in the next decade as some experts predict,[35] whether Jews participate in the upward swing. Past patterns suggest that, if they do, it will not be to the same extent as the general population. As Cohen has recently suggested, the factors helping to explain the low Jewish birthrate—including higher divorce and separation rates, later age at marriage and possible rises in levels of celibacy, increased extra-familial activity, higher education levels, greater secularism, and higher rates of intermarriage—should serve to reenforce low fertility levels.[36]

For the immediate future, and most likely for the longer run as well, therefore, available evidence points to birth levels among Jews which are inadequate to insure growth, especially when viewed in conjunction with possible losses through intermarriage and assimilation. There seems little prospect that the total Jewish population of the United States will rise above 6 million in the foreseeable future. The chances are much more likely that it will stabilize or move toward 5 million, and possibly go even lower. Moreover, the losses in population resulting from ZPG or NPG take on added significance because they will also produce changes in the age composition of the Jewish population, reducing the percentage of youths and increasing that of the aged. Before turning to questions of composition, however, attention needs to be given to the other components of change: intermarriage, assimilation, and migration.

INTERMARRIAGE

In contrast to the recentness of concern about the levels of Jewish fertility, interest in the levels and impact of intermarriage has a much longer history. Particular importance was attached to intermarriage, not so much because it was seen as a threat to the demographic maintenance of American Jewry, but because it was viewed as an index of the loss of Jewish identification, and as a threat to the social and religious cohesiveness of the community. Yet, if marital assimilation takes place at a high rate, the Jewish group faces demographic losses both through the assimilation of the Jewish partner in the marriage and through the loss of children born to such a marriage. Thus, it is not surprising (particularly in the face of earlier evidence that Jews had been remarkably successful, compared to other groups, in maintaining religious endogamy) that a variety of evidence suggesting an increasing rate of intermarriage has set off alarm bells in the Jewish community.

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[34] Cf., New York *Times*, April 2, 1976.

[35] Ronald Lee, "Demographic Forecasting and the Easterlin Hypothesis," *Population and Development Review*, 1976, p. 459.

[36] Steven Cohen, "Renascence or Oblivion," paper presented at meeting of Task Force on Jewish Population, New York, September 19, 1977.

Regrettably, the quality of the information that we have on the rates of intermarriage and its impact on identity is still poor; we lack a clear picture of the overall situation. The evidence suggests that the level of intermarriage and its impact vary considerably depending on community size, location, and social cohesiveness. Complications are also introduced by the manner in which intermarriage is measured. Studies relying exclusively on current religious identification of marriage partners run the risk of undercounting intermarriages, since those partners to a mixed marriage who have changed their religion in conjunction with the marriage would not be identified as having intermarried. This problem can be compounded by fairly loose definitions of who is regarded as a Jew. At the other extreme, the rate of intermarriage may be inflated if the criterion for religious identification is the ancestry of individuals rather than their personal life histories.

Despite these measurement problems, the evidence clearly points to an increased rate of Jewish intermarriage. A number of communities surveyed in the late 1950's and 1960's showed levels of intermarriage between 5 and 10 per cent—levels which differed only minimally from those observed in communities surveyed in the 1930's. The March 1957 sample survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census found that only 3.8 per cent of married persons reporting themselves as Jews were married to non-Jews, and that 7.2 per cent of all marriages in which at least one partner was Jewish were intermarriages.[37] Both of these statistics are probably somewhat low, since no information was collected on the earlier religion of the marriage partners. Yet the 1950's and 1960's also produced studies that revealed intermarriage rates as high as 17 per cent in New York City, 37 per cent in Marin County, California, and 54 per cent in Iowa.[38]

Eric Rosenthal's analysis of intermarriage among the Jewish population of Washington, D.C. in 1956 aroused serious anxiety concerning the threat which intermarriage posed to the demographic survival of the Jewish population.[39] This anxiety grew out of his observation that the rate of intermarriage increased from 1.4 per cent among foreign-born husbands, to 10.2 per cent among second-generation men, and up to 17.9 per cent among husbands of third- and higher-order generation status. The possibility that these generation differentials reflected a trend toward rising levels of

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[37] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*

[38] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[39] Eric Rosenthal, "Studies of Jewish Intermarriages in the United States," AJYB, Vol. 64, 1963, pp. 34–51.

intermarriage was reinforced by data emanating from other community studies, such as Providence and Springfield,[40] even though the levels of intermarriage were lower than those for Washington. The 1965 Boston survey also suggested a sharp rise in the level of intermarriage among the very youngest segment of the population; in contrast to a 3 per cent level of intermarriage among couples in which the age of the husband was 51 and over, 20 per cent of the couples in which the husband was 30 years old or younger were intermarried.[41] Interestingly, the 1975 Boston survey also found 3 per cent of couples in which the age of the husband was 50 and over to have been intermarried; but the rate had risen to 26 per cent of those under 30 years of age.[42] The sharpest increase occurred in the intermediary age groups. In contrast to 7 per cent of those with the husband between ages 31 and 50 who were intermarried in 1965, 22 per cent of those in the 30–49 age range in 1975 were intermarried. The lesser rise for the youngest age group may reflect the high percentage in that age group who are still unmarried, and that intermarriage occurs somewhat later.

The NJPS provided the first nationwide set of comprehensive data on Jewish intermarriage patterns.[43] Since it ascertained the religious identity of the marriage partners at the time they met, it allowed fuller assessment of intermarriage than did the census data. The NJPS found that 9.2 per cent of all Jewish persons married at the time of the survey were intermarried. This level was not unusually high; what was "shocking" about the NJPS findings was the analysis of intermarriage in terms of marriage cohorts. This analysis determined that the level of intermarriage rose from 2 per cent of those individuals who had married between 1900 and 1920, to 6 per cent of those marrying between 1940 and 1960, and increased precipitously thereafter to 17 per cent of the 1960–1965 marriage cohort and 32 per cent of those marrying in the five years preceding the survey.

In the absence of a full evaluation of the NJPS data and of supporting evidence from independent sources attesting to the validity of this very high level of intermarriage, its exactness must be questioned. There seems little doubt, however, that the finding does justify the conclusion, based on reports by rabbis, newspapers, and other sources, that the level of intermarriage has risen very substantially in recent years. This is undoubtedly related to the increasing proportion of the population that is now third-generation, and has moved away from older areas of dense Jewish population to newly developed, more integrated areas within both the cities and suburbs; to the very high proportion of Jewish youth enrolled in colleges and universities; to the entrance of Jews into occupations and social groups which earlier had been closed to them; to the generally greater freedom and integration which Jews have enjoyed in American society in recent years; and to the increasing secularization and weakening of tradition among younger Jews. Whether these conditions will lead to still further increases in intermarriage, or whether a plateau may have been reached, has not been ascertained. To answer this question, comparative data of the type emanating from the Boston study are needed.

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[40] Sidney Goldstein, *The Greater Providence Jewish Community: A Population Survey* (Providence, 1964); Sidney Goldstein, *A Population Survey of the Greater Springfield Jewish Community* (Springfield, 1968).

[41] Morris Axelrod, Floyd J. Fowler, and Arnold Gurin, *A Community Survey for Long Range Planning: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1967).

[42] Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston* (Boston, 1977), pp. 66–67.

[43] Massarik and Chenkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 292–306.

Whether the effects of intermarriage on demographic growth are serious may largely be determined by the extent of conversion to Judaism on the part of the non-Jewish partner to such marriages, as well as by the extent to which children born to such marriages are raised as Jews. Obviously, counts such as this for purposes of measuring the demographic outcome may not do justice to the effect of intermarriage on Jewish identification and religiosity *per se,* which constitute other significant dimensions of the intermarriage question. Considerable evidence does exist, however, suggesting that a substantial part of the threat of high levels of intermarriage to demographic survival is reduced by comparatively high rates of conversion to Judaism and of children being raised as Jews.

When attention was given to these questions as part of the 1963 Providence survey, for example, it was found that of all the intermarried couples, 42 per cent had experienced the conversion of one partner to Judaism, thereby creating religious homogeneity within the family unit.[44] Even more significantly, perhaps, the proportion of persons converting increased with decreasing age, a finding consistent with that of many other studies. The 1975 Boston survey did not find as high a level of conversion; those data indicate that only about 10 per cent of all the intermarriages of males 30–49 years of age at the time of the survey resulted in a conversion of the non-Jewish partner.[45] The NJPS found that in 27 per cent of the intermarriages in which the husband was originally Jewish, the wife converted; however, among those couples in which it was the wife who was originally Jewish, only 2.5 per cent of the husbands converted.[46] An interesting finding of the NJPS is that a very substantial percentage of non-Jewish partners in intermarriages identify themselves as Jews even though they have not officially converted. This was true of 46 per cent of the non-Jewish wives and 44 per cent of the non-Jewish husbands.

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[44] Goldstein, *The Greater Providence Jewish Community, op. cit.,* pp. 186–187.

[45] Fowler, *op. cit.*

[46] Massarik and Chenkin, *op. cit.,* pp. 296–297.

The same questions can be raised from the point of view of the religion in which the children of intermarriages are reared. According to the 1963 Providence survey, 78 per cent of the 280 children born to intermarried couples were being raised as Jews. This contrasted very sharply to the 70 per cent of the children of mixed marriages being raised as non-Jews according to Rosenthal's Washington survey. The NJPS found a high proportion of children of intermarriage being raised as Jews: 63 per cent of the children of Jewish fathers and 98 per cent of those of Jewish mothers.

Overall, therefore, the evidence suggests that although the rate of intermarriage has increased sharply, a substantial proportion of these intermarriages result in the conversion of the non-Jewish spouse to Judaism, while an even larger number result in the non-Jewish spouse identifying as Jewish. Moreover, the rate of conversion seems to be higher among the very groups having a higher intermarriage rate. Furthermore, a significant proportion of children from such marriages are evidently being raised as Jews. Finally, evidence from several studies indicates that the fertility patterns of intermarried couples are coming to reflect those of the non-intermarried, whereas older groups had a much stronger tendency to have significantly lower fertility.[47] Taken together, these changes suggest that the net effects of intermarriage on the overall size of the Jewish population may not be as serious as the rates of intermarriage themselves suggest. The effect of intermarriage on Jewish identification and religiosity may be a different matter, and these concerns can certainly have long run implications for the demographic variables.

Reflecting the continuing concern with the impact of intermarriage on Jewish demography and identity, the American Jewish Committee in 1976–1977 sponsored an eight-city study focusing on Intermarriage and the Jewish Future, directed by Egon Mayer.[48] Defining intermarriage broadly as a marriage between any individual born Jewish and one who was not, the study population encompassed 446 intermarried couples in Cleveland, Dallas, Long Island, Los Angeles, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Westchester. Given the *ad hoc* character of the selection of the respondent couples (largely through reliance on local informants) and high rates of non-response, the results cannot be regarded as representative of all intermarried couples. Furthermore, the absence of any control groups of Jewish homogamous marriages precludes direct comparisons with the characteristics of the non-intermarried as well as calculation of rates of intermarriage.

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[47] Sidney Goldstein and Calvin Goldscheider, *Jewish Americans: Three Generations in a Jewish Community* (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), pp. 168–169.

[48] Egon Mayer, "Patterns of Intermarriage Among American Jews: Varieties, Uniformities, Dilemmas, and Prospects," mimeographed report, New York, 1978.

Typical of previous findings, two-thirds of the intermarried consisted of a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman. Interestingly, the ratio was lower in the younger age group, suggesting that higher rates of intermarriage may come to characterize women as their educational and occupational patterns more closely resemble those of men. The effect of the women's liberation movement, and the deficits in potential Jewish husbands under conditions of high intermarriage rates, may also lead to a closer balance in the ratio of male and female intermarriage rates. If this does not happen, it could well lead to a growing proportion of Jewish women who remain unmarried due to the lack of available Jewish spouses.

In this population study, just over one-quarter of the not-born-Jewish respondents had converted to Judaism, whereas only 3 per cent of the Jews had converted out. The finding that rates of conversion were highest in the youngest age group (one-third of those aged 20–29 compared to one-fourth of those aged 30–49, and only one-fifth of those aged 50–59) again lends support to earlier evidence that higher rates of conversion prevail among groups with the highest intermarriage rates. About 80 per cent of the Jewish spouses in marriages in which the other spouse had converted considered their children Jewish, compared to about one-third of the Jewish spouses in mixed marriages.

Overall, the study concludes that intermarriage represents a threat to Jewish continuity, as evidenced by the low conversion rate, the low level of Jewish conduct and practice in mixed marriages, the low proportion of children regarded as Jewish, and the fact that most of the children are not socialized as Jews. Strong stress is therefore placed on the need for outreach programs designed to provide more formal and informal opportunities to enhance the Jewish content of the family life of the intermarried, and especially to strengthen the likelihood that children will identify as Jews. Most provocative is Mayer's suggestion that a new category of "naturalized" Jew be established to allow those who have not converted to identify more formally with the Jewish people and thereby confer a sense of legitimacy to the non-converted spouse as a way of strengthening the Jewish identity of the family.

Together, the results of the varied studies reviewed here confirm that the problem of intermarriage warrants considerable concern on both the policy and research levels. That it is receiving such attention is evidenced by recent calls by such community leaders as Rabbi Alexander Schindler of the Reform movement to reverse the practice of centuries and begin a drive to convert the unchurched to Judaism.[49] He especially argues for conversion of the non-Jewish partner in an impending marriage and for removal of the

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[49] Providence *Sunday Journal,* December 3, 1978.

"not-wanted signs" that make non-Jewish spouses feel alienated. It needs to be stressed, however, that from a demographic perspective, attention to intermarriage certainly should not exclude concern about the impact of fertility and population redistribution on the size of Jewish population and on the quality of Jewish identification. Concurrently, the Jewish community needs to take heed of the words of Marshall Sklare:

> A more realistic confrontation is necessary, and that requires a much larger body of research than we now possess on the current rate of intermarriage in the country as a whole. It also requires much more information about the Jews who intermarry and about the causes and consequences of their doing so. So, too, there is a need for studies to evaluate the various methods in use to combat intermarriage, particularly those involving Jewish education. And demographic research will have to be done at regular intervals so that a reliable trend-line can be established.[50]

ASSIMILATION

If attempts to assess the demographic consequences of intermarriage on Jews are difficult, attempts to evaluate the impact of assimilation are almost impossible. To some extent, the problem is illustrated by the experience of the NJPS. To qualify a household for inclusion in the NJPS at least one person within it was required to be "Jewish." By intent, a broad definition of Jewish was used;[51] the respondent had to provide an affirmative reply, for himself or for one or more household members, to at least one of the following questions: 1) was person born Jewish? 2) is person Jewish now? 3) was person's father born Jewish? 4) was person's mother born Jewish? Clearly, a more narrow or halakhic definition would exclude certain households, some of whose members may, however, satisfy sociological (ideological and/or behavioral) definitions of Jewishness. It was on the basis of a broad definition of a Jewish household as one including one or more Jewish persons that the NJPS reached the estimate of 5,800,000 Jews in 1971. But as was noted earlier, if non-Jewish persons in such households (including non-Jewish spouses and children not being raised as Jews) are excluded, the total number of Jewish residents in households is reduced to 5,370,000, almost a 10 per cent reduction.

The use of a loose definition of Jewishness has particular implications for the study of intermarriage. In his assessment of intermarriage, using NJPS data, Massarik distinguishes between "typical intermarriage" (in which either the husband or the wife was Jewish at the time the couple met) and "marginal intermarriage" (in which one or both partners expressed no preference concerning religious viewpoint at the time of initial meeting, noted the existence of some Jewish familial or ancestral roots, but affirmed either only vague relatedness to Jewishness or none at all).[52] Massarik's analysis does not indicate the numerical division between these groups, but it could well be that the high rates of intermarriage he noted are partially a function of the inclusion of "marginal intermarriages" in the total.

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[50] Marshall Sklare, "Intermarriage and the Jewish Future," *Commentary*, April 1964, p. 52.

[51] National Jewish Population Study, *National and Regional Population Counts*, New York, 1974, p. 6.

The problems encountered by the NJPS and comparable surveys clearly document the difficulties in determining for survey purposes who constitutes a Jew. The halakhic definition is too simple for the sociologist and demographer, particularly for analysis of assimilation. Yet, the possibility is very limited of identifying clearly those individuals who were born Jews but who do not identify themselves as such; even the NJPS may not have succeeded in identifying a representative sample of such persons in its survey, despite the wide net that was thrown out.

Some limited insights about assimilation have come from studies of college students who have "dropped out" from Judaism. A study of Jewish seniors in 1961 found that about 13 per cent had apostatized, while in 1969, 21 per cent of the graduates reported no religious preference. Comparison of freshmen in 1965 and 1972 surveys shows a rise in the number who expressed no religious preference from 13 to 18 per cent. However, it is not at all clear whether such individuals, if approached in a general population survey, would or would not report themselves as Jewish; therefore these data have only very limited value. All that one can conclude is that the same general conditions in society which have led to a rise in intermarriage also probably lead to substantial rates of dropouts; there is little basis for believing that the rate will decline in the foreseeable future.[53]

A study designed to assess assimilation was recently undertaken in Los Angeles.[54] Based on 413 respondents selected from a canvas of 5,000 households, the analysis concludes that intermarriage, a reduced birthrate, and the decline of Jewish neighborhoods are contributing to the assimilation of the nearly half-million Jews of Los Angeles. This was compounded by declining rates of affiliation and involvement in Jewish religious and secular organizations. The authors also find that "at the same time, the picture that emerges from the survey is of a vibrant people whose closest personal associations are with other Jews in their family, friendship, and occupational groupings." They further note that "one of the most significant changes in Jewish life in the last generation is the way in which Jews act out their Jewishness. Whereas only 18 per cent see being Jewish as primarily religious, 61 per cent perceive of Jews as an ethnic-cultural group." This was seen as "a dramatic shift from formal religious involvement to ethnic and cultural commitment." As a result, the challenge for Jewish leaders is seen as the need to adapt their institutions to the increasingly informal expressions that are becoming more common.

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[52] Massarik and Chenkin, *op. cit.*

[53] Cohen, *op. cit.*

[54] Neil C. Sandberg and Gene N. Levine, as summarized in *News from the Committee,* American Jewish Committee, November 21, 1979.

Overall, one can raise the questions whether assimilation is, in fact, an especially new phenomenon in Jewish history. We know that crusades, inquisitions, and pogroms all took a heavy toll of the Jewish population, but these occurrences in themselves were probably inadequate to account for the tremendous loss in numbers that must have occurred if only 16.7 million Jews were alive just before the Holocaust. Many, quite clearly, were also lost through assimilation and intermarriage. Yet then, as now, any attempt to approximate the losses sustained through "dropouts" would be sheer guesswork. It is likely to remain so for many years to come.

MIGRATION AND POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION

Jewish history might easily be written in terms of migration and resettlement, from the days of Abraham's move to Canaan to the recent exodus of Jews from the Soviet Union. Yet, in the United States the large majority of immigrants arriving between 1880 and 1924 tended to be quite stable geographically. They settled in communities, often ports of entry, where there was a need for their labor in various industries. Subsequently many immigrants went into business for themselves, but while socially and economically mobile, they and often their children remained in the same city all their lives. This pattern now seems to be undergoing significant change. Because Jews are increasingly third- and fourth-generation residents of the United States, and are more highly educated than ever before, they enjoy the widest possible range of occupational choices. But the kinds of education which Jews are seeking, and the kinds of jobs for which their high education qualifies them, very often require geographic dispersion—movement away from family and out of centers of Jewish population concentration. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that many high-level jobs require repeated movement, so that individuals and families have no opportunity to plant deep roots in any single Jewish community.

Regional Distribution

Estimates indicate that in 1900, 57 per cent of American Jewry lived in the Northeast, in contrast to 28 per cent of the total American population; and virtually all of the Jews in the Northeast were in New York, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey (Table 5). New York alone accounted for about 40 per cent of the national total. The North Central region accounted for the next largest number of Jews—about one-fourth—with most concentrated in Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan. By contrast, one-third of the total U.S. population lived in this region in 1900. Compared to the general population, Jews were also underrepresented in the South, where 14 per cent were located, largely in Maryland. Florida at that time had only 3,000 Jews. The proportion of Jews in the West in 1900 was identical to that of the general population, just over 5 per cent.

The continued mass immigration from Eastern Europe during the first decades of the 20th century resulted in a fourfold increase in the Jewish population of the country between 1900 and 1930; and it became even more concentrated in the large cities of the Northeast, especially New York. By 1930 the Northeast region contained 68 per cent of the American Jewish population and most of it lived in New York. The other regions of the country all contained smaller proportions of the Jewish population than they had in 1900, with the sharpest change occurring in the South. The Far West continued to be the region with the smallest percentage of Jews, although the proportion of the total American population living in the Western states doubled between 1900 and 1930. Jews had clearly not yet joined the Western movement on the same scale as had the rest of the population.

By 1979 the pattern had changed considerably, reflecting both the cutoff in large-scale immigration and increasing internal mobility. Jews in large measure seem to have followed the pattern of redistribution characterizing the population as a whole; in fact, they may have been doing so to an exaggerated degree. For example, between 1930 and 1979, the percentage of Jews living in the Northeast declined from 68 to 58 per cent. This was a larger percentage decrease in absolute points than those characterizing the general population (see Table 5). The drop was even more substantial for the North Central states, where Jews decreased from 20 per cent of the national total in 1930 to only 12 per cent in 1979. In contrast, both the South and the West contained growing proportions of the total U.S. Jewish population, reflecting the strong participation of Jews in the shift to the Sun Belt and to the Western states. Between 1930 and 1979, the South's share more than doubled, and that of the West tripled. The growth of the Jewish population in the South is illustrated by the experience of the Orlando metropolitan area. In 1966 it included only 600 Jews; by 1977 the Jewish

TABLE 5. DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL UNITED STATES AND JEWISH POPULATION, BY REGIONS, 1900, 1930, 1968, AND 1979

	1900		1930[c]		1968[d]		1979[e]	
Region	Jewish[a]	United States[b]	Jewish	United States	Jewish	United States	Jewish	United States
Northeast	56.6	27.7	68.3	27.9	64.0	24.2	57.9	22.5
New England	7.4	7.5	8.4	6.6	6.8	5.7	6.6	5.6
Middle Atlantic	49.2	20.3	59.9	21.3	57.1	18.5	51.3	16.9
North Central	23.7	34.6	19.6	31.4	12.5	27.8	11.9	26.7
East North Central	18.3	21.0	15.7	20.5	10.2	19.8	9.6	18.9
West North Central	5.4	13.6	3.9	10.9	2.3	8.0	2.3	7.8
South	14.2	32.2	7.6	30.7	10.3	31.2	15.8	32.4
South Atlantic	8.0	13.7	4.3	12.8	8.1	15.0	13.5	15.9
East South Central	3.3	9.9	1.4	8.0	0.7	6.6	0.7	6.4
West South Central	2.9	8.6	1.9	9.9	1.5	9.6	1.7	10.1
West	5.5	5.4	4.6	10.0	13.2	16.8	14.3	18.4
Mountain	2.3	2.2	1.0	3.0	0.9	4.0	1.8	4.7
Pacific	3.2	3.2	3.6	7.0	12.2	12.8	12.5	13.7
Total United States								
Per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number (in 1,000s)	1,058	75,994	4,228	123,203	5,869	199,861	5,861	218,059

[a] "Jewish Statistics," AJYB, Vol.1, 1900, pp. 623–624.

[b] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population,* Vol. 1, *Characteristics of the Population* (Washington, D.C., 1961), pp. 1–16.

[c] H. S. Linfield, "Statistics of Jews," AJYB, Vol. 33, 1931, p. 276.

[d] Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States," AJYB, Vol. 70, 1969, p. 266.

[e] Alvin Chenkin and Maynard Miran, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1979," AJYB, Vol. 80, 1980, p. 163.

population of Orlando had reached 11,000, and it is projected to rise to over 20,000 by 1985.[55] Although the South and the West continued to contain proportionally fewer Jews than it did members of the general population, the differences in distribution had considerably narrowed.

Thus, by 1979 the greater mobility of the Jews had resulted in patterns of distribution throughout the country that resembled somewhat more closely those of the general population. These similarities are likely to become accentuated in the future, as Jews increasingly enter occupations requiring mobility because of the limited opportunities available in particular areas, as family ties become less important for third-generation Jews than they had been for the first- and second-generation, and as more Jews no longer feel it necessary to live in areas of high Jewish density. In an ecological sense, therefore, the population will become a more truly "American population," with all this implies in terms of assimilation and numerical visibility.

At the same time, the Middle Atlantic subregion, and the New York area in particular, remains a very large and obviously dynamic center of American Jewry. Over half of the American Jewish population was still concentrated in the Middle Atlantic states in 1979, and two out of these three million persons lived in Greater New York. Yet even here changes were occurring: the estimates of Jewish population prepared for the AJYB show a decline in the Jewish population of Greater New York from 2.38 million in 1972 to just under 2.00 million in 1979.[56] In part this may reflect an artifact of the system of estimating the population; but it may also reflect the impact of changing rates of natural increase and out-migration from the New York area. The AJYB statistics show a decline in the Jewish population of New York City from 1.84 million in 1972 to 1.23 million in 1979, and even this is considered an overestimate, with 1 million probably being a more realistic statistic. This decline reflects both the change in enumeration procedures, partly related to the estimates derived from the NJPS, and the impact of changing distribution patterns. There seems little doubt, however, that the concentration of Jews in the Northeast corridor focusing on New York is likely to undergo substantial change in future years as increasing numbers of Jews leave this section of the country.

This process of dispersal is documented by an analysis of the changing geographic distribution of American Jews between 1952 and 1971, based on data from the AJYB.[57] The heavy residential concentration of the Jewish population is demonstrated by the fact that only 504 of the 3,073 populated counties of the continental United States contain at least 100 Jews; most of these are metropolitan counties and most are in the Northeast. More interesting, however, is the fact that the highest growth in Jewish population between 1952 and 1971 occurred in counties other than those of traditional residence. In all, 77 counties were added to the list of those containing 100 or more Jews; 37 of these are in what the authors refer to as "new areas," and 10 more are in California and Florida. On the other hand, areas of high concentration in 1952 displayed moderate or low growth. Concurrently, therefore, the changes point to higher rates of dispersal and continued growth associated with urbanization and metropolitanization. Overall, while Jews still remain highly concentrated compared to other religious groups, the evidence on changing residence patterns leads to the conclusion that they locate in counties with high degrees of denominational pluralism, regardless of the size of the Jewish community. This suggests that Jews "feel accepted in America and are less concerned about venturing out into more traditionally conservative culturally homogeneous enclaves."[58]

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[55] Rhode Island *Herald,* September 1, 1977.

[56] Alvin Chenkin, "Jewish Population in the United States, 1974," AJYB, Vol. 76, 1976, pp. 232–236.

[57] William M. Newman and Peter L. Halvorson, "American Jews: Patterns of Geographic Distribution and Change, 1952–1971," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* June 1979, pp. 183–193.

Suburbanization

The redistribution of population is occurring concurrently on a number of levels, including regional changes as well as shifts within and between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Throughout American history the Jewish population has been overwhelmingly concentrated in urban places. At the time of the 1957 census survey, about nine out of every ten Jews lived in urbanized areas of 250,000 or more persons.[59]

Within the urban and metropolitan areas, Jews tended to live in a limited number of neighborhoods, but this pattern is also undergoing change. For example, between 1923 and 1970 radical shifts in distribution occurred in New York City alone.[60] Although very approximate estimates, these data illustrate the pattern of development that has probably characterized other areas of Jewish concentration. In 1923, 39 per cent of the 1.9 million Jews living in New York City resided in Brooklyn, and 37 per cent lived in Manhattan; less than 3 per cent lived in Queens. By 1970 Manhattan's share of the New York City Jewish population had declined to only 14 per cent, that of Queens had risen to 31 per cent, while Brooklyn increased its dominance to 42 per cent. Concurrently, the proportion of the total living in the Bronx declined from 20 to 12 per cent. Even more significantly, the percentage of Jews in the Greater New York area living in the city proper, in contrast to the suburban counties, declined from 82 per cent of the total in 1957 to 64 per cent by 1970. By 1979 the AJYB estimated that only 61 per cent of Greater New York's Jewish population was living in the city proper, and the real figure may be 50 per cent or less.[61]

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[58] *Ibid.*, p. 192.

[59] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *op. cit.*

[60] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.*, pp. 39–41.

Similar patterns emerge from the limited data available for such metropolises as Chicago and Detroit; and the same pattern characterizes moderate sized communities. In 1970, for example, only 17 per cent of the Jews of Greater Providence, R. I., were living in the old urban areas of the central city, in contrast to 45 per cent in 1951; and the proportion living in the suburbs had grown from 11 to 36 per cent.[61a] The comparative data from the Boston 1965 and 1975 surveys show similar patterns.[62] Both the city and the older suburbs experienced population decline while the newer outer suburbs gained, resulting in an increased dispersal of the population. Suburbanization is also clearly evidenced in Minneapolis. In 1957, 66 per cent of the population was found to be living in the city and 34 per cent in the suburbs. By 1971 the pattern had been more than reversed, with 23 per cent in the city and 77 per cent in the suburbs.[63]

Overall, therefore, the developing pattern seems to be one of ever greater dispersion and a more general integration. As a result, Jewish institutions may become located at quite widely separated points within a metropolitan area, and many communities find it increasingly difficult to decide on a central location for those institutions serving the community as a whole. In the past, residential clustering has been an important variable in helping to perpetuate Jewish values and the institutions important to the functioning of the community. In metropolitan areas with large Jewish populations, such clustering undoubtedly will continue, both within the central cities and in some of the suburbs. But greater dispersal and integration seem likely to become more common in the future, effecting greater changes in the extent and character of ties to Judaism, and making it increasingly difficult, from both a financial and an organizational perspective, to provide services to the total population. The impact of both suburbanization and more general dispersal of the population throughout the United States on the assimilation process needs to be fully recognized. In particular, much more research is necessary to ascertain how communal orientation varies among Jews living in cities and suburbs of differing Jewish density and size, and what significance the various activities available to Jews and the patterns of interaction and experience of Jews with non-Jews have for the larger question of Jewish identification and survival.

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[61] Jack Diamond, "How Many Jews in New York City?" *Congress Monthly,* January 1978, pp. 8–10.

[61a] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.,* p. 42.

[62] Axelrod, Fowler, and Gurin, *op. cit.;* Fowler, *op. cit.,* pp. 28–33.

[63] Judith B. Erickson and Mitchel J. Lazarus, *The Jewish Community of Greater Minneapolis* (Minneapolis, 1973).

Small-Town Jewry

Because the vast majority of America's Jews live in large metropolitan areas, until recently little attention has been given to the situation of Jews in those small towns where the Jewish community itself typically numbers no more than a few thousand families, and often less. Since World War II many of these small communities have had great difficulty retaining their population, Jewish and non-Jewish. Like their neighbors, Jews have left to seek better educational, occupational, and social opportunities in larger cities. Many of those who remained small-town residents tended to minimize their Jewishness, and often assimilated or intermarried. On the whole, small-town life was generally viewed as isolating the Jew both from his coreligionists and from the non-Jewish community in which he was often regarded as a "stranger."[64]

Yet, beginning with the 1970's (and consonant with what seems to be an emerging trend among the American population as a whole of movement from metropolitan areas to small towns and rural places, including locations which had earlier lost population) a number of small Jewish communities have been once again gaining population. Some Jews are now seeking the tranquility and slower pace of small-town life, and at the same time seem to be developing a more active identification with Judaism in their new surroundings. Jewish life in small towns is beginning to be viewed as having positive as well as negative effects on its members. Despite the limited communal services that are available in such places, the strong desire of many small-town Jews to maintain their identification may result in "more Judaism per square Jew in the small town than in the big city."[65]

Although levels of identification are not easily measured, the demographic effects of both the old trend away from small Jewish communities and the more recent trend toward them are evident in communities such as Charleston, West Virginia.[66] In 1959 the city included 1,626 Jews; by 1975 the Jewish population had declined to 1,118, of which only 703 persons had been in Charleston 16 years earlier. The decline in population resulted from both an excess of deaths over births and more out-migrants than in-migrants; it was further compounded by a high rate of intermarriage. By 1977, despite continuing high intermarriage rates, the community's migration losses had been reversed and it was gaining population.

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[64] Eugen Schoenfeld, "Problems and Potentials," in Abraham D. Lavender, (ed.), *A Coat of Many Colors: Jewish Subcommunities in the United States* (Westport, 1977), pp. 71–72.

[65] Rabbi Benjamin M. Kahn, quoted in New York *Times*, November 25, 1973.

[66] See, *The Jewish Population of Charleston, W. Va.*, annual reports of 1959 through 1977, Charleston.

The 1977 *Annual Report on Charleston's Jewish Population,* the 19th in this unique series, was one of the most optimistic to appear. Its introduction states:

> In our report of a year ago we stated that there were indications, however slight, 'that we are on our way upward (demographically) instead of downward, . . .' We are pleased to report that this year's study reveals that Charleston's Jewish population is definitely on its way upward. In this past year more newcomers (90) moved to our community than in any year since 1959, when we began these studies. Our losses through moving (49) were less than in any of the past 18 years. The good news, then, is that fewer are leaving and more are coming.[67]

The importance of such a reversal is further evidenced in the fact that the gain through migration was more than enough to compensate for losses through a surplus of deaths over births and through intermarriages, accounting for all of the increase experienced in the community's total size from 1,121 to 1,151 during 1976–1977.

The reports on Charleston issued since 1977 have been less optimistic. The 1978 report shows a gain of only two persons, and the 1979 analysis recorded a resumption of the decline in total population size, from 1,158 to 1,086.[68] This reversal reflected in part the continuing excess of deaths over births; it also resulted from the removal from the 1979 population count of those individuals who had been counted for a number of years even though they had left the community. Nonetheless, despite this record cleaning operation, in both 1978 and 1979 Charleston gained Jews through migration. Such in-migration is probably being experienced by a number of small communities and could be crucial in either maintaining or creating the critical mass requisite to initiation and maintenance of the institutional facilities essential for continued Jewish identification. Migration may thus constitute the "blood transfusion" which greatly improves the chances of small community survival.

Internal Migration

We know little about the extent and character of Jewish migration within the United States. For such an analysis national data are essential; however, except for the recent information available from the NJPS, no such data exist. Our insights on Jewish migration patterns have, therefore, been largely restricted to what can be gleaned from local Jewish community surveys.

Judged both by the percentage of population born outside the community of residence and by the length of time that individuals have resided in the area in which they were enumerated in community surveys, high levels of population mobility have come to characterize American Jews. The 1963 Detroit study found that only one-third of the total Jewish population of Detroit was born in the city; 28 per cent were foreign-born; and 36 per cent had moved to Detroit from other places in the United States, half from other locations in Michigan.[69] A similar picture emerged for Camden, New Jersey, where one-third of the residents had been born in the Camden area, and as many as 60 per cent had moved from other places in the United States (probably reflecting the younger age of the Camden population).[70]

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[67] *Ibid.,* 19th annual report, p. 1.

[68] *Ibid.,* 20th and 21st annual reports.

The 1975 Boston survey found that only 30 per cent of the respondents living in Boston in 1975 had also been living in the city in 1965.[71] Although the 1965 survey provided no basis for anticipating the decline of Newton and Brookline, both those older suburbs experienced heavy out-migrations and Jewish population decline. Of those Jews who lived in the city of Boston in 1965 and still resided in the Boston area in 1975, more than half remained in the city itself. However, this stable core was supplemented by a considerable influx from outside the Boston area, and there was some shifting in residence within the area by those living in it in both 1965 and 1975.

In Dallas, the 1972 survey found that only 35 per cent of the population were born in Dallas, and a high percentage of these were children.[72] Over half the Jewish population had moved to Dallas from other parts of the United States, and an additional 14 per cent were foreign-born. Consistent with the patterns of regional redistribution noted earlier, 23 per cent of the U.S.-born migrants to Dallas had originated in the Northeast, and 27 per cent in the North Central states. Similarly, the 1976 Greater Kansas City survey found that "not only are the majority of the household heads not born in Kansas City, but there is little tendency for this proportion to increase among the younger people."[73]

Given these illustrative data, it is not surprising that the NJPS found that only 62 per cent of the Jewish population aged 20 and over in 1970 were still living in the city in which they resided in 1965.[74] One out of every five adult Jews had changed city or town of residence while remaining in the same county or metropolitan area; an additional 3 per cent had changed areas within the same state; while 10 per cent of the total adult population had actually moved to a different state within the five-year interval. These high mobility levels are even more dramatic for Jews in the peak migration ages of 25–39 years. As the data in Table 6 show, just under half of persons aged 25–29 and 35–39 resided in the same city in 1970 as 1965; and only 4 out of every 10 persons aged 30–34 did so. Moreover, for the 25–29 age group, interstate migration accounted for the largest number of mobile persons—almost 1 out of 4. Even for those aged 30–34, almost 1 in 5 moved between states. The higher percentage in this age group moving within the same county or metropolitan area is related to their life-cycle stage of family formation and expansion.

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[69] Albert J. Mayer, *The Detroit Jewish Community Geographic Mobility: 1963–1965 and Fertility—A Projection of Future Births* (Detroit, 1966).

[70] Charles F. Westoff, *A Population Survey* (Cherry Hill, 1964).

[71] Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[72] Betty J. Maynard, *The Dallas Jewish Community Study* (Dallas, 1974).

[73] *The Jewish Population Study of the Greater Kansas City Area* (Kansas City, 1979), p. 12.

[74] National Jewish Population Study, *Mobility*, New York, 1974.

Residential stability rises quite dramatically above age 40 and peaks for ages 55–64; three-fourths of those among the latter group reported themselves as living in the same city in 1970 as they had in 1965; a large proportion who moved did so only within the same general area. For persons aged 65 and over the stability rate remains comparatively high,

TABLE 6. MOBILITY: CURRENT RESIDENCE BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN 1965, BY AGE (TOTAL FOR EACH AGE GROUP = 100 PER CENT)

Age Group	Same City As 1965	Different City, Same General Area In 1965*	Different Area, Same State As 1965	Different State From 1965	In Foreign Country In 1965
20–24	60.2	28.3	1.3	8.0	1.7
25–29	48.0	21.3	2.6	22.8	4.2
30–34	41.6	30.8	2.9	18.8	4.5
35–39	48.6	28.7	11.7	7.1	3.5
40–44	62.2	22.1	1.6	12.0	1.5
45–49	66.8	16.6	1.3	11.9	1.0
50–54	67.2	17.7	3.0	6.5	5.1
55–59	75.3	13.6	2.0	3.4	5.4
60–64	76.1	12.4	1.7	4.8	1.5
65–69	70.1	14.8	0.7	10.9	2.6
70–74	70.2	17.5	0.7	8.2	2.3
75–79	69.9	17.6	3.7	4.0	2.7
80 & over	62.7	24.6	1.5	5.2	2.6
Total**	61.6	20.0	3.1	8.9	2.5

Note: Horizontal details may not add to 100 because of "no answer."
*Same county or same Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area.
**Includes 6 per cent persons under 19 for whom no detailed data are shown above.
Source: National Jewish Population Study, *Mobility,* New York, 1974.

although declining somewhat as a result of retirement, the break up of families through the death of one of the spouses, or the departure of children from home. Yet the fact that 30 per cent or more of the persons 65 and over had made some kind of residential move within a five-year period indicates that geographic mobility must be incorporated into community planning processes. The need to do so is especially crucial for the younger age groups, among whom much more movement occurs, and more of it involving longer distances requiring clear breaks with former communities and integration into new ones.

The continuation of a large degree of movement is apparent from preliminary tabulations of the NJPS data based on questions about plans to move.[75] Of the total population, 16 per cent indicated plans to move within at least five years. Again, sharp age differentials characterize this aspect of mobility: 61 per cent of those 25–29 years of age indicated they planned to move, and 11 per cent expected to do so immediately; 47 per cent among those aged 20–24 years also planned to move. These mobility intentions are related to the family formation and career stages of persons in these age groups. The greater stability of older ages is evidenced by the sharp decline in the percentage (29) planning to move among those aged 30–34, a further decline to only 19 per cent among those aged 35–39, and a percentage varying within a 15–19 per cent range through age 70, following which even greater stability seems to set in.

Further evidence of changing Jewish mobility patterns is available through surveys of family units conducted so as to permit comparison of place of residence of children with that of their parents. Lenski has noted that one of the best indicators of the decreasing importance attached to family and kin groups by modern Americans is their willingness to leave their native community and migrate elsewhere.[76] Since most migration is motivated by economic or vocational factors, he suggests migration serves as an indicator of the strength of economic motives as compared to kinship ties. In modern society the removal of economic rewards out of the hands of kinship and extended family groups lessens the dominance of Jewish families over the economic placement of its young. The change in kinship relations, coupled with more fluid labor markets, thus contributes to higher mobility rates.

If this interpretation is correct, data available for both Providence and northern New Jersey suggest that kinship ties among Jews have been weakening. In the 1963 Providence survey only one-third of sons aged 40 years and over were living outside Rhode Island, compared to just over half of the sons aged 20–39.[77] Moreover, a higher proportion of the younger group were living further away. Accentuation of this trend is suggested by the fact that almost two-thirds of sons under age 20 living away from their parental home resided outside the state. Although fewer daughters lived away from their parental community, the basic age pattern was the same as for the males. In northern New Jersey, about one-fourth of both sons and daughters living outside of their parental home remained in the same general area, and an additional quarter were living in other parts of New Jersey.[78] But about 25 per cent were living in parts of the United States outside of New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, pointing to a fairly substantial dispersal of family members.

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[75] *Ibid.*, pp. 5–6.

[76] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, 1963), p. 214.

Together, these data support the assumption that the American Jewish community is increasingly mobile, and that such mobility must be taken into account in any evaluation of Jewish life in the United States. Such mobility affects not only the size of a particular community but also the characteristics of its residents if the migration process is selective of age, education, occupation, and income. At the same time, migration may have an important effect on the migrants, as well as on community institutions. To the extent that community ties within the Jewish population are expressed through membership in synagogues and temples, enrollment of children in educational programs, and participation in local organizations and philanthropic activities, the high degree of population movement may disrupt patterns of participation or weaken the loyalties they generate. More seriously, they may result in the failure of families and individuals to identify with organized life in the local community. Sociological research has suggested, for example, that recent migrants to a community are much less active in its formal structure than are long-time residents.[79] Although their participation eventually increases, the adjustment has been shown to take five years, and migrants may never reach the same level of participation as persons who grew up in the community. If a significant proportion of migrants know in advance that their residence in a community is not likely to be permanent, the stimulus for active participation and affiliation may be even weaker.

Mobility is not a new facet of Jewish life, and at a number of points in Jewish history it may have served to strengthen the Jewish community and indeed to insure its very survival. Such mobility may still perform a positive function in selected situations. Small Jewish communities may benefit considerably from the influx of other Jews who are attracted by nearby universities or new economic opportunities.

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[77] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

[78] Mervin F. Verbit, *Characteristics of a Jewish Community: The Demographic and Judaic Profiles of the Jews in the Area Served by the Jewish Federation of North Jersey* (Paterson, 1971), p. 13.

[79] Basil Zimmer, "Participation of Migrants in Urban Structures," *American Sociological Review*, 1955, pp. 218–224.

More often, migration may have a deleterious effect on the community and the migrant. Especially when repeated movement occurs, the individual's ties to Judaism and the Jewish community may be weakened. This, in turn, may affect the strength of the formal community structure as an increasing proportion of individuals fail to develop strong loyalties to local institutions. For all too long, local Jewish communities have assumed that most Jews remain residentially stable for a lifetime, and that they are therefore willing and obligated to support local organizations. This may no longer be true for many Jews. An increasing number may be reluctant to affiliate with the local community, not so much because they do not identify with Judaism, but because they anticipate that they will not remain in the local area long enough to justify the financial and other investments required. The situation is further complicated by the dispersed residential patterns which Jews adopt and by their high degree of social integration into religiously heterogeneous groups. All of this suggests the need for greater concern with the role of migration in the future of American Judaism. Indeed, the rising rates of intermarriage may largely be only a by-product, along with other undesirable consequences, of increased mobility and weaker ties to both the family and the community. Given high mobility rates, there is a pressing need to view the Jewish community from a national as well as a local perspective, so that the official affiliation of individual Jews to Jewish institutions can be easily transferred from one community to another, thereby facilitating maintenance of Jewish identity.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION

While size and density are crucial variables in the strength and vitality of any segment of the population, a wide range of demographic, social, and economic variables also significantly affects the group's current vitality and future survival. To the extent, for example, that generation status affects the strength of ties to traditional Judaism, the changing proportion of native- and foreign-born individuals in the Jewish community takes on great relevance. Rising levels of education and changing patterns of occupational careers also have direct effects on the levels of population movement, the degree of integration into the social and residential structures of the larger community, and the likelihood of intermarriage. Age structure is a crucial variable, because the socio-demographic structure of the population as well as the processes of birth, death, and migration are closely affected by it. In the growing attention, both in research and planning, that has been given to the Jewish population, the size of the total population and the dynamics of change have received priority. Too little attention has been given to composition and the impact of its changes. The discussion which follows attempts briefly to review the major composition variables with a view to describing the present socio-demographic characteristics of the American Jewish population, likely changes in the future, and the implications that such changes may have.

Generation Status

Of all the demographic characteristics of the Jewish population, the one with perhaps the greatest relevance for its future is the changing generation status, that is, how many are foreign-born, how many are children of foreign-born, and how many are third- or higher-generation Americans. In the past, a major factor in the continued vitality of the American Jewish community has been the massive immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe. Now, for the first time in the community's history, third-generation Jews face the American scene without massive outside reinforcement. At the same time, Jews enjoy much greater freedom than ever before, so that in several respects the Jewish community in the United States is increasingly an American Jewish community. Although this emergent pattern has been somewhat modified by the influx of Jews from both the Soviet Union and Israel, the full extent to which the upsurge in this immigration affects the demographic composition and particularly the sociological character of American Jewry, especially of the populations in those communities where they are settling, remains to be documented.

Every community study which has collected data on generation status documents the diminishing proportion of foreign-born and the rise in third-generation Jews. These studies show the percentage of American-born Jews as well above 70 per cent and becoming increasingly higher.[80] In Boston, for example, between the 1965 and 1975 surveys, the percentage of foreign-born declined from 22 to 12 per cent of the total.[81] By contrast, those with American-born parents rose from 20 to 49 per cent. Evidence of change is even sharper when judged by the generation composition of different age groups. Over 80 per cent of those under age 40 in Boston were born of American-born parents, but this was true of only 2 per cent of those aged 65 and over.

The same general pattern emerges from the NJPS, which found 23 per cent of household heads in the Jewish population to be foreign-born, and one out of every five already third-generation.[82] The distribution would favor American-born individuals much more strongly if the NJPS data referred to the population as a whole.

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[80] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.*, pp. 53–57.

[81] Fowler, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Assessment of the demographic, social, economic, and religious characteristics of three generations in the Jewish community suggests that the community's future depends to a great degree on how its members, now increasingly third-generation, react to the freedom to work for integration into the American social structure. Whether they are reversing or accelerating certain trends toward assimilation, initiated by their second-generation parents or by the small number of older third-generation Jews, needs careful monitoring.

Research has suggested that the geographic dispersal and deconcentration of the Jewish population marked for many not only a physical break from the foreign-born, but also symbolized the more dramatic disassociation of American-born Jews from the ethnic ties and experiences that had served as unifying forces for the earlier generation.[83] The degree of identification with Judaism of the third-generation Jews who participate in this dispersal has become a key issue. The residential changes are taking place concurrently with sharp increases in the amount of secular education and with an opening up to Jews of career opportunities in the professions and at high executive levels of business. All of these factors increase the amount of interaction between Jews and non-Jews, and contribute to high intermarriage rates and to redirections of the religious system.

Yet, these trends toward assimilation have been counterbalanced by a tendency toward increased Jewish education for the young, as well as by increases in certain religious observances which are seen as better fitting into the American scene. The religious change among three generations of Jews is undoubtedly a complex process involving the abandonment of traditional forms and the development of new forms of identity and expression which are seen by many Jews as more congruent with the broader American way of life. Analysis of the Providence community in 1963 suggested that, evolving out of the process of generational adjustment, the freedom to choose the degree of assimilation has been exercised in the direction of Jewish identification.[84] Whether that pattern holds for the nation as a whole and whether it has changed since the Providence survey are major questions that argue strongly for fuller exploitation of existing data and collection of new information on the interactions among generation change, demographic variables, and Jewish identity.

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[82] Massarik and Chenkin, *op. cit.,* p. 276.
[83] Goldstein and Goldscheider, *op. cit.*
[84] *Ibid.,* pp. 171–231.

Age Composition

Of all demographic variables, age is regarded as the most basic. The significant impact of age on the generation status of the Jewish population, as well as on fertility and migration, has already been noted. Age composition also has obvious implications for communal institutions. Until the NJPS, the only source of information on the age composition of Jews nationally was the 1957 Census Survey. It clearly indicated that the Jewish population was, on the average, older than the general white population of the United States. The median age of the Jewish group was 36.7 years, compared to 30.6 for the total white population. This substantial differential results from sharp differences in the proportion under 14 years of age and in the 45–64 age category. The youngest group constituted only 23 per cent of the Jewish population, compared to 28 per cent of the total white population; this reflected lower Jewish fertility. By contrast, only 21 per cent of the total white population, but 28 per cent of the Jews, were between 45 and 64 years of age in 1957 (Table 7). Both the Jewish and the total white populations had quite similar proportions in the 65 and over category, 10 and 9 per cent, respectively. On the whole, data on age structure available from individual communities confirm the older age of the Jewish group compared to that of the total population.

The data from the 1971 NJPS indicate that Jews continue to differ from the general population in age composition. Whereas 28 per cent of the national population were under age 15 in 1970, only 23 per cent of the Jewish population were in this age category—virtually identical to the 1957 differential which refers to those under age 14. By 1970 both the Jewish and the general population had more persons aged 65 and over, 11 and 10 per cent, respectively; but this differential is understated, since the Jewish institutional population was not covered directly in the NJPS. If they are included, the proportion of Jewish aged rises to 12 per cent. The effects of the declining birthrate are clearly evidenced in the decreasing percentage of Jewish children in the youngest age groups. Whereas 20 per cent of the Jewish population in 1970 were aged 10–19, only 12 per cent were under 10 years old. If these data are accurate, they point to a very substantial reduction in the absolute number of youngsters in the population and in their proportion of the total. Such changes have serious implications for future growth, for educational program needs, and for the size of a future "reservoir" from which adult support and leadership can be drawn.

The dramatic changes occurring in age composition are illustrated on the community level by comparative data from surveys taken in the same community. For example, the 1958 survey of New Orleans found 11 per cent of the population to be under age 5 and 15 per cent to be age 65 and

TABLE 7. PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY AGE, SELECTED COMMUNITIES AND UNITED STATES

Community	Date of Study	Age Distribution				
		Under 15	15–24	25–44	45–64	65 and Over
Washington, D. C.	1956	30	9	38	18	5
Worcester, Mass.	1957	27	11	26	26	10
Los Angeles, Calif.	1959	27	12	25	28	8
Rochester, N. Y.	1961	25	12	24	26	13
St. Joseph, Ind.	1961	30	14	24	24	8
Pittsburgh, Pa.	1963	27	14	25	26	8
Providence, R. I.	1963	25	14	24	27	10
Detroit, Mich.	1963	31	11	25	25	8
Milwaukee, Wis.	1964	24	15	23	28	10
Camden, N. J.	1964	30	13	23	28	6
Springfield, Mass.	1966	24	16	21	27	12
Boston, Mass.	1966	23	17	25	24	11
Flint, Mich.	1967	29	10	30	23	8
Columbus, Ohio	1969	27	13	23	28	9
Houston, Texas	1976	25	14	30	22	9
Greater Kansas City	1976	15	15	22	29	19
U.S. Jews	1957[a]	23	12	28	28	10
U.S. whites	1957[a]	28	14	28	21	9
U.S. Jews	1971	23	18	22	25	11
U.S. whites	1970	28	17	24	21	10

[a] For United States, lowest age categories are "under 14" and "14–24."

Sources: Sidney Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970: A Demographic Profile," AJYB, Vol. 72, 1971.
Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p. 271.
1970 U.S. Census of Population.

over.[85] Reflecting, in part, the effect of lower fertility and, in part, the cumulative effects of migration and lengthening of life, the 1973 survey found only 6 per cent of the population to be under 6 years (six was used instead of five as the cutoff in 1973) but 21 per cent to be 65 and over. Clearly, there has been a substantial aging of the community in the 15-year interval.

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[85] *Opinions and Attitudes of the New Orleans Jewish Community* (New Orleans, 1973).

As demonstrated, the American Jewish community already has an older age structure than the total U.S. white population; over time, because of its lower fertility and its higher proportion of individuals in the middle age group, the Jewish population can be expected to become even older. The United States as a whole is already facing serious problems associated with an aging population; but during the next few decades these problems may become even more serious for the Jewish community. We can look forward to a rise in the percentage of older Jews from the 11 per cent observed in 1971 to over 15 per cent by the early 1990's.[86] This implies a 40 per cent increase in the number of aged over the 1971 count. Concurrently, the number of children under 15 will be lower, reflecting the low birthrates noted earlier. Changes will also occur in the middle range of the age hierarchy, as the reduced number of persons born during the depression years move into the upper middle-age range. This change may initially create some serious problems for the community, as the pool of persons to whom it can turn for leadership and financial contributions is somewhat reduced.

In short, Jewish communities need to reevaluate and reorganize their services to deal with the changing age composition. Equally important, continuous monitoring of the changing age composition must be maintained. The past fluctuations in fertility will manifest themselves in the magnitude of differing age cohorts as they pass through the life cycle, and may lead to temporary rises or declines in the need for services catering to particular segments of the community. While recognizing the general trend toward an aging population, and its associated problems of housing, financial restrictions, and health impairment, there must also be an awareness that changes are taking place in other key points of the age hierarchy and that the need for schools, playgrounds, camps, and teenage programs will also change as the overall age profile varies. Even if the size of the population were to remain constant, the shifting age composition would undoubtedly call for drastic changes in services, and affect residential distribution patterns and the ability of the community to provide the resources needed for strong leadership.

One of the more serious consequences of changes in the age structure and the resulting higher proportion of Jewish aged may be increasing problems of poverty. Lulled by the general affluence of America's Jews, the Jewish community paid little heed to its poor until the publication in 1971 of Ann Wolfe's "The Invisible Jewish Poor."[87] As a result of her findings and the ensuing controversy over the actual number of Jewish poor in America, communal institutions in a number of cities initiated efforts to deal with the problem, and new research programs were undertaken to document the subject.

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[86] National Jewish Population Study, *The Jewish Aging,* New York, 1973, p. 1.

[87] Ann G. Wolfe, "The Invisible Jewish Poor," in Lavender, *op. cit.,* pp. 137–144.

Regardless of whether the number of Jewish poor in the United States is estimated at 264,000[88] or 700,000–800,000[89] persons, those concerned with the issue generally agree that a large majority of the poverty-stricken are over age 60. Descriptions of the Jews who have retired to South Beach in Miami[90] or of those still left in the tenements of the Lower East Side in New York[91] serve as poignant examples. If, as Bertram Gold states, "most of the Jewish poor are poor because of special circumstances—isolated old age, cultural separateness, maladjustment, death of the breadwinner,"[92] the problems may well become more severe in the near future. Larger numbers of older persons, coupled with the loosening of family ties and the greater mobility among American Jews, would help to create the conditions which foster poverty. The Jewish community may thus have one more dimension to add to the services it will be called on to provide. At the very least, it is an area which should be closely monitored, with an eye to alleviating the situation before it becomes more acute.

Education

Of all the Jews who immigrated to America in the late 1800's and early 1900's, a large majority came because of the supposedly equal opportunities for social and economic mobility. But lacking secular education, adequate facility in English, and technical training, rapid advancement proved an unrealistic goal for many. For others, both education and occupational achievement were made difficult, if not impossible, by factors related to their foreign-born status and/or their identification as Jews. Frustrated in their own efforts to achieve significant mobility, many Jews transferred their aspirations to their children. First-generation American Jews recognized the special importance of education as a key to occupational mobility and made considerable effort to provide their children with a good secular education. Reflecting the great value placed on education, both as a way of life and as a means of mobility, the Jews of America have compiled an extraordinary record of educational achievement.

The limited data available for the period around 1950 show the education of Jews was higher than that of the white population, averaging about 12 and 10 years, respectively.[93] This differential was confirmed on the national level by the 1957 Census Survey.[94] For the population 25 years old and over, the median number of school years completed by Jews was 12.3, compared to 10.6 for the general population. Yet, even sharper differences than those conveyed by these statistics distinguished the educational achievements of Jews from those of the general population: 17 per cent of the adult Jews were college graduates, compared to only 7 per cent of the general population. At the other extreme of the educational hierarchy, 29 per cent of all adult Jews had received only an elementary school education, compared to 40 per cent of the total population. Various community studies lent further weight to the strength of the differential, and pointed particularly to the rising levels of education among younger Jews, both male and female.[95] That an estimated 80 per cent of those in the college age group were enrolled in college emphasized the very high value placed by Jews on college education. In fact, within the Jewish population the important educational differential in younger groups is between those who had only some college education and those who went on to postgraduate work. This was further confirmed by studies of educational expectation among school-age children. In 1965, 86 per cent of the Jewish students planned to attend college, compared to only 53 per cent of the general student body.

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[88] Kaplan, "Comment: The Invisible Jewish Poor, I," in Lavender, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[89] Wolfe, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[90] Elinor Horwitz, "Jewish Poverty Hurts in South Beach," in Lavender, *op. cit.*, pp. 160–166.

[91] Mark Effron, "Left Behind, Left Alone," in Lavender, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–179.

[92] As quoted in Rhode Island *Herald*, February 4, 1972.

The NJPS lends further support to the conclusions based on these earlier sets of data (Table 8). Among the male Jewish population aged 25 and over, only 15.2 per cent had not graduated high school. By contrast, 60 per cent had had some college education. Of those aged 30–39 (age specific data not shown in Table 8), who constitute the youngest age cohort likely to have completed their education, only 4 per cent had no high school education and 83 per cent had some college education. In fact, at least 70 per cent had graduated college, and 45 per cent of all the males aged 30–39 had done some graduate work. Although sex differentials are apparent among Jews, as they are for the total population, Jews value extensive education for women, particularly among the younger cohorts. Like the men, very few women (16 per cent) had less than a high school degree, but many more had restricted their education to a high school level; and just over half reported some college education. Sharp age differentials are evident, however. Among women aged 30–39, only 2.4 per cent had less than a high school degree, and as many as 75 per cent had some college education. The sharpest difference between men and women appears with respect to graduate work. Of women 30–39 years of age, only 15 per cent reported a graduate or professional degree. The trend data suggested by age differentials point clearly, however, to rising levels of graduate work among the younger women.

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[93] Ben Seligman and Aaron Antonovsky, "Some Aspects of Jewish Demography," in Marshall Sklare, (ed.),*The Jews* (Glencoe, 1958), p. 54.

[94] Sidney Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials Among Religious Groups in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology,* May 1969, pp. 612–631.

[95] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.,* pp. 63–65.

Comparison in Table 8 of the levels of education completed by Jews with those reported in the 1970 U.S. census for the total white population documents the persistence of sharp educational differentials. Just over half of the Jews, but only 22 per cent of the non-Jews, had some college education; the widest difference characterized those with some graduate studies: 18 per cent of the Jews compared to 5 per cent of all whites. At the other extreme, only 16 per cent of the Jews had less than 12 years of schooling, compared to 46 per cent of all whites. Clearly, Jews continue to be characterized by distinctively higher levels of educational achievement, and, as the data in Table 8 show, this holds for both men and women.

TABLE 8. PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED BY PERSONS AGED 25 AND OVER, JEWISH AND TOTAL UNITED STATES WHITE POPULATION, BY SEX, 1970

Years of School Completed	Males		Females		Both Sexes	
	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White
Less than 12 years	15.2	46.1	16.0	44.9	15.6	45.5
12 years	22.5	28.5	35.3	35.5	29.2	32.1
College:						
1–3 years	17.3	11.1	21.0	11.1	19.2	11.1
4 years	14.9	7.2	13.6	5.7	14.2	6.4
5 or more years	26.5	7.1	10.6	2.8	18.2	4.9
Unknown	3.5	—	3.5	—	3.5	—
Total per cent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Sources: For the Jewish population: Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p.280.
For the United States white population: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 U.S. Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics,* PC(1)-C1, (Washington, 1972) p. 386.

Note: Since the differentials between the Jewish and the total white population change only minimally when age is controlled, the non-standardized data are presented here.

These data on the changing educational achievements within the Jewish population and the differentials between the Jews and the larger American population have a number of implications for the various demographic developments reviewed in this assessment. First, they clearly confirm the exceptionally high level of education that has come to characterize the Jewish population. Although the differentials between Jews and non-Jews will diminish, particularly if current emphasis on recruitment of minority group members and underprivileged students persists, it will still be some time before college attendance levels among the non-Jewish population reach those achieved by the Jews. As a result, some of the educational differences can be expected to persist for a number of decades, and indirectly to continue to affect occupation and income differentials. The growing enrollment of women in graduate work and the implications that this has for their developing independent careers have particular significance for both marriage rates and fertility, as well as for family stability.

To the extent that education is highly correlated with occupation, the continuing high percentage of college graduates in the Jewish population will affect its occupational composition, provided, of course, that the opportunities for employment exist which utilize skills developed through education. In the future even more Jews will likely be engaged in intellectual pursuits and in occupations requiring a high degree of technical skill. Concommitantly, there will probably also be a reduction in the number of self-employed, both because small, private business will not provide an adequate intellectual challenge and because patterns of discrimination which thus far have held back Jews in large corporations are likely to continue to weaken.

As before, and perhaps increasingly so, the impact of high education will go beyond occupation. In order to obtain a college education, particularly at the postgraduate level, a large proportion of young Jews must leave home. As a result, their ties to both family and community will weaken. Moreover, many of these college-educated Jews will not return permanently to the communities in which their families live and in which they were raised.

A 1973 study undertaken in Savannah, Georgia, for example, has shown that from 1954 to 1958 half of Savannah's Jewish college graduates settled in the city.[96] From 1965 to 1969 only one in five returned; the Jewish community was losing its college graduates for lack of job opportunities. Thus education serves as an important catalyst for geographic mobility which eventually leads many individuals to take up residence in communities with small Jewish populations, to live in highly integrated neighborhoods, and to work and socialize in largely non-Jewish circles. The extent of such a development needs to be assessed and future patterns need to be monitored.

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[96] Rhode Island *Herald*, September 1, 1977.

Finally, Jews with higher education may have significantly higher rates of intermarriage and become more alienated from the Jewish community. This development involves not only the possible impact of physical separation from home and the weakening of parental control in dating and courtship patterns, but also the general liberalizing effect a college education may have on religious values and Jewish identity. It would be ironic if the very strong positive value which Jews have traditionally placed on education, and that now has manifested itself in a very high proportion of Jewish youths attending college, turns out to be an important factor in the general weakening of the individual's ties to the Jewish community.

Whether the high levels of enrollment in colleges and in graduate work will persist remains an open question. If the Jewish population becomes more generally dispersed and tendencies toward migration increase, a much higher proportion of Jewish youth may be raised in neighborhoods and attend schools that are less densely Jewish. Some evidence suggests that in such a situation the motivation for higher education is less strong.[97] If so, a somewhat lower proportion of Jewish youth may plan to go to college in the future. Still another factor that may affect enrollment levels is the perceived employment opportunity open to college students. If the job market is such that students are discouraged from continuing their college and graduate studies, Jews may well be affected more than other segments of the population, especially if this situation is coupled with emphasis on minority group selection in admission to universities and in the hiring practice of large firms. We need studies to document whether the college dropout rate has risen for Jews and whether the more recent Jewish high school graduates are, in fact, continuing their education. It seems less likely now than it did one or two decades ago that a college education will become virtually universal for Jewish youth. More likely, levels of educational achievement will plateau at the very high level they have already reached or slightly below it.

Occupational Composition

Reflecting in part their high levels of education, Jews are disproportionately concentrated in the upper ranks of the occupational structure. As part of his analysis of the social characteristics of American Jews prepared in 1954 for the tercentenary celebration of Jewish settlement in the United

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[97] A. Lewis Rhodes and Charles B. Nam, "The Religious Context of Educational Expectations," *American Sociological Review*, April 1970, pp. 253–267.

States, Nathan Glazer observed that, outside of New York City, the homogeneous character of the occupational structure of Jewish communities was beyond dispute.[98] Basing his conclusions on a number of local Jewish community surveys conducted between 1948 and 1953, he noted that the proportion of Jews in the nonmanual occupations ranged from 75 to 96 per cent, compared to 38 per cent for the American population as a whole. Even in New York City, where greater heterogeneity would have been expected, as many as two-thirds of the employed Jews were engaged in nonmanual work. Glazer further noted a general tendency for the ethnic concentration in a single occupation to suffer dilution as the native-born generation became better educated and more familiar with occupational opportunities. In the case of Jews, however, "this dilution upward becomes a concentration, for the Jews began to reach the upper limit of occupational mobility relatively early."[99] For Jews to reflect the general occupational structure of the United States would, in fact, require downward mobility for many, and Glazer concluded that, since this will not happen, "we may expect the Jewish community to become more homogeneous in the future as the number of first-generation workers and the culture they established declines."[100]

The data from the fairly large number of community studies conducted in the 1950's and 1960's, as well as those from the 1957 Census Survey, support Glazer's thesis of an upward shift in Jewish occupational affiliations. The census survey, in particular, has special significance because of its national coverage. It found that three-fourths of all Jewish, employed males were in white collar positions, compared to only 35 per cent of the total white male population.[101] To a very great extent, this large difference is attributable to the much greater concentration of Jewish men in professional and managerial positions. Compared with men, women in the labor force were much more concentrated in white collar positions, and therefore the differentials between Jewish women and all women were less marked than those for men. Just over four out of every five Jewish women were in white collar jobs, compared to just over half of the total female labor force.

The sharp generation changes in occupational affiliation reflected in the 1957 data are attested to by a 1964 B'nai B'rith Vocational Service report.[102] It found that three-fourths of all Jewish high school youths hoped to enter professional and technical jobs, whereas only one in five of their fathers actually held such jobs. By contrast, only 3 per cent hoped to be business proprietors, compared to 27 per cent whose fathers owned businesses.

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[98] Nathan Glazer, "The American Jew and the Attainment of Middle-Class Rank: Some Trends and Explanations," in Sklare, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[99] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[100] *Ibid.*

[101] Goldstein, "Socioeconomic Differentials," *op. cit.*

[102] New York *Times*, June 25, 1972.

The 1965 and 1975 Boston surveys have particular value in documenting recent changes in occupational composition, although some of the changes may reflect selective in- and out-migration and changing opportunities in the Boston area.[103] In 1965 one-third of the employed Jewish males in Boston were professionals; by 1975 this proportion had risen to 40 per cent. The percentage engaged in clerical and sales work also rose from 15 to 21 per cent. As might be expected on the basis of developments noted earlier, the proportion engaged in managerial activities declined from 37 to only 27 per cent of the total in 1975. In all, therefore, the percentage of males making their living in white collar work rose, but the distribution by specific types of occupations shifted.

Jewish women followed a somewhat different pattern, with increasing percentages engaged in both professional and managerial activities. These changes relate to the rising educational levels of women and their greater participation in the labor force. In both 1965 and 1975 in the Boston area, over 90 per cent of all women were in white collar jobs, contrasted with 70 per cent for the non-Jewish employed women, with most of the differential being attributable to fewer non-Jews in professional and managerial positions.

Similar patterns of occupational distribution were found by the NJPS (Table 9). Almost 90 per cent of all males and females were employed in white collar positions, and those in the younger ages were much more heavily concentrated in professional activities. Only a very small proportion were engaged in manual work. Data from the various community surveys also point to a continuing increase in the proportion of Jews engaged in white collar work, but within the white collar group there appears to be a shift toward more professionals; either stability or decline characterizes the managerial and proprietor group. With the decrease in small businesses, an increasing proportion of Jewish men may be turning to executive positions in larger corporations, instead of operating their own firms as did many of their parents and grandparents.

Simon Kuznets, in his analysis of the trends in the economic structure of U. S. Jewry, assessed the various constraints affecting the occupational choices of American Jews. He concluded that it is evident that changes in these constraints have contributed toward greater concentration of Jews in professional and technical pursuits; an increase in employees rather than employers among officials, managers, and within the professional-technical group; a decline in the share of industrial blue collar jobs; and a lesser

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[103] Axelrod, Fowler, and Gurin, *op. cit.;* Fowler, *op. cit.,* pp. 46–47.

TABLE 9. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE JEWISH AND TOTAL UNITED STATES WHITE POPULATION,[a] BY SEX, 1970

	Males		Females		Both Sexes	
Occupation	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White	Jewish	Total White
Professional and technical	29.3	15.0	23.8	16.3	27.4	15.5
Managers, administrators	40.7	12.0	15.5	3.9	32.2	9.0
Clerical	3.2	7.6	41.7	8.1	16.2	18.4
Sales	14.2	7.4	8.3	36.8	12.2	7.7
Crafts	5.6	21.8	1.5	1.9	4.2	14.4
Operatives	3.9	18.7	2.3	14.0	3.4	17.0
Service	1.2	7.3	3.6	17.4	2.0	11.0
Laborers	0.3	5.7	0.2	0.9	0.3	3.9
Agriculture[b]	—	4.5	—	0.7	—	3.1
Unknown	1.7	—	3.1	—	2.2	—
Total percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

[a] The Jewish population includes persons aged 25 and over; the total white population includes persons aged 16 and over.

[b] No separate category for agriculture was included in the NJPS data.

Source: For the Jewish population: Fred Massarik and Alvin Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, pp. 284–285. For the United States white population: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 U.S. Census of Population: General Social and Economic Characteristics,* PC(1)-C1, (Washington, 1972) p. 392.

Note: Since the differentials between the Jewish and the total white population change only minimally when age is controlled, the non-standardized data are presented here.

concentration in trade, particularly small proprietorships.[104] The reasons he cites are similar to those mentioned earlier in this analysis.

Change also characterizes the non-Jewish population. Between the 1957 census survey and the 1970 decennial census, the occupational differentials between Jews and non-Jews seemed to have narrowed somewhat, as a result of the noticeable increase in the percentage of non-Jews in white collar jobs. Three-fourths of all Jewish males 14 and over were already in white collar work in 1957, compared to only 35 per cent of all the white males; by 1970 this was true of 87 per cent of the Jewish males aged 25 and over covered by the NJPS and 42 per cent of all white males aged 16 and over in the 1970 census. For females the data also suggest some narrowing. Whereas 83 per cent of Jewish women were in white collar work in 1957, and 89 per cent in 1970, among all white women the percentage rose from 55 to 65 per cent. More importantly, perhaps, sharp differences persisted despite the narrowing. For example, among men twice as large a proportion of Jews as of all white males were in the professional and technical group. Only 11 per cent of Jewish men were engaged in manual work, compared to 58 per cent of all white men; for women the difference was almost as great—8 per cent of Jewish women, compared to 35 per cent of all white women.

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[104] Simon Kuznets, *Economic Structure of U.S. Jewry: Recent Trends* (Jerusalem, 1972), pp. 17–18.

As differentials between Jews and non-Jews with respect to educational level diminish, and as discriminatory restrictions on occupational choice weaken, it seems likely that occupational differentials generally, and within white collar occupations specifically, will decline. The major question, as with education, revolves about the specific direction in which the youngest generation will move as they face career decisions. How many of them, motivated by different values and attracted by new life styles, will forego college and attempt to make a living through manual work or lower white collar positions? How many of those who are trained for higher positions, but who are frustrated by their inability to obtain such work, will opt for blue collar jobs or seek employment in clerical or sales positions?

A 1972 assessment of employment prospects for Jewish youth stressed that Jewish young men and women faced "relatively greater" job-hunting difficulties in the near future, and should therefore give more consideration to nonprofessional jobs than they had in the past, due to the projected slower rise in professional and technical jobs between 1970 and 1980.[105] In his review, Herbert Bienstock called for more emphasis on vocational guidance and placement, and on "attitudinal reconditioning, particularly in terms of value structures relating to nonprofessional job opportunities,"[106] especially as the latter became more attractive in pay and security than in the past. Although predicting that a majority of Jews entering the job market would continue to seek white collar jobs, Bienstock, a labor force expert, also suggested that young Jews might turn in increasing numbers to self-employment, not in the old-style shop or small store, but in new areas where demands for services were likely to grow.

Only repeated surveys of the kind that have been undertaken in Boston, but preferably on a more frequent basis, and more intensive monitoring of changes occurring both at the attitudinal and behavioral levels, will provide the opportunities to fully assess the very significant reversals in the trends of the past that may be occurring at present or that are likely to occur in the near future. At the same time, research is needed to ascertain whether the changing occupational affiliations of Jews, and particularly their entrance into new types of professional and managerial responsibilities, lead to increased channeling of self-identification through professional or intellectual sub-societies rather than through the Jewish community. We also need to know more about the ways in which occupational mobility is related to geographic mobility. The two together may well provide the organized community with one of its major challenges.

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[105] New York *Times*, June 25, 1972.

[106] As quoted in *Ibid.*

THE CURRENT AND FUTURE DEMOGRAPHIC SITUATION

An assessment of the demographic situation of American Jewry in 1970[107] pointed to a number of challenges which the American Jewish community would have to face in the closing decades of the 20th century as a result of the demographic changes that were then taking place. The low level of Jewish fertility, coupled with some losses from intermarriage, pointed at best to maintenance of the slow growth rate characterizing the Jewish population in the second and third quarters of the 20th century, and possibly to still slower growth. Concurrently, increasing Americanization seemed likely to continue, as judged by greater geographic dispersion, a higher percentage of third- and fourth-generation Americans, and narrowing of such key socioeconomic differentials as education, occupation, and income. All these changes pointed to the potential for greater behavioral convergence between Jews and non-Jews, and corresponding losses in Jewish identity. However, it was also suggested that structural separation and the continuity of Jewish identity would persist as American Jews continued their efforts to find a meaningful balance between Jewishness and Americanism.

Since the 1970 assessment was undertaken, many of the patterns that were then emerging have become further accentuated. By 1977 the Jewish population constituted only 2.7 per cent of the American population, in contrast to the peak of 3.7 per cent reached in the mid-1930's. Jewish fertility levels seem to have declined even further as part of the national pattern in the 1970's. If the fertility rates of Jews persist at the low levels reached in the 1970's, the American Jewish population is quite certain to decline in actual numbers (unless there continue to be compensating additions through immigration). Even should fertility remain at near the replacement level, the losses resulting from intermarriage and assimilation will compound the effects of either very low natural increase or negative growth resulting from an excess of deaths over births.

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[107] Goldstein, "American Jewry, 1970," *op. cit.*

Recent estimates of the Jewish population suggest that although the American Jewish population had approached the 6 million mark in the late 1960's, it has not yet passed that milestone and, given the recent pattern of demographic growth, is not likely to do so. A realistic assessment suggests that the Jewish population of America will remain at approximately its present size, between 5.5 and 5.8 million, through the end of the century. In the absence of significant reversals in fertility behavior or in rates of intermarriage, a decline will set in during the first decades of the 21st century that could well lead to a reduction of one to two million by the time of the tricentennial. Most of the social and economic changes characterizing the United States in general, in combination with the unique characteristics of the Jewish population itself, are likely to reinforce the low growth rates or decline. These include high rates of divorce and separation, later age at marriage and possible rises in levels of non-marriage, increased extra-familial activity on the part of women, higher education levels, greater secularism, growing concern about overpopulation, and rising costs of living. Many of these very same factors are likely to lead to continued high levels of intermarriage. Although its effects on population size are compensated to a degree by conversions to Judaism and the rearing of many of the children of intermarriages as Jews, maintenance of the high levels of intermarriage reported in recent years would undoubtedly compound the impact of low fertility on the rate of population growth.

Jews have already become widely dispersed throughout the United States, and this trend is likely to continue in the future. The available evidence suggests that as a result of continuously higher education and changing occupations, lower levels of self-employment, weakening family ties, and reduced discrimination, Jews have begun to migrate in increasing numbers away from the major centers of Jewish population. Even while distinct areas of Jewish concentration remain, and while Jews continue to be highly concentrated in the metropolitan areas, the emerging patterns of redistribution point to fewer Jews in the Northeast, substantial decreases in central cities, and possibly even some reduction in the suburban population as Jews join the movement to non-metropolitan areas, smaller urban places, and even rural locations. Regardless of which particular stream becomes more popular, the net result is likely to be a much more geographically dispersed Jewish population in the decades ahead.

Such greater dispersal means that factors other than religion will provide an increasingly important basis for selecting areas and neighborhoods of residence. In turn, the lower Jewish density will provide the seeds for still greater acculturation and assimilation. Moreover, to the extent that Jews increasingly participate in the pattern of repeated population movement which characterizes the American scene, additional dangers to the strength of community ties loom on the horizon.

The decline in relative or even total numbers may not be very significant in the next few decades, since Jews have never constituted a numerically large segment of the American population. What may be more crucial is the vitality of individual Jewish communities, and this may be much more influenced by the size of such communities and their socioeconomic composition. Only when the change in total numbers is accompanied by significant changes in distribution and composition which are deleterious to both the ability to maintain a vital Jewish community and to foster individual Jewish identification will the change in numbers itself take on a new significance. Because population movement has special significance for these concerns, any substantial change in the pattern of residential distribution of Jews and in their ability to maintain close identity with a Jewish community takes on special importance.

Operating partly as a cause and partly as an effect of these changing patterns of growth, distribution, and intermarriage are the underlying changes in population composition characterizing American Jewry. Perhaps the most striking compositional change has been the reduction in the percentage of foreign-born. Indeed, as already noted in 1970, even the proportion of second-generation American Jews has begun to diminish as third- and fourth-generation persons become an ever larger proportion of the Jewish population. The pace of change would be even faster were it not for the low levels of Jewish fertility, which, in addition to contributing to the low rate of population growth, result in a reduced number of young persons in the population and an increasing proportion of aged.

Given the ZPG levels of fertility which the Jewish population seems to have reached, the average age of the Jewish population is likely to rise still further and to remain substantially above the average of the general population. Thus, a major challenge for the Jewish community in the future will be the comparatively large numbers of older persons, a considerable portion of whom will be widows.

Jews remain unique, despite some evidence of narrowing differentials, in having a heavy concentration of members who are highly educated, who hold white collar positions, and who have large incomes. It is the large proportion of Jews who obtain specialized university training—with their tendency to move out of small family businesses into salaried employment, and their increasing willingness to seek and take positions away from their community of current residence—that helps to explain the growing residential dispersal of the Jewish population. The same factor undoubtedly also contributes to the high rates of intermarriage, the low level of fertility, and the growing tendency toward assimilation.

In combination, the current pattern of very low fertility, high levels of intermarriage, and lower residential density through population redistribution may all serve to weaken the demographic base of the Jewish population in the United States. Yet, to the extent that Jews retain a comparatively close-knit, ethnic-religious identification within the total society, the potential for continued vitality remains. Stability of numbers or even declining numbers need not constitute a fundamental threat to the maintenance of a strong Jewish community and to high levels of individual Jewish identity. The risk that this may happen is obviously present, but this was also true in the past when larger numbers obtained. Although maintenance of numbers is certainly desirable in the interest of providing a strong base for insuring Jewish identity and vitality, whether or not the community as a whole should or can do anything to control the changing fertility levels or the patterns of redistribution is debatable. To the extent that mobility and fertility behavior represent reactions to a wide and complex range of social, economic, and normative changes in the larger American society, they are probably well beyond the direct and even indirect control of the organized Jewish community. What is perhaps more important is that the community undertake and maintain fuller assessments of the implications of these developments, and that it be prepared, on the basis of such assessments, to develop new institutional forms designed, at a minimum, to mitigate the negative effects of population decline and dispersal. Ideally, these efforts should also increase opportunities for Jewish self-identification and for greater participation of individuals in organized Jewish life. By taking these steps, the community will help insure that the changes that do occur still allow for a meaningful balance between being Jewish and being American.

Jewish Survival: The Demographic Factors

by U. O. SCHMELZ

OVER THE CENTURIES, JEWS HAVE SHOWN a remarkable capacity for survival as a group possessing a distinct identity—this despite forbidding difficulties, including serious numerical losses in certain generations. The human life span being limited, however, each generation faces anew the challenge of insuring its growth, maintaining its numbers, or at least reproducing itself at reduced size. This depends both on demographic factors, particularly the balance between births and deaths, and on the will to continue group identity. For minorities like Diaspora Jews the practical feasibility of integrating into the majority population is liable to affect group cohesion. World Jewry constitutes a widely dispersed entity that was reduced in size by almost a third as a result of the Holocaust. Systematic study shows that the prospect of maintaining the present size of the world Jewish population has become quite problematic.

In the following pages we shall review some features of the demographic situation of world Jewry—its recent evolution, present state, and future prospects. Emphasis will be placed on the factors affecting Jewish population size. While the approach will be demographic, the social and economic structure of the Jews is obviously very important in this context. Some of the problems of Jewish demography—e.g., alienation, out-marriage, and low levels of fertility—are by their very nature closely linked to the study of social psychology of modern Jews.

This article is based on extensive research, involving a good deal of data accumulation and computations. However, in the interests of clarity and increased comprehension, technical explanations will be relegated to footnotes or to the appendix at the end of the article. The demographic situation, trends, and prospects of Jews in the Diaspora and Israel differ markedly, as do the amount and quality of the data available on each. We shall therefore consider separately each of these two major components of world Jewry.

Owing to large-scale Jewish migration over several generations, and the reduction of European Jewry through the Holocaust, world Jewry has undergone a drastic geographical redistribution. Many of its component groups are characterized by relative newness in their respective environments; about 70 per cent of Diaspora Jews—and as much as 80 per cent of the total world Jewish population—live at present in regions (the

Americas, South Africa, Australia, Israel, etc.) which contained hardly three per cent of world Jewry a mere hundred years ago. On the other hand, large sections of the traditional Diaspora are now virtually without Jews, e.g., great parts of Eastern Europe, the Balkans, Asian countries, and North Africa.

From the point of view of Jewish ethnography, the main branches of the Jewish people in modern times have been the Ashkenazim, Sephardim, and various Oriental communities. All branches have tended to conform to the demographic patterns of their respective surrounding general populations. The patterns of the Sephardim have reflected those of the nations in which they have lived, either in Europe or in the Middle East and North Africa. Toward the middle of this century, the Ashkenazim exemplified to an extreme the European-North American demographic type of low fertility and high longevity, while Oriental Jews conformed to the demographic patterns of their countries of residence, manifesting high fertility but also high mortality. During the past 30 years, however, the overwhelming majority of the Oriental Jews have left their home countries in Asia and North Africa; those countries have dwindled, with few exceptions, to virtual insignificance on the map of Jewish dispersion. In their new places of residence, Oriental Jews have rapidly adopted the demographic patterns of the advanced populations among whom they have come to live: their mortality rate has been greatly reduced; the marriage-age for girls has risen; fertility has dropped; and, in Diaspora countries, there has been a spate of out-marriages. With the exception of out-marriage, these changes are abundantly documented in detailed evidence from Israel, even though Jews from Asia and North Africa constitute there, by now, one half of the entire Jewish population, and this large proportion might have made them less amenable to rapid transformations. The analogous phenomena are now under study in France, the second largest recent destination of Oriental Jews, as well as elsewhere. In their new countries of residence outside Israel, Oriental Jews are but a small fraction of the entire population; they belong on the average to a higher and more easily adaptable social stratum than their brethren in Israel, and have more opportunities for out-marriage. Thus, recent data point to even faster demographic transformations in the Diaspora than in Israel—*inter alia,* a drastic fertility decline (see Oriental Jews in Greater Paris, Tables 2-4, 7, 8). As a result of the mass exodus of Oriental Jews from their traditional lands of residence and their rapid adaptation to new demographic patterns, virtually the entire Diaspora now belongs to the category of advanced populations such as are characteristic of Europe and North America.

The majority of Jews currently in the Diaspora have their roots in Eastern Europe, which their families left in the course of the last hundred years.

This may be one reason for the underlying similarity of demographic trends evidenced in the contemporary Diaspora, great distances notwithstanding. Prominent features common to Diaspora Jewries of the 1970's are very high urbanization; a high and increasing level of formal education (great proportions of the younger generation are college-trained); and a high and growing share of white-collar workers among the Jewish labor force, including relatively many persons in the professions and in managerial positions. In all of these areas, Jews far outdistance the general populations.

In the following brief analysis, which must confine itself to the most prominent features of Diaspora demography, we shall consider only the overwhelmingly represented type—the demographically advanced Jews. The extant remnants of Asian-North African Jewries and some ultra-Orthodox splinter groups in the Western world are proportionally negligible exceptions in the overall picture.

The dispersion of Jews in a great many countries means that the phenomena of Jewish demography are multiplied in a great many national settings.[1] The study of Diaspora demography as a whole, therefore, is the synthesis of studies of the various Diaspora populations, at least the numerically more important ones. The unique geographical dispersion of Jews results in a scattering of information, which is available, if at all, in differing formats and languages.

The proportion of Diaspora Jews who are distinguished as such in the official statistics of their countries of residence has dwindled since the Holocaust, and is still decreasing. Official census statistics are presently available for only about a quarter of Diaspora Jews, and these figures appear at long intervals. The Jews being now but a small minority in all Diaspora countries, the data routinely published about them in official statistics are basic figures with few cross-classifications.[2]

In the absence of official statistics—or, better still, in judicious conjunction with them—data on Jews can be compiled by Jewish organizations. The local Jewish community surveys that have been carried out in numerous cities of the United States are well-known examples, but they have the drawback, for purposes of wider synthesis, of lacking coordination of contents, methodology, and timing and, above all, of not being representative of the total American Jewish population. In recent years several country-wide sample surveys of Jewish populations, embracing a wide range of demographic, social, economic, and identity factors, have been carried out. There has also been some current data collection, undertaken by Jewish institutions, on vital statistics and other population features.

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[1] On the substantive and methodological problems of Jewish demography, and recent attainments in data collection and research, see the publications in the Jewish Population Studies series of the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Particularly relevant is R. Bachi's *Population Trends of World Jewry* (Jerusalem, 1976).

[2] There exists, however, the technical possibility of obtaining detailed tabulations on Jews from official statistics if they are distinguishable therein as a separate group. Use of these potentialities depends on Jewish initiative and funding and, of course, on the consent of the various statistical bureaus. Such opportunities have been increasingly utilized in recent years.

However, both official and Jewish sources of information on the demography of Diaspora Jews give no more than a fragmentary picture. The study of Jewish Diaspora demography, both on the national level and on a global scale, is further complicated by the following factors: the great migratory mobility of Jews; the increasing number of out-marriages and offspring of such unions; and the growing frequency of "marginal" and "alienated" Jews whose identification as Jews may be uncertain. As a result of all this, the Jewish demographic scene, worldwide and poorly documented as it is anyway, undergoes continual change to an extent unusual among majority populations. Close attention to chronology is therefore required in discussing the phenomena of Jewish demography.

Despite these serious difficulties, persevering work, assisted by the substantive and methodological information available to modern demographic researchers, has made it possible to attain a relatively clear picture of the fundamental trends of Jewish Diaspora demography. In this account, we shall have to limit ourselves to the presentation of the principal facts and trends directly influencing the recent as well as the anticipated size of Jewish populations. We shall concentrate on the underlying similarity in trends of the main Jewish populations, notwithstanding the cultural differences of their respective countries of residence, and the great distances separating them. We shall often be unable to enlarge on the peculiarities of each of these Jewish populations. The factual examples adduced will be confined to the larger Jewish populations, usually those comprising at least 20,000 Jews, and for which the required data are available.

For ascertaining the fundamental trends of any population, it is imperative to know its natural movements—especially births and fertility, on the one hand, and mortality, on the other. Direct information on these topics being scanty, extensive use will be made in this discussion of the age-sex composition of contemporary Jewish populations, as empirically known from censuses or surveys. Our aim will be to elucidate the natural movements of Jews in various settings by use of indirect but effective methods of demographic analysis which permit reasonably accurate estimates.[3] For lack of space, this account will have to refrain, excepting occasional brief remarks, from any consideration of the determinants for the observed demographic differentials between Jews and Gentiles, between and within the Jewish populations of various Diaspora countries, and between Jews in the Diaspora and in Israel. It must be stressed, however, that the investigation of the determinants for these various sets of differentials constitutes a good part of the scholarly challenge and appeal in the demographic study of contemporary Jews.

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[3] These methods are briefly indicated in the Appendix.

RECENT DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS OF DIASPORA POPULATIONS

Demographic Evolution of General Populations in Developed Countries

It has already been noted that most contemporary Jewish Diaspora communities belong to the demographically advanced populations of the world. As background to contemporary Diaspora demography, therefore, it is necessary to outline the salient features of these populations.

At present, the main features characterizing the general populations of the highly developed regions of Europe, North America, and Australia are the following: a) high average length of life, amounting to more than 70 years (if both sexes are considered together). There is limited and decreasing differentiation in the average length of life for various groups within the total population; b) decreasing fertility and birth rate. During the great depression of the 1930's, a slump of births took place in the developed countries. It was followed by a "baby boom" at the end of World War II. In Western Europe the "baby boom" soon subsided and was followed, in most countries, by a decade or so of relatively stable births at a moderate level. In the United States, Canada, Australia, and among the whites of South Africa, the higher level extended into the 1960's. In any case, a sharp decline in fertility and the birth rate set in subsequently, and accelerated in the first half of the 1970's. These transformations are linked to changes in matrimonial mores, including frequency of informal unions, delayed weddings, and rising divorce rates. Both current fertility and the fertility expectation of women of reproductive age have declined a great deal. Family formation—i.e., age at first marriage as well as at childbearing—has been postponed, and this poses the question whether postponement of the anyway low expected fertility may not lead eventually to partial cancellation of even these expectations. The result of all this has been low and dropping natural increase, which in some European countries has descended to virtually nil or turned into an outright decrease (annual deaths outnumbering annual births)—a trend which has been accelerated by the propagation of an ideology of "zero population growth"; c) marked "aging," i.e., a growing proportions of elderly people. The main reason for this is the low reproduction in the 1930's and early 1940's, and again since the 1960's. A relatively great proportion of elderly persons in a population does not affect average fertility or average length of life, but it tends to reduce the crude birth rate—the number of births per 1,000 of population—as the old do not contribute to it. Conversely, it tends to raise the crude death rate—the number of deaths per 1,000 of population—because, where old people are numerous, many deaths must occur, even if the average life span is long.

In Table 1 some data are presented for illustration of the above-mentioned trends. It can be seen that in those developed countries in which large Jewish populations reside—the United States, Canada, France, Great Britain, and the European parts of the Soviet Union—the rate of natural increase has gone down strikingly in recent years.

Widespread Demographic Features of Jewish Diaspora Populations

Diaspora Jewries are distinguished, at present, by very low fertility and birth rates which regularly fall short of the same phenomena in corresponding general populations—both in whole countries and in individual major cities. Diaspora Jewries are also affected by out-marriages, which tend to reduce the actually Jewish offspring even beneath the level determined by low fertility; they are apt, besides, to sustain other assimilatory losses. "Aging" is more pronounced among Jews than among the corresponding general populations. While average length of life is, by now, roughly equivalent for Jews and corresponding Gentiles, the greater aging of Jews results in higher crude death rates among them. Besides, most European Jewries, and those elsewhere that have absorbed Jewish emigrants from Europe since World War II, are affected by age-sex distortions due to the Holocaust and its after-effects. Under these circumstances it is inevitable that the balance of births and deaths in Diaspora Jewries will fall short of that in corresponding general populations. In all but perhaps one of the large Diaspora Jewries (South Africa) this balance recently has been very close to zero or outrightly negative.

The unmistakable long-term trend in all larger Diaspora populations is toward aggravation of the factors which reduce population size and thus intensify the already negative or near-negative character of their internal demographic balance. In the immediate future, to be sure, there will be a tendency toward increased Jewish births, as the relatively many young people born during the "baby boom" around 1950 reach the procreative age range. This phenomenon, however, is necessarily temporary and should not delude us as to the definite long-term trend.

While the long-term trend appears to be similar throughout the Diaspora, and is in basic alignment with that of the general populations of the advanced countries, there are substantial differences in the present level of the various factors, both between Diaspora Jewries and between the Jews and

TABLE 1. RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE AMONG GENERAL POPULATION, BY SELECTED COUNTRY, 1960–1975
(Per 1,000 of Population)

Country	1960	1965	1970	1975
U.S.A. (whites)	13	9	8	5
Canada	19	14	10	8
South Africa (whites)	16	14	14	11
Australia	14	11	12	9
United Kingdom	6	7	4	0[a]
France	6.5	7	6	3[a]
Belgium	4.5	4	2	0
Netherlands	13	12	10	5
Denmark	7	8	5	4
Norway	8	8	7	4
Sweden	4	6	4	2
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	6	6	1	−2
(Dem. Rep.)	4	3	0	−3.5
Switzerland	8	9.5	7	4
Austria	5	5	2	−1[a]
Italy	9	9	7	5
Czechoslovakia	7	4	3	8
Hungary	4.5	2.5	3	6
Poland	15	10	9	10
Rumania	10	6	12	10
USSR	18	11	9	9
RSFSR	16[b]	8	6	6
Ukraine	14	8	6	6
Israel (Jews)	18	16	17	18

[a] 1976.
[b] 1959.

the corresponding general populations. Diaspora Jewries fall into several regional groups with regard to the intensity of their demographic problems. In rough outline, the situation is most acute in Eastern and Central Europe, and less acute in Western Europe, though some natural decrease usually prevails there also. In the Americas and Australia natural increase is near zero. The only sizable Diaspora Jewry (of European provenance) which maintained a modest natural increase by the beginning of the 1970's was the compact and relatively secluded one in South Africa.

Table 2 presents crude rates of births and deaths, and their difference—the rate of natural increase or, when negative, of natural decrease. These values are given for large Jewries and for corresponding general

TABLE 2. RATES OF NATURAL MOVEMENT AMONG JEWS AND GENERAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRY AND PERIOD
(Per 1,000 of Population)

Country	Period	Birth Rate		Death Rate		Rate of Natural Increase/Decrease	
		Jews[a]	Gen. Pop.	Jews	Gen. Pop.	Jews[a]	Gen. Pop.
U.S.A.	1967–71	10	17[b]	10	9.5[b]	0	7.5[b]
Canada	1957–61	17	27	7	8	10	19
	1967–71	12	17	10	7	2	10
Sao Paulo (Brazil)	1965–69	10		7		3	
Argentina	1956–60	11	24	10	9	1	15
South Africa	1966–70	16	23[b]	9	9[b]	7	14[b]
Australia	1957–61	14	23	9	9	5	14
	1967–71	11	20	11	9	0	11
Greater Paris	1972–76[c]	9	15	9	9	0	6
Origin of Jews:							
Europe		9		12		–3	
Africa-Asia		9		7		2	

Brussels (Belgium)	1957–61	8	13	10	13	−2	0
Netherlands	1962–66	11	19	13	8	−2	11
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	1961–65	3	18	21	11	−18	7
	1971–75	3	11	19	12	−16	−1
Switzerland	1959–62	11	18	16	10	−5	8
	1969–72	12	15	16	9	−4	6
Italy	1961–65	11	19	16	10	−5	9
	1966–70	11	17	15	10	−4	7
Russian Republic (in Soviet Union)	1959–70	6	18	15	8	−9	10
Israel (Jews)	1971–75	24		7		17	
Origin of Jews:							
Europe	1975	21		10		11	
Africa-Asia	1975	29		5		24	

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[a] "Effectively Jewish" rates; see text.

[b] Whites.

[c] Averages for the 5-year interval preceding the years indicated.

Sources and methods: see Appendix.

populations. The figures for Jews are mostly estimates derived from their age-sex distribution as empirically known from an official census or Jewish-sponsored survey. Despite the indirect derivation of these figures, their approximate order of magnitude need not be subject to doubt (see Appendix). The table shows, consistently and strikingly, lower rates of births and natural increase for Jews than for the general populations. It also substantiates in numerical terms the prevalence of a near-zero or negative balance of births and deaths among the large Jewries.

Fertility and Birth Rate

The precarious demographic situation of Diaspora Jewry is evidenced by its very low fertility, which is insufficient for inter-generational replacement.

The importance of fertility in the demographic dynamics of Diaspora Jews is easily realized if we bear in mind that fertility is *the* positive factor on which future replacement depends in any closed population—one unaffected by external migrations or conversions or other affiliative changes. With the average length of life being already very high among Diaspora Jews, as among all advanced populations of the world, there is little chance of increased population growth through the betterment of health and living standards. Moreover, the affiliation balance—losses due to assimilation minus any adhesions to the Jewish group—is assumed to be usually negative for Diaspora Jewries. In addition, the migration balance for the Diaspora as a whole versus Israel is negative. Though there is no uniformity in the migratory balance of the individual Diaspora populations, this is likewise negative for many of them. These circumstances enhance the importance of fertility for Jewish population growth.

Two terms that are part of the basic vocabulary of demography are "fertility" and "birth rate." Fertility means the number of children born, or expected to be born, by a group of, for example, 1,000 women, or by the average woman in that group. The "crude birth rate," or briefly "birth rate," measures the annual frequency of births per 1,000 persons—of both sexes and all ages—in a population, and is therefore markedly influenced by the age-sex composition of that population. The complex realities of Diaspora life, however, necessitate a further distinction. Because of the influence of out-marriages and/or marginality, not all children born to one actually Jewish parent are Jews. Sometimes, too, two parents who are Jews do not wish their newborn children to grow up Jewish. Consequently, it is necessary to distinguish the "effectively Jewish fertility" of Jewesses from their actual fertility, and the "effectively Jewish birth rate" from a birth rate that would account appropriately for all children currently born to Jewish parents, irrespective of whether the children are themselves considered

Jews.[4] Only the "effectively Jewish" reproduction of Jews operates for the replacement of a Jewish population.

Data enumerated in a census or survey on currently recorded Jewish newborn or on young Jewish children from which recent births can be estimated belong to the "effectively Jewish" type and reflect the direct losses of children due to out-marriages. If mixed marriages are not infrequent, as is usual now in the Diaspora, a disproportion results between the size of the parental generation and the offspring among the Jewish population, and the effectively Jewish birth rate is depressed. On the other hand, data from a census or survey on the fertility experienced by Jewish women usually include all children born to them, irrespective of the children's religion. When considerable mixed marriage prevails, these fertility data, though demographically correct insofar as the full reproductive behavior of Jewesses is concerned, exceed the actual level of effectively Jewish reproduction.

MEASUREMENT OF JEWISH FERTILITY

Table 2 contains figures on effectively Jewish birth rates. Table 3 presents two measures of current effectively Jewish fertility: the "fertility ratio," which has been computed from the number of children 0–4 years old per 1,000 women aged 15–44; and the "total fertility rate," which is the final number of children which women would be expected to have on average, if their current age-specific fertility performance persisted. The approximate value of this parameter for Jews has been derived here by an indirect method (see Appendix). Table 3 shows, in addition, the per cent change over the preceding 5-year interval in the number of effectively Jewish births and in the fertility ratio.[5] Where the size of the Jewish population changed little over that interval—as was the case in most Diaspora countries listed in the table—the per cent change in the number of births is similar to the corresponding change in the effectively Jewish birth rate.

Table 4 contains retrospective data on the full fertility of Jewish women—cumulative up to given ages—as reported in response to a specific question in a census or survey on the total number of (live-born)

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[4] Some actually Jewish children are born to actually non-Jewish wives of Jews. Hypothetically half of the children resulting from "mixed marriages" (where the partners keep their different religions) might be expected to be Jews.

[5] Because of the technique used for obtaining the data (see Appendix), this interval relates to the five years between the average of years 5–9 and the average of years 0–4 prior to the enumeration of a Diaspora population.

TABLE 3. FERTILITY MEASURES[a] OF JEWS AND GENERAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRY AND PERIOD

Country	Period	Fertility Ratio			Total Fertility Rate		% Change[b]	
		Jews	Gen. Pop.	% Difference	Jews	Gen. Pop.	Jewish Births	Jewish Fertility Ratio
U.S.A.	1967–71	228	392[c]	−32	1.4	2.4[c]	−30	−41
Canada	1957–61	421	606	−30	2.6	3.7	−14	4
	1967–71	292	390	−25	1.8	2.3	−14	−30
Sao Paulo (Brazil)	1965–69	220			1.3		−38	−42
Argentina	1956–60	247	471	−48	1.5	2.8	−24	−22
South Africa	1966–70	387	476[c]	−19	2.4	3.1[c,d]	−1	−14
Australia	1957–61	353	528	−33	2.2	3.4	−16	8
	1967–71	296	460	−36	1.8	2.9	1	−20
Greater Paris	1972–76[e]	221	344	−36	1.4	2.0	−38	−44
Origin of Jews:								
Europe		257			1.6		−44	−44
Africa-Asia		199			1.2		−31	−43

Brussels (Belgium)	1957–61	238	322	–26	1.4	2.0	–31	–27
Netherlands	1962–66	302	406[f]	–26	1.8	3.0	8	4
Switzerland	1956–60	315	383	–18	1.9	2.3	–10	–3
	1966–70	305	364	–16	1.8	2.3	–5	–16
Italy	1961–65	303	398	–24	1.8	2.4	3	20
	1966–70	249	396	–37	1.5	2.4	–24	–37
Israel (Jews)	1971–75	529			3.2		18	–4
Origin of Jews:								
Europe	1975	492			2.8		30	8
Africa-Asia	1975	560			3.6		10	–12

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[a] For explanation of technical terms, see text. The measures for Jews relate to "effectively Jewish" fertility and births.

[b] Per cent change in interval between the two latest 5-year periods.

[c] Whites.

[d] 1970 only.

[e] Average for the 5-year interval(s) preceding the years indicated.

[f] 1963–1967.

Sources and methods: see Appendix.

TABLE 4. AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN PER JEWISH WOMAN, BY AGE OF WOMEN, COUNTRY AND YEAR

	U.S.A.	Canada		Argentina	Australia	Greater Paris 1972-76			Netherlands	Italy	European Immigrants to Israel
						Origin of Jews:					
	1971	1961	1971	1960	1966	Total	Europe	Africa-Asia	1966	1965	1955–61[a]
	Jewish Women, by Age at Enumeration										
Age:											
15–19	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
20–24	0.2	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.5
25–29	1.1	1.6	1.1	1.0	1.4	0.7	0.5	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.2
30–34	2.2	2.0	2.1	1.6	2.0	1.4	1.1	1.8	1.5	1.4	1.6
35–39	2.4	2.2	2.4	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.6	1.7
40–44	2.2	2.0	2.4	2.0	1.9	2.6	2.0	3.1	1.7	1.9	1.9
45–49	2.4	1.9	2.3	2.0	1.7	2.5	1.9	3.0	1.8	2.0	1.7
50–54	2.1	1.8	2.0	2.0	1.6	2.3	1.6	3.1	n.a.	1.3	2.0
55–59	1.8	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.4	2.6	1.7	3.8	n.a.	1.8	
60–64	1.6	2.3	1.8	2.4	1.4	2.6	1.8	3.8	n.a.	1.6	
65–69	1.4	3.3	1.9	2.8	1.4	2.8	1.8	4.7	n.a.	1.7	
70+	2.2		3.0	3.4	1.8				n.a.	1.9	

Jewish Women with Virtually Completed Fertility (Aged 35–39 and Over at Enumeration), by Approximate Year When They Reached Age 25–29

Year:											
1920	2.2	3.3	3.0	3.2	1.8	2.7	2.2	4.4	n.a.	1.9	2.0
1925		2.3		2.4	1.4				n.a.	1.7	
1930	1.4	2.0	1.9	2.2	1.4	2.8	1.6	4.9	n.a.	1.6	
1935	1.6	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.4				n.a.	1.8	
1940	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0	1.6	2.6	1.8	3.8	n.a.	1.3	1.7
1945	2.1	2.0	2.0	2.0	1.7	2.6	1.7	3.8	1.8	2.0	1.9
1950	2.4	2.2	2.3	1.9	1.9	2.3	1.6	3.1	1.7	1.9	1.7
1955	2.2		2.4		2.1	2.5	1.9	3.0	1.8	1.6	
1960	2.4		2.4		2.6	2.6	2.0	3.1			
1965						1.9	1.8	2.1			

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[a] Married women (in first marriage), by age at time of immigration.

Sources and measures: see Appendix.

children.[6] Table 4a presents analogous data for currently married Jewish women from three country-wide surveys taken in the United States in the 1970's, as well as data on the number of children expected by these women. Table 4a contains comparisons with women in the general population.

The data presented in Table 2 on births and in Tables 3, 4, and 4a on fertility of Diaspora Jews can be summed up as follows: Jewish fertility and birth rate are lower than in the corresponding general population; both have declined; both are by now usually insufficient for the continuing replacement of Diaspora populations; there are differences in the present levels of fertility and birth rate between various regional types of Diaspora populations.

Jewish fertility and birth rates in the Diaspora have, for a long time, been markedly and consistently lower than those of the general populations. Also, several studies conducted in the United States since the 1950's have

TABLE 4a. FERTILITY OF CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN IN THE U.S.A., BY AGE

Age	Jewish Women			All White Women	
	1971	1973	1976	1973	1976
	Average Number of Children Born				
15–19	0.3	n.a.	n.a.	0.4	0.5
20–24	0.5	n.a.	n.a.	0.9	0.8
25–29	1.3	1.0	1.1	1.6	1.5
30–34	2.2	2.1	1.7	2.5	2.4
35–39	2.4	2.5	2.4	3.0	2.8
40–44	2.2	2.7	2.5	3.2	3.2
	Average Number of Children Expected				
15–19	2.7	n.a.	n.a.	2.4	2.4
20–24	2.5	1.6	2.1	2.3	2.2
25–29	2.3	2.1	2.2	2.4	2.2
30–34	2.4	2.1	2.0	2.8	2.6
35–39	2.4	2.6	2.1	3.2	2.8
40–44	2.2	2.8	2.6	3.2	3.2

Sources: see Appendix.

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[6] It is usual for the question to be confined to married or ever-married women (the latter include also the divorced and widowed), but we have been able to convert this information into fertility data with regard to all women, of given age, in a Jewish population. This indicator is needed for assessing the demographic replacement of the population as a whole.

shown that Jews desire and expect fewer children than do members of other groups and are more efficient in the application of family planning practices. This is partly attributable to the fact that Jews are heavily concentrated in the major urban centers, where the reproduction of the general population is below that of the country as a whole. However, even in the great cities some differential in reproductive behavior between Jews and all other inhabitants usually persists. Thus, the Current Population Survey undertaken by the Bureau of the Census in March 1957 indicated that the average number of children born to Jewesses aged 15–44 fell short by 28 per cent of that for all white women, by 21 per cent of that for all urban women, and by 9 per cent of that for all women in urban areas with 3 million or more inhabitants.[7]

The levels of both Jewish fertility and birth rates in the Diaspora have been generally on the decline since the early 1960's, and in many countries even since the first half of the 1950's. This can be seen in those instances, in Tables 2 and 3, where data from several years are presented for the same Jewry. The same tendency is documented more fully by the columns of Table 3 which report on the per cent of change—recently, almost always a decline—in the number of effectively Jewish births and in the fertility ratio of Jewish Diaspora populations over the preceding 5-year interval. In most instances, the reductions in births and in fertility are seen to run parallel. This indicates that the downward change in births was mainly due to an actual drop in "effectively Jewish" fertility and not to a shift, for example, in age composition. We shall later show, through discussion of Table 4 and connected data, that the "full" fertility of the Jewesses has also gone down.

In addition to the data presented in Table 3, a reverse projection carried out on the basis of the age-sex composition of American Jews[8] revealed by the country-wide sample study of 1970–1971 (the National Jewish Population Study—NJPS), shows the following picture of changes in "effectively Jewish" reproductive behavior:

TABLE 4b. U.S. JEWISH BIRTHS AND FERTILITY: ESTIMATED PER CENT CHANGE OVER 5 YEARS

Interval	Effectively Jewish Births	Fertility Ratio
1957–61 to 1962–66	−32	−26
1962–66 to 1967–71	−30	−41

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[7] The data cover women of all marital status categories, and are standardized for age.

[8] Jews only, i.e., excluding non-Jews in households defined as Jewish by the NJPS.

Likewise, among the Jews of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) in the Soviet Union, a drastic decline in effectively Jewish births can be inferred from the following data, which demonstrate that the younger the age group, the more pronounced the reduction in the average number of Jews.

TABLE 4c. AGE DISTRIBUTION OF YOUNG JEWS IN RSFSR, 1970

Age Group	Jews	Average of Jews per Year of Age	
		Number	Per Cent Change from Next Older Group
16–19	31,375	7,844	
11–15	34,335	6,867	−12.5
0–10	56,002	5,091	−25.9

This trend of declining Jewish reproduction makes it imperative to pay close attention to chronology in comparing data for various countries, which are only available from different years.

JEWISH FERTILITY INSUFFICIENT FOR DEMOGRAPHIC REPLACEMENT

For minimal replacement of a Diaspora Jewish community at the present very low level of mortality, a fertility ratio of about 350 Jewish children aged 0–4 per 1,000 Jewish women aged 15–44, or a total fertility rate of about 2.1 Jewish children per Jewess,[9] is needed (see Table 3). In the retrospective data of Tables 4 and 4a, an average of 2.1–2.2 children per any woman, or about 2.2–2.4 children per married woman, would have sufficed for ordinary demographic replacement of a Jewish population if the woman had reached the terminal ages of fertility in the recent past. Higher figures were required for older women, whose fertile period stretched back to an earlier period when mortality was higher, for spouses in mixed marriages if a majority of their children were not Jews,[10] and for Holocaust survivors who experienced inordinately high child mortality. Tables 3 and 4 show very few examples of Diaspora Jewries whose fertility has recently reached the minimal replacement level. Around 1961 Canadian and Australian Jews did reproduce themselves at an "effectively Jewish" level which, if continued, might have ensured replacement. By 1971, however, their reproductive performance had dropped far below this level.

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[9] As somewhat fewer girls than boys are born, and some of the children die before reaching maturity, an average of 2.1 children per woman is required for replacement even with very low mortality.

[10] While the data on Jews in Table 3 reflect "effectively Jewish" fertility, those in Tables 4 and 4a report on the "full" fertility of the Jewesses concerned, as stated above.

The decline in the effectively Jewish total fertility rate of U.S. Jews, roughly estimated from the NJPS data,[11] is as follows: 3.2 in 1957–1961; 2.1 in 1962–1966; and 1.4 in 1967–1971. The U.S. National Natality Study 1967–1969, a sample survey of women who gave birth during those years, yielded figures on the number of child-bearing women who were reported as Jewesses, by age of women.[12] Recomputing from them, an estimate of approximately 1.7–1.8 for the total fertility of Jewesses in those years can be inferred,[13] as compared to 2.4 among the entire white population of the United States. Other sample studies, carried out in the United States in 1971, 1973, and 1976, have indicated declining trends and low figures for the number of children born and expected by married Jewish women in the younger procreative ages (see Table 4a).[14] In all age groups investigated, both the actually achieved and the expected fertility of Jewish women were considerably below that of all white women.[15] It is possible, though not statistically substantiated, that at the same time a relative reduction occurred in new marriages of Jews. This would have further diminished the reproductivity of the U.S. Jewish population.

All the above data point to a recent drop of fertility among U.S. Jews, which has rendered it insufficient for "full," and especially for "effectively Jewish," demographic replacement.

Among all the larger Diaspora Jewries for which statistical information exists, only the Jews of South Africa had a reproductive level somewhat above minimal replacement by the beginning of the 1970's. However, analysis of the data from two studies conducted in 1972 and 1974 points to a downward trend there also. Moreover, with the atypical exception of the Jews of Iran, no other large Jewries among those for which data are absent can be assumed to have had a fertility sufficient for demographic replacement. The indirect evidence, based on analogies with geographically close and typologically similar Jewish populations for which relevant data exist, points decisively in the opposite direction.

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[11] The estimates have been obtained by applying the indirect methods used in Table 3 (see Appendix), excluding non-Jews in households defined as Jewish.

[12] See S.Goldstein, "Jewish Fertility in Contemporary America," in P. Ritterband, (ed.), *Modern Jewish Fertility* (Leiden, in press).

[13] Goldstein himself arrived at fertility estimates ranging between 1.41 and 1.53. We have assumed for the computation of the fertility rate a provisionally estimated total of U.S. Jews at the time of the NJPS which is close to that underlying Goldstein's highest fertility figure. But we have excluded from the published age-sex distribution of the NJPS the non-Jews who were enumerated in households defined as Jewish by that survey. This raises the fertility rate, as non-Jews were relatively frequent among the young women in the NJPS, due to mixed marriages. However, few childbearing Jewesses were included in the survey.

[14] See also the article by Sidney Goldstein in the present volume, pp. 3–59.

[15] The data from those surveys relate to the "full" fertility of Jewesses and not to "effectively Jewish" fertility. Few Jewish women, however, were included in the two cycles of the National Survey of Family Growth.

Research on the family formation patterns of married Jewish women in the Diaspora shows that most of their reproduction is achieved during ten years or less from first marriage, that it falls within the 20–34 age range, and that it displays its peak activity at ages 25–29. These facts are also reflected in the data of Tables 4 and 4a on the fertility achieved by Jewish women up to given ages (cumulative fertility). It should be kept in mind that these data are cross-sectional;[16] the women of each age-group at the time of enumeration were different individuals, born in different years, and married under different societal conditions. Moreover, the reported enumerations were spread over two decades. The same information has been partially recast in the lower section of Table 4, which shows the virtually completed fertility of Jewesses (aged 35 and over) according to the approximate calendar years when they were age 25–29, and thus in the central stage of their reproductive performances. In this form the table shows more conveniently for Jews of European origin the higher fertility that prevailed up to the 1920's (this can be seen in Table 4, especially among Jewish populations which absorbed comparatively many immigrants from Eastern Europe between the World Wars, e.g., in Canada and Argentina); the depression of cumulative fertility resulting from the slump of births in the 1930's and early 1940's; and the boost in cumulative fertility produced by the "baby boom" around 1950, which in North America and Australia extended until the early 1960's. The onset of the recent fertility reduction is seen among the younger women in the upper part of the table, though their cumulative fertility was, of course, not yet complete. The upper part of Table 4 also shows that the Oriental Jewish women who lived in Greater Paris in the 1970's and were below age 40 had attained very low fertility.

One feature of the displayed fertility data requires special elucidation. Table 3 shows for the Jews of the United States and Canada in the early 1970's low fertility insufficient for replacement, while the upper part of Table 4 and Table 4a indicate that the virtually completed fertility of the Jewish women there, who were aged 35–49 at that time, stood on average at the substantial level of 2.2–2.7 children. The explanation for this lies in the difference between current and retrospective measurement of fertility. The higher figures in Tables 4 and 4a reflect the results of the preceding "baby boom" period. While the cumulative fertility of Jewesses in Canada at ages 25–29 reached an average of 1.6 children in 1961, it was only 1.1 children by 1971. Moreover, for Canadian Jewesses aged 20–24, the average number of children born had declined from 0.5 to 0.2. Analogously, the recent data for the United States have revealed a reduction in the number of children achieved and expected by the younger Jewish women.

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[16] As distinct from a cohort analysis which follows up the same persons through various ages.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The future development of fertility patterns among Jewish Diaspora populations remains to be seen. The level reported in the late 1960's and early 1970's was already very low. In addition, the fertility decline of the general populations of the Diaspora countries appeared to be gathering further momentum in the first half of the 1970's. Since Jews have been extreme exemplars of the modern demographic trends, some further reduction of fertility in the Diaspora, especially where it has not been at its lowest levels, seems quite possible. Moreover, "effectively Jewish" fertility can be further eroded by out-marriages and/or advanced marginality.

For about a decade, however, an opposite influence will also operate on Jewish birth rates. As pointed out, the crude birth rate is affected by changes in the age composition of a population, especially in the proportion of women at their most fertile ages. And indeed, throughout the Jewish Diaspora, as in the general populations of the advanced countries, the relatively many children born during the "baby boom" around 1950 are now moving into the procreative age range. In particular, a sudden increase was due in the second half of the 1970's in the number of Jewish women aged 25–29 —the most fertile age group. The changes that have taken place in the size of female age groups in some Diaspora populations can be inferred from the

TABLE 5. RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF JEWISH WOMEN, BY SELECTED AGE, COUNTRY AND YEAR
(30–34 Years Old Women = 100)

Country	Year	Age of Women						
		30–34	25–29	20–24	15–19	10–14	5–9	0–4
U.S.A.	1970–71	100	102	191	201	206	146	103
Canada	1971	100	137	186	183	157	132	118
Sao Paulo	1968–69	100	90	132	180	136	132	80
South Africa	1970	100	114	147	151	134	129	146
Australia	1971	100	132	196	170	158	120	122
Greater Paris	1972–76	100	100	132	128	121	120	77
Netherlands	1966	100	130	127	229	137	113	123
Switzerland	1970	100	106	134	129	98	103	96
Italy	1965	100	115	115	184	143	118	128

data in Table 5, e.g., the high frequencies of 20–24 year olds who were enumerated around 1970, or 15–19 year olds enumerated in the mid-1960's.

The increase in the number of Jewish women who are in their most fertile ages may tend temporarily to boost the number and crude rate of Jewish newborn, if actual fertility remains equal;[17] alternatively, it will for some time compensate, wholly or partly, for any further declines in the "full" or "effectively Jewish" fertility of Jews.[18] The essentially transient nature of this phenomenon, however, must be realized.

Marriage Patterns

Marriage patterns have a great bearing on fertility and on the maintenance of the size and cohesion of a minority group.

For lack of space we shall refrain from dwelling here in any detail on recent Jewish marriage patterns insofar as the propensity to marry and the age of marrying are concerned. Suffice it to state that the average age at first marriage is usually higher among Diaspora Jews than among corresponding general populations, and that there is a tendency for greater percentages of Jews not to marry at all. These features relate to both sexes, and reduce the average number of fertile years spent in marriage per Jew/Jewess. They therefore tend to diminish fertility.

Recently, trends toward increased frequency of informal unions, postponement of formal marriage, and rising divorce rates have manifested themselves among the general populations of the developed countries. These factors account in part for the present fertility decline. Though similar tendencies are likely to operate among Diaspora Jews as well, statistical evidence is still lacking.

OUT-MARRIAGE OF JEWS

Out-marriage is one of the causes of the low level of effectively Jewish fertility. If, as has been the case recently, the latter is barely sufficient or outrightly insufficient for the replacement of Jewish Diaspora populations, any additional net losses due to increased out-marriage will aggravate an already precarious situation. Moreover, apart from the direct effect of out-marriage on Diaspora population dynamics, its frequent occurrence may weaken the cohesion, and therefore the future demographic staying-power, of Jewish populations.

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[17] In Diaspora Jewries where the baby boom was relatively short-lived, such as South Africa, Switzerland, and Argentina, the expected upward influence on natality will be limited. In the United States and Canada this influence will be prolonged, because the original baby boom lasted longer there.

[18] In the next section we shall point out that strong alternations in the size of age groups, as documented for Jewish females in Table 5, constitute a demographic incentive for rising out-marriage.

The tendency to out-marry is a consequence of the social and spiritual situation of Diaspora Jewry—the weakening of religious commitment, especially insofar as behavioral observance is concerned; the cultural and social integration of Jews into the majority populations of many of the countries in which they live, involving schooling, work, and recreation in religiously mixed settings; the freedom of individuals in choosing a marriage partner; and the desirability of some Jews as marriage partners, because of wealth, good education, talent, etc.

Though the major determinants of modern out-marriage by Jews are socio-psychological in nature, some more specifically demographic factors are also operative. The small size of the Jewish population in certain localities is apt to increase out-marriage, since a small population is more likely to have an irregular age-sex structure, thus impeding the formation of endogamous couples.

The alternation of strong and weak Jewish birth cohorts also raises the likelihood of out-marriage. Since grooms are, on the average, a few years older than brides at the contraction of first marriage, the following disparities arose in the past: as a consequence of the gradually intensifying recession of births in the 1930's and early 1940's, the Jewish men born in the earlier part of that period failed to be matched, when they reached marriageable age, by sufficient numbers of Jewish women; conversely, the girls born during the early phases of the ensuing baby boom were not matched sufficiently by boys born toward the end of the preceding slump in births. By a renewed reversal, then, the Jewish boys born toward the end of the most recent baby boom will not find sufficient Jewish partners among the girls born during the current fertility decline. While in actual fact the demographic realities are more complex than these simplifications—particularly since the difference in marriage age between the two sexes is not constant—they do not detract from the basic relevance of alternating strong and weak birth cohorts as a determinant of out-marriage by Jews.[19]

In the interpretation of data on out-marriage by Jews, careful attention must be paid to several definitional and terminological matters. When a Jew marries a non-Jew, each partner may adhere to his or her religion; or alternatively, religious uniformity may be achieved by conversion of one of the partners either before the wedding or subsequently.[20] We shall use the term "mixed marriage" for the former situation and "intermarriage" for the latter, with the term "out-marriage" covering the whole complex. The data available, if any, from official statistics relate to mixed marriages.

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[19] It is true that similar alternations of strong and weak birth cohorts took place among the corresponding general populations. However, Jews are now such a small minority everywhere in the Diaspora that their requirements of match-making need not be viewed as being decisively affected by general squeezes in the "marriage market." The situation may be different in certain cities with a considerable proportion of Jews in the total population, e.g., New York.

Out-marriage data may relate to current weddings indicated in marriage statistics, or to all couples existing in a population as enumerated in a census or survey. Since the frequency of out-marriage has risen in recent decades, data of the former type indicate higher levels of the phenomenon than do data of the latter type.

Out-marriage data may relate to Jewish persons or to couples with at least one Jewish partner. It should be noted that in the same factual situation, the latter type of data indicates higher percentages of out-marriage than does the former type. This is so because an endogamous Jewish couple is reckoned as two persons in the enumeration of marrying or married Jews, but as only one counting-unit, just like any mixed match, in the enumeration of couples with at least one Jewish partner.

There are uncertainties with regard to the "unknown" category of religious classification in official statistics on weddings or couples. The designation "unknown" may hide a Jew/Jewess who has not converted out, and who might, on other occasions, be included in a count of Jews.

MEASUREMENT OF OUT-MARRIAGE BY JEWS

Data on out-marriages of Jews are poor in quantity and quality. Official statistics, available only for a limited number of countries, tend to understate the phenomenon, as they usually take into account only the current situation (at the time of the wedding, or of the census), disregarding prior conversions; they reflect mixed marriages but not intermarriages. Jewish-sponsored sample surveys, if undertaken with some sophistication, inquire not only about present religion (or Jewishness otherwise defined) but also about religion at birth, religion of parents, etc. On the other hand, they often have great difficulty in identifying some types of out-married Jews or ex-Jews (in particular, originally Jewish wives who live in non-Jewish surroundings), and in obtaining responses from them. Because of these objective difficulties, Jewish-sponsored sample surveys may end up underestimating the volume of Jewish out-marriage and getting a nonrepresentative picture of the persons involved.

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[20] Under present conditions, uniformity of an originally mixed couple may be achieved even without formal conversion. Moreover, in Eastern Bloc countries, and for some elsewhere as well, it is no longer religion but other criteria that define Jewishness. Even the validity of formal conversions is contested among the several branches of organized Judaism.

Aside from direct statistics on Jewish out-marriage, several other types furnishing indirect indications are sometimes available, e.g., official statistics on newborn children by religion of both parents, or on divorcing couples by religion of both partners. Even a sharp decrease in synagogue marriages may be indicative of a rise in out-marriage.

Despite the quantitative and qualitative deficiencies, a considerable amount of statistical information on recent Jewish out-marriage has been accumulated, and there is wide consensus on the saliency of the phenomenon. Table 6 presents some general data on current mixed marriages and existing mixed couples among Diaspora populations.

In the United States, the Current Population Survey of 1957 found 8 per cent of mixed couples among those with at least one Jewish partner. The NJPS of 1970–1971 came up with a figure of 17 per cent out-married couples, including those in which a spouse had converted to Judaism and some in which neither spouse was actually Jewish at the time of the survey (but which belonged to the enlarged Jewish population covered by the survey). From the published data the following approximate extent of mixed marriage by persons reported as actual Jews with actually non-Jewish partners could be inferred: 7 per cent of Jewish husbands, 5 per cent of Jewish wives, and 11 per cent of couples with at least one Jewish partner. The NJPS showed a marked rise of recent out-marriage, though its exact extent remained a matter of dispute (see footnote 29).

The available information makes it clear that out-marriage is found to a considerable extent in most Diaspora populations. There are great differences in the level of Jewish out-marriage between geographic regions, individual countries, and cities. It is especially common in some European countries, where an absolute majority of the newly married couples involving a Jewish partner are mixed. A marked rise in the relative frequency of out-marriage has recently occurred everywhere, except perhaps where its level was already previously very high. One gets the impression that the rising trend, which applies also to the United States, is continuing. Within the same Diaspora country there is a tendency for greater prevalence of out-marriage where fewer Jews reside, and where they are more acculturated. So far it has been usual to find greater proportions out-married among Jewish men than Jewish women. Yet, it must be realized that even high levels of out-marriage actually signify a marked persistence of Jewish endogamy. Since Jews are a small minority nearly everywhere in the Diaspora, if they were to contract their marriages randomly, hardly any endogamous unions would be formed.

TABLE 6. MIXED MARRIAGES OF JEWS, BY COUNTRY AND PERIOD

Country	Period	% in Mixed Marriages among		
		Jewish Husbands	Jewish Wives	Couples with Jewish Partner(s)
			New Weddings	
Canada[a]	1961–65	12	6	17
	1966–70	14	10	21
	1971–76	21	16	31
Netherlands[b]	1960–65	54	45	67
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	1961–65	78	43	81
	1966–70	67	45	74
	1971–75	69	57	78
Switzerland	1961–65	49	31	58
	1966–70	44	26	56
	1971–75	45	42	61
		All Married Couples in Population		
U.S.A.	1957	6	3	8
	1970–71[c]	(7)	(5)	(11)
Canada[a], total	1951	7	4	11
total	1971	9	6	14
Jewish centers		7	5	12
Other		17	13	26
South Africa, Jewish centers	1974	2	0	3
Australia, total	1961	12	6	15
total	1971	14	10	21
Jewish centers		12	9	20
Other		24	20	36
Netherlands	1966	42	34	55
Switzerland	1950	19	10	26
	1960	25	12	32
	1970	24	13	32
Italy	1965	23	10	29

[a] For weddings in Canada—Jews according to religion (since 1974 excluding Quebec); for couples in Canadian population—Jews according to ethnicity.

[b] Married Jews in 1966 survey whose wedding occurred in 1960–1965.

[c] See explanations in text.

Sources and measures: see Appendix.

DEMOGRAPHIC CONSEQUENCES OF OUT-MARRIAGE

The demographic consequences of out-marriage for a Jewish population can be divided into short- and long-range effects as they relate to the out-marrying Jews themselves and to their children and subsequent descendants.

In the past it was customary for out-marrying Jews to adopt the Christianity of their mates. Presently, it is usual for each partner to retain his or her religion, so that a mixed couple is formed. It also happens that the non-Jewish partner, generally the wife, formally accepts Judaism or becomes informally committed to the Jewish group. In discussions in the United States on the demographic consequences of out-marriage, conversions to Judaism are often emphasized; the claim is put forward that the conversion balance is positive on the Jewish side. However, the situation in this regard varies from country to country. Moreover, the information available to Jewish bodies on conversions for reason of marriage may be biased in favor of cases where Judaism is accepted. Above all, as stated above, religious conversions at the present time seem to occur only in a minority of out-marriages. This has been amply confirmed for the United States by the NJPS.[21] The demographically decisive factors in terms of the short-range consequences of out-marriage, therefore, are the fertility of out-married couples and, most especially, the religious designation and consequent upbringing of their children.

There is some indication that the fertility of mixed couples is lower than that of endogamous Jewish unions—other relevant characteristics being equal.[22] However, this issue requires a good deal of further empirical study. If such differentials are confirmed, they might perhaps be attributable to some correspondence between the types of Jews who exercise particularly vigorous birth control and those who out-marry.

In out-marriages, where one partner has converted, it may be presumed that the children will be brought up in the religion which now unites the parents. The problem of the children's religious identity, therefore, pertains to overtly mixed couples, which are thought to constitute in our time the great bulk of the out-married. At any rate, the children of those mixed marriages in which the Jewish partner is not only out-married but also very marginal, are not likely to grow up as Jews.

The empirical information available on the religion of children born to mixed couples is very fragmentary. Obviously, it is not a knowledge of particular instances that is needed, but a statistical assessment of the proportion of such children actually being reared as Jews. Official data on births or on children in a population, by religion of both parents and of the children themselves, are very rare. Inferences can be drawn by comparing the number of young Jewish children in a population to the actual or expected[23] number of recent births to Jewish women. If the former number falls considerably short of the latter, it is clear that some of the children born to Jewish women were not reported as Jews in the population count.[24] But the main source of information should be surveys which permit detailed investigation of the religious composition of households with Jewish members.

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[21] F. Massarik and A. Chenkin, "United States National Jewish Population Study: A First Report," AJYB, Vol. 74, 1973, p. 296.

[22] Here the "full" and not the "effectively Jewish" fertility of the mixed couples is meant.

Since in cases of mixed marriage the parental generation is evenly divided between Jews and non-Jews, a majority of the children in either direction signifies gain or loss for the respective Jewish population. The statistical indications available on this issue point in most cases, especially in Europe, to net losses for the Jewish group. Any recent very low levels of "effectively Jewish" birth rates ought probably to be interpreted as the combined result of reduced fertility and net losses of children due to out-marriage.

While some of the data on U.S. Jewry released by the NJPS require additional evaluation,[25] two stark facts stand out:[26] 22.5 per cent of the young children (aged 0–4) in households classified as Jewish[27] were not Jews; and the respective percentage was increasing rapidly, since it amounted to only 6.5–7 per cent for the 5–9 and 10–14 year olds. This corresponded to the sharp rise in the frequency of out-marriage which was indicated by the same survey. To arrive at a clear picture of the recent demographic loss or gain to the U.S. Jewish population through out-marriage, it would be necessary to know, *inter alia:* the religious composition (including religion prior to marriage) of all those couples to which the 0–4 years old children who were reported in the NJPS were born; the respective fertility of the endogamously Jewish couples and the out-married couples; and the degree to which the survey actually succeeded in representing individuals at the margins of the population intended to be covered, such as out-married and alienated Jews living in very "un-Jewish" surroundings.[28] On the basis of the various bits of evidence already available,[29] it may be doubted whether the overtly mixed couples who had engendered most of the reported 22.5 per cent non-Jews among the children aged 0–4 really brought at least half their children into the Jewish fold.

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[23] As computed from data on the fertility of Jewish women.

[24] The more so as some of the children in the population who were actually reported as Jews may have been born to non-Jewish wives of Jewish husbands.

[25] E.g., a table was published on "children's religious orientation," but without breakdown by period of marriage (F. Massarik, and A. Chenkin, *op. cit.,* p. 298).

[26] F. Massarik, "The Boundary of Jewishness—Some Measures of Jewish Identity in the United States," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Gliksc[illegible] and S Della Pergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973* (Jerusalem, 1977), p. 12[illegible]

[27] In the enumeration stage of the NJPS, [illegible] in the data here quoted, a wide definition of Jewishness was used, including [illegible] none of whose members was a Jew at the time of the survey, though at leas[illegible] had a [illegible]ish parent. The quoted NJPS figures are, of course, subject to sampling errors.

Special note should be taken of the effects of Jewish out-marriage in Eastern Bloc countries, where out-marriage is reported to be frequent. Because of the social pressures of endemic antisemitism and the weak state of religious life, it is unlikely for the children of such unions to become or remain Jews. Generally those European Jewries which show the highest tendency to out-marriage also have a very low effectively Jewish reproductivity.

As to the long-range consequences of out-marriage, it is clear that under the conditions of the Diaspora, where Jews are a small and sometimes even tiny minority, Jewish survival depends, in the long run, not only on patterns of demographic behavior, but also on the ability and readiness to transmit to further generations a sufficient sense of Jewish values to make them willing to maintain their distinctiveness in the face of religio-culturally different majority populations. This challenge confronts every Jewish family in the Diaspora. When, because of out-marriage, children are not brought up as Jews, their "non-Jewishness" is generally final. When children from out-marriages, in particular overtly mixed unions, grow up as Jews, only the future, over several generations, can reveal the strength of Jewish commitment that will be maintained. It is not difficult to speculate that this commitment will further weaken under the ever-mounting pressure of increased secularization, integration, and out-marriage. Empirical information, though sparse, indicates that children from out-marriages who grow up as Jews tend to out-marry more than other Jews. With regard to mixed unions where the children are not brought up as Jews, one certain and important demographic effect is a lack of inter-generational Jewish replacement. The out-married person may remain a Jew until death, but he/she will not be replaced demographically. Given the facts that most persons today marry as young adults and have a life span of 70 years or more, and that mixed marriages have been growing rapidly in many important Diaspora countries in the last few decades, as long as they live, the many Jews who have recently contracted mixed marriages will, by their very survival, delay the numerical attrition of Jewish Diaspora populations. But when they die—which will happen in great numbers toward the very end of this century—the numerical decline of Diaspora Jewries will be accelerated.

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[28] One of the reports on the NJPS states cautiously: "For those individuals who converted out of Judaism and others who made a purposeful move to completely cut ties with anything Jewish, together with their associated household members, the likelihood of failing to appear in a *Jewish* household survey was strong, despite the 'field definitions' employed." F. Massarik, "National Jewish Population Study: A New United States Estimate," AJYB, Vol. 75, 1974–75, p. 300.

[29] Data produced by various members of the scientific staff of the study differ somewhat in the definition used for the "Jewishness" of the individuals tabulated, the way the weighting of the sample figures was handled, and the criteria by which results were considered to be sufficiently reliable. See F. Massarik and A. Chenkin, *op. cit.*, "Explorations in Intermarriage," and D. Lazerwitz, "Current Jewish Intermarriages in the United States," in U.O. Schmelz, S. Della Pergola, and P. Glikson, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1977* (Jerusalem, 1980).

Marginality and Alienation

In the 19th and early 20th centuries it was not uncommon in Europe for assimilated Jews desirous of social advancement to embrace Christianity. This is illustrated by many well-known names in public life, scholarship, and the arts. In the climate of secularization and religious tolerance which prevails in most Diaspora countries today, conversions from Judaism—for the above-mentioned or other reasons—have become unusual. Absence of formal conversions also applies to Eastern Bloc countries, where religion in general is discouraged. On the other hand, there is at present widespread assimilation, but with complex and, in many countries, insufficiently studied patterns. For our purposes, the different stages of the assimilation process may be distinguished as follows: "estrangement," involving reduced participation, interest, or knowledge regarding Jewish matters in any respect (religious, communal, cultural, etc.); "marginality," corresponding to far-reaching estrangement; "alienation," consisting of deliberate repudiation by a person who was born Jewish of his Jewishness—this however without formal change of religion; and "out-conversion," signifying a Jew's formal embracement of another religion.

For the purpose of realistically delimiting and measuring Diaspora populations, the elimination of out-converts and the alienated from among the Jewish-born or in-converted is necessary. In practice, the distinction between the very marginal and the alienated is an important and difficult issue. This will be best determined by the individual's self-identification if questioned in a Jewish-sponsored survey.[30] Where it is impossible to distinguish between the actually alienated and the very marginal persons, for lack of evidence, it has been customary to extend the benefit of doubt, and to include both in the count of Jews. This imparts an upward bias to the resulting figures.

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[30] Reliance on a person's self-identification is in keeping with common practice in large-scale demographic data collection. Besides, a moral issue is involved—respect for a person's own will. An alienated individual, as defined here, or even an out-convert, may still be regarded as "Jewish" by some people, or evince an interest in certain Jewish matters, e.g., cultural subjects or support for Israel.

In the contemporary Diaspora, an unmistakable tendency to estrangement from Judaism and organized Jewish life prevails. Some of the specific factors operating to enhance estrangement are out-marriage, ideological opposition (often based on leftist political views), and sheer indifference. These factors often overlap; individuals who are indifferent or negatively oriented toward Judaism are more likely to out-marry, and if they do, they move even farther away from Jewishness. In our time, marginality appears to be particularly frequent among young adults. However, very marginal and even alienated persons may later change their minds for reasons having to do with becoming older, assuming the responsibilities of child-rearing, world events (particularly as they pertain to Israel, Soviet Jewry, antisemitic outrages), etc. The increasing "respectability" of being Jewish in important Diaspora countries can also counteract tendencies toward alienation that are influenced by practical considerations. In reality, marginal persons are often inconsistent and are apt, under different circumstances, to admit or disclaim a Jewish identity.

In most Diaspora countries no detailed socio-demographic surveys have yet been undertaken that would permit us to distinguish between marginal and alienated persons for improved assessment of actual Jewish population size. Practical difficulties arise from the inevitable crudeness of terminology, definitions, and procedures employed in large-scale enumerations when confronted by such subtle and evasive phenomena. There exists also the danger of willful distortions; some persons who otherwise admit to a Jewish identity have been known to disclaim their Jewishness in an official census,[31] either as a practical precaution toward their Gentile surroundings or because the census inquired into religion and they are non-religious Jews. On the other hand, Jewish-sponsored data collection confronts great difficulties in reaching very marginal or alienated people.

The alienated, as defined above, deliberately place themselves outside the actual Jewish population, and this usually applies to their children as well. Advanced marginality is likely to express itself, in terms of Jewish population size, only in the next generation—a phenomenon similar to what happens at the present time with many out-marriages. If a very marginal Jew or Jewess is out-married, the chance of his or her children being raised as Jews is extremely slim. Also some endogamous couples of marginal Jews do not encourage their children to grow up as Jews. The likelihood is considerable that the children of the very marginal will be raised in an environment devoid of Jewish content, and will eventually remove themselves from Jewish life and perhaps out-marry.

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[31] Mostly by leaving the question on religion unanswered or declaring to have "no religion."

In the Eastern Bloc countries, where Jewish religious life is largely nonexistent, assimilatory pressures are particularly heavy, unless counterbalanced to some extent by latent or overt antisemitism, or evaded through emigration. Paradoxically, in the Soviet Union the Jewishness of individuals and their descendants is formally perpetuated by use of the term "Jew" in the entry for ethnic group in their identity documents.[32]

Assimilatory losses to Jewish populations comprise not only the alienated and out-converted, but also the children of out-marriages who are not raised as Jews.

Mortality

Jews, as a group, have a low rate of mortality, resulting in high average length of life.[33] This can be attributed to their socio-economic status, their concentration in large cities where health services are most readily available, and to the Jewish tradition of concern about health care. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, one of the most consistent demographic differences between Jews and Gentiles was the lower mortality of the former, especially in the case of children. The differentials in mortality between Jews and Gentiles in the developed countries have narrowed as a result of the great progress in public health care.

A radically contrasting picture is presented by the crude death rate of Jews, i.e., the number of deceased per 1,000 persons. Because of the greater "aging" of Jews as compared with the other inhabitants of the Diaspora countries, the former have increasingly higher crude death rates. This can be clearly seen from the data in Table 2. The differential is most pronounced in Europe, where the crude death rate of Jews in some areas is about twice that of the general population.

Aging

Demographic aging of a population manifests itself, in its advanced stages, through considerable and growing proportions of elderly persons. Such a trend prevails in all the developed countries, but it is much more pronounced among Jews than among the general populations.

As can be seen from Table 7, Diaspora Jewries contain substantial and rising percentages of elderly people, and have a higher median age[34] than the corresponding general populations. Where data from several surveys are indicated in Table 7 for the same Jewry, the intensification in aging which has taken place can be seen. Further aggravation of this situation in the near future can be inferred where a larger percentage of a Jewish population belonged recently to the 55–64 age group than to the 49–54 age group, or where these two percentages were similar. Among American and Canadian Jews in 1971, the 25–34 and 35–44 age groups were smaller than the group of 45–54 year olds. This reflected the recession in births that had taken place in the 1930's and early 1940's, and foreshadowed further accentuation of aging in the future. A similar predictive significance attaches to the very low proportions of young children throughout the Diaspora. Among the larger Diaspora Jewries, the phenomenon of aging is most pronounced in Europe.

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[32] Except for children of mixed couples who can choose, upon reaching the age of 16, the ethnic group to which they wish to belong.

[33] Here and subsequently in this article, average length of life means life expectancy at birth as computed by the life-table technique.

The main cause of the present aging of Jewish Diaspora populations is the prolonged prevalence of low fertility. Another contributing factor is the Holocaust, which exacted particularly heavy losses among those who were old people or children at the time. If the latter had survived, they would have been, roughly, in the 25–40 age range by 1970. Consequently, in the enumerations taken around 1970, their absence made itself felt among the Jewish populations which had been directly affected by the Holocaust or had absorbed relatively many of its survivors. Also playing a role is age-specific selectivity of population losses due to a negative migration balance (including the effect of *aliyah* to Israel) or to alienation, since these phenomena occur most frequently among young adults.

The strong aging of Jewish Diaspora populations has many societal consequences, including a reduced proportion in the labor force, growing dependency ratios, increased percentages of institutionalized persons, and shifts in the demand for communal services. In the narrowly demographic field, the advanced aging of a population, as displayed by contemporary Diaspora Jewries, depresses the number and crude rate of births, while it raises the number and crude rate of deaths. Hence, it has a negative effect on the balance of current population changes.

The Interrelationship of Internal Population Change Factors

So far we have considered separately the factors of internal change in Jewish Diaspora populations. In reality there is an interaction among them which, under the prevailing conditions, strengthens their negative effect on Jewish population size. Low fertility leads to aging, which, in turn, reduces the crude birth rate and raises the crude death rate. To the extent that net

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[34] This is the age which divides a population into two numerically equal groups; 50 per cent are younger or older than the median age.

TABLE 7. AGE COMPOSITION OF JEWS AND MEDIAN AGE OF GENERAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRY AND YEAR
(By Per Cent)

Country	Year	All Ages	0–4	5–14	15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65–74	75+	Median Age	
												Jews	Gen. Pop.
U.S.A.	1970–71	100.0	4.8	17.1	18.1	9.8	12.1	14.0	11.9	8.1	4.1	35.2	28.9[a]
Canada	1961	100.0	8.2	19.4	11.8	11.3	15.5	16.0	9.6	5.9	2.3	34.4	26.3
	1971	100.0	5.9	14.7	18.3	11.7	10.5	13.8	13.3	7.9	3.9	34.4	26.4
Sao Paulo	1968–69	100.0	5.0	16.6	19.1	11.4	13.7	13.7	11.2	7.2	2.1	33.2	
Argentina	1960	100.0	5.5	15.0	14.8	15.0	14.3	15.6	12.0	5.8	2.0	34.8	27.0
South Africa	1970	100.0	7.8	15.9	16.8	11.9	10.8	11.8	13.4	8.5	3.1	32.8	26.0[a]
Australia	1961	100.0	6.7	17.6	10.7	9.9	16.3	17.4	12.0	9.4		38.1	29.4
	1971	100.0	5.6	12.6	16.8	10.3	10.5	16.1	15.2	12.9		40.2	27.7
Greater Paris	1972–76	100.0	4.4	16.0	18.2	12.5	12.1	13.7	11.7	7.8	3.6	34.0	32.4
Origin of Jews:													
Europe		100.0	4.3	16.2	14.8	10.5	11.3	14.1	14.2	9.7	4.9	39.1	
Africa-Asia		100.0	4.6	15.9	20.9	14.1	12.7	13.5	9.8	6.1	2.4	30.2	

Brussels (Belgium)	1961	100.0	4.0	12.3	11.0	11.5	12.0	18.1	19.5	7.9	3.7	44.3	40.0
Netherlands	1966	100.0	5.4	10.7	15.3	10.2	10.0	15.4	17.5	9.6	5.9	43.6	28.6
Germany (Fed. Rep.)	1961	100.0	3.6	11.1	5.4	7.5	15.6	18.2	19.1	13.3	6.2	49.0	34.6
	1970[b]	100.0	(11)		(13)	(10)	(11)	(16)	(19)	(14)	(6)	(48)	34.4
Switzerland	1960	100.0	5.1	12.3	11.4	10.9	11.4	15.5	14.7	11.4	7.3	44.0	32.6
	1970	100.0	5.3	11.4	13.8	10.9	10.3	11.7	15.1	12.9	8.6	43.4	32.1
Italy	1965	100.0	5.7	11.9	13.1	9.9	14.4	14.2	13.2	9.6	8.0	41.7	32.0
Russian Republic (in Soviet Union)[c]	1970	100.0	(11)		(10)	(13)	(15)	(16)	(16)	(19)		(46)	30.6
Israel	1975	100.0	11.4	18.4	19.0	14.0	10.2	10.1	8.4	6.0	2.5	25.7	
Origin of Jews:													
Europe		100.0	9.8	14.0	16.1	14.0	9.6	12.2	11.8	9.0	3.5	30.9	
Africa-Asia		100.0	13.0	22.9	22.0	14.0	10.8	7.9	4.9	3.1	1.4	21.3	
Iran	1966	100.0	10.8	26.3	19.0	13.6	11.8	8.0	5.3	5.2		21.1	17.3

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[a] Whites.

[b] Percentages computed from rounded figures of sample tabulation.

[c] Rough estimates made from the differently classified age data that were published.

Sources: see Appendix.

losses are incurred among Jewish Diaspora populations because of alienation or conversion from Judaism the negative factors in the current population dynamics are intensified. Out-marriage and alienation reduce the already low fertility of Diaspora Jewries to a still lower "effectively Jewish" fertility, and thus further depress both the current balance of population change and the long-range prospects of intergenerational replacement.

The balance of internal change in a Jewish Diaspora population is the product of two main components: the balance of natural changes and of affiliative changes. The balance of natural change (or "natural movement," i.e., the difference between births and deaths) has gone down consistently in the Diaspora since the "baby boom" around 1950. This decrease has been due to declining birth rates and growing death rates (in consequence of aging).

The crude rates in Table 2 convey the short-range picture of the numerical relationship between births and deaths. A sophisticated measure of the extent of intergenerational replacement is given by the net reproduction rates (NRR) of Table 8. For technical reasons, these rates assume that the detailed age-specific fertility and mortality patterns of the base period will continue unaltered. The NRR is not influenced by irregularities and changes in the age structure. Values of the NRR above 1.0 signify expected intergenerational growth; values below 1.0, if persisting over considerable time, indicate future decline of a population. Actually the NRR values for Jewish Diaspora populations in Table 8 are rough estimates, arrived at by an indirect method (see Appendix). As they are, they fell short of 1.0 by the end of the 1960's, thus pointing to the future population decrease—with the solitary exception of the Jews in South Africa. The NRR of Jews was lowest in Europe, and everywhere considerably lower than that of the corresponding general populations.

The long-range net effects of out-marriage and affiliative changes are, in all likelihood, negative for the size of most Jewish Diaspora populations. This compounds the effects of low fertility and reduces even further the insufficient demographic replacement. According to the indicators computed by this author for U.S. Jewry from the available NJPS data of 1970–1971,[35] the crude rate of natural movement was close to zero in 1967–1971 and perhaps subject to a slight temporary rise afterwards, because of the entry into the most fertile age groups of those born during the "baby boom." However, the NRR, which is so devised as to disregard the passing effects of age irregularities, indicated already then a clearly negative long-range trend with regard to future Jewish population size—0.7, or 30 per cent below the replacement level of 1.0. Both measurements relate to

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[35] Excluding non-Jews in households defined as Jewish by the study.

TABLE 8. NET REPRODUCTION RATES[a] OF JEWS AND GENERAL POPULATION, BY COUNTRY AND PERIOD

Country	Period	Jews	General Population
U.S.A.	1967–71	0.7	1.2[c]
Canada	1957–61	1.2	1.8
	1967–71	0.8	1.1
Sao Paulo	1965–69	0.6	
Argentina	1956–60	0.7	1.4
South Africa	1966–70	1.1	1.5[c,d]
Australia	1957–61	1.0	1.6
	1967–71	0.8	1.4
Greater Paris	1972–76[b]	0.6	0.9
Origin of Jews:			
Europe		0.7	
Africa-Asia		0.6	
Brussels (Belgium)	1957–61	0.7	0.9
Netherlands	1962–66	0.9	1.4
Switzerland	1956–60	0.9	1.1
	1966–70	0.9	1.1
Italy	1961–65	0.9	1.2
	1966–70	0.7	1.1
Israel (Jews)	1971–75	1.5	
Origin of Jews:			
Europe	1975	1.3	
Africa-Asia	1975	1.7	

[a] For explanation, see text. The rates for Jews relate to "effectively Jewish" net reproduction.

[b] Averages for the 5-year interval preceding the years indicated.

[c] Whites.

[d] 1970 only.

Sources and methods: see Appendix.

effectively Jewish reproduction in the United States, excluding non-Jewish children of Jewish parents. Any additional declines in fertility and/or negative shifts in the balance of affiliative changes will further reduce both the short- and long-range balance of internal demographic changes among U.S. Jewry.

Among the factors which at present tend to aggravate the demographic problems of Diaspora populations are their smallness, remoteness, and newness in their surroundings. Under the present conditions of secularization and social integration, these factors, so common in the long history of

Jewish dispersion, assume particular demographic importance.

The dispersal of the Diaspora Jews has been much intensified in the last hundred years and made truly global, though a great new nucleus has been created in the United States. Jews have been highly active in international and intercontinental migrations, as well as in residential shifts within countries. The Holocaust drastically reduced most European Jewries and scattered the survivors. The momentous ingathering of exiles in Israel has had the corollary of leaving extant no more than small remnants of previously large Jewries in some age-old Diaspora countries. While there are now eight Diaspora countries with Jewish populations above 100,000, most countries where Jews reside have but small or medium-sized Jewish populations. Moreover, great geographical scattering of Jews prevails within many countries and cities. In the United States, Jews have been moving to the West and South; in the USSR, to the Asian territories. Suburbanization of the Jews has taken place in metropolitan areas. These migratory movements within countries reflect, *inter alia,* the occupational and social mobility of many Jews, and will apparently continue. In some countries, particularly in the United States, there is a tendency for Jewish college students, who form a great proportion of young Jewish adults, to stay away for long periods from the parental home. Consequently, the majority of Diaspora Jews now live in places which were inhabited by few, if any, Jews a hundred years ago, and a considerable proportion reside in small clusters quite removed from one another. Moreover, even among the larger Jewish populations in urban areas, it is not uncommon for Jewish families to reside at a distance from other Jews.

The smallness and relative geographical isolation of Jewish groups hamper organization and maintenance of communal services, including the provision of Jewish education for the young. The newness of a Jewish group in a particular country, city, or neighborhood may also be associated with limited internal cohesion. All of this is conducive to estrangement, out-marriage, and the eventual alienation of Jews, and to loss of their children to the Jewish group. Besides, a small population is more likely to have an irregular age-sex structure, another factor that makes for out-marriage.

The Holocaust destroyed two thirds of European Jewry and about one third of the world Jewish population. The ravages of the Holocaust have led to far-reaching distortions in the age-sex composition of the survivors. These distortions, in turn, have intensified aging and out-marriage. In addition, there may have been psychological after-effects of the Holocaust which were of demographic significance, e.g., instances of decreased will for Jewish continuity. (Instances of the opposite phenomenon are also to be noted.) Nor are these only concerns of the past. The indirect after-effects of the Holocaust will continue to make themselves felt for decades to come—not only in Europe, but also among the Jewish populations elsewhere which absorbed considerable numbers of survivors.

Some fleeting reference must be made to the numerous countries with small Jewish populations. At the end of 1975 the number of such countries (with Jewish populations of between 100 and 20,000 persons), and the respective aggregates of Jews, were approximately as follows:

Number of Jews in Country		Number of Countries	Estimated Total of Jews
100 to less than 500		16	4,000
500 " " " 1,000		12	7,500
1,000 " " " 2,000		8	10,500
2,000 " " " 5,000		7	21,000
5,000 " " " 10,000		8	48,500
10,000 " " " 20,000		6	73,000
	Total:	57	164,500

There is no uniformity in the situation of these small Jewish populations, which are distributed over all regions of the world, and are unalike in their geographical distance from larger Jewish concentrations, their political climate, and their typology of Jews. A rough distinction may be made between these Jewries according to whether they are in the free and highly developed countries of the world, are in developing countries (except for the Arab states), are the small remnants of some East European Jewries, or are the small remnants of Jewries in Arabic-speaking countries. The first and third groups are exposed to especially strong assimilatory influences, while the second, third, and fourth groups have particularly distorted age-sex compositions.

The information available on several small and medium-sized Jewries, including some with above 20,000 persons, indicates advanced disintegration—very frequent out-marriage, very high aging, and a striking natural decrease (because of many deaths among the aged, and few effectively Jewish births). In the communist countries of Europe the religious and communal aspects of Jewish life have been greatly weakened, and there is no Jewish immigration from abroad. In Western Europe there is freedom of worship and organization and opportunity for Jewish cultural life. Besides, instances are not lacking in which the deficit of the internal Jewish population dynamics has been covered by immigration of Jews from abroad. Such reinforcements have, for the time being, maintained or even increased the size of certain Jewish populations in Western Europe which otherwise would have displayed a numerical decline.

DIFFERENTIALS AND TIME LAGS

In the preceding review of demographic conditions we have continually encountered differentials of two kinds: between Jews and corresponding general populations, and between various Jewries. As for Jewish-Gentile differentials, we have already noted that they are partially to be explained by factors which may be termed "positional," insofar as Jews are concentrated in certain sectors of the general population and display the features characteristic of those sectors—residence in large cities, advanced education, and economic affluence. Other factors include perennial minority status, high geographical and socio-occupational mobility, and perhaps mental and cultural peculiarities due to long historical conditioning and/or traditional "Jewish values." With regard to the differentials between Jewish populations, we have mentioned some explanatory elements: size, geographical proximity to Jewish centers, age-old or recent location, and the after-effects of the Holocaust.

Without wishing to detract from the relevance of the factors just noted, it is necessary to draw attention to an additional explanatory factor which has both analytical and some predictive value—the occurrence of timing differences in essentially analogous demographic evolutions. The modern demographic evolution of Jews in Europe, North America, and, in recent decades, the developing regions of the world, can be viewed as a shift away from traditional patterns, involving a reduction, first, of mortality and, then, of fertility. There have been time lags in the attainment of new patterns between "leading" and "lagging" population groups, between different countries (in Europe the innovations were transmitted from the northwest and center to the east and south), between urban and rural localities within the same country, and between the affluent and educated classes and the other social strata in the same country or locality.

A study of the demography of European Jews in the 19th and early 20th centuries (which is the only aspect of Jewish demography that affords both extensive statistical documentation and a considerable time perspective) makes it seem likely that a large part of the observable differentials in given years between Jews and the general population of any country or city, and between Jews in the Western and the Eastern regions of Europe, were in fact differences in the chronology of reaching a certain level in much the same demographic modernization process. Jews preceded the surrounding population in reducing, first, mortality and, then, fertility; similarly, Jews in the Western regions of Europe preceded those in the Eastern regions. Eventually, however, the lagging groups reached the level attained some time earlier by those whose transition had been faster. The differentials either persisted by and large, while moving to a new level, or narrowed as the group which had advanced later caught up with that which had preceded it.

It has already been noted that the general populations of the developed countries have virtually caught up with the Jews in terms of average length of life, and are moving like them, though at some distance behind, toward zero and perhaps negative population growth. Jews appear in this, as in other fields, as torch-bearers of "modernization." This is not to state, however, that full uniformity of demographic levels will soon or, perhaps, ever be reached between the general and Jewish populations in and among the various countries.

International Migrations

The Jews as a people have a long history of migration. This has been especially conspicuous over the past hundred years, and has resulted in a far-reaching redistribution of the world Jewish population. On the whole, it is the hope for social and economic betterment which makes Jews decide to move to another country, but there are other operative factors, including the desire for personal safety, political freedom, and status as Jews. The refugee aspect has been more prominent among Jews than among most other migrants.

There is a continual net transfer of Jews from the Diaspora as a whole to Israel, since the number of *olim* exceeds that of *yordim.* There are also some important Diaspora countries—the United States, Canada, and France—which have had a markedly positive migration balance for a long time; compared to the existing Jewish population, the migratory gains have been small in the United States in the last decades (except for Soviet Jews quite recently), whereas they have been considerable in Canada and particularly in France. Argentina, South Africa, and Australia, important destinations of Jewish migrants in the past, have virtually ceased to be so. On the other hand, the East European and, especially since 1948, the Islamic countries have been the main sources of Jewish emigration, resulting in several instances in the virtual disappearance of age-old Diaspora communities.

Otherwise there is little regularity. Jewish migration, like that of other groups, often shows a wave-like pattern, with peaks and troughs, depending on economic or political conditions in the countries of departure and arrival. Since the bulk of Jewish emigrants in recent decades have come from Eastern Europe and the Islamic countries, political circumstances in those countries, particularly changing attitudes of the authorities toward Jewish emigration, have had a great influence on the total volume of international migration of Jews. The Soviet Union is a case in point.

A multiplicity of migratory streams and trickles—far too complex and irregular to be followed up here in any detail—have proceeded between the various countries of Jewish residence. Since most Jewish migration for the last 30 years has been directed toward Israel, subsidiary migratory gains have accrued in this process to transit countries (e.g., Italy) and to the destinations of *yordim,* whose number tends to increase after an immigration wave to Israel. Many Diaspora populations in the free world during the last few decades have experienced net gains or losses as a result of migrations, depending on the circumstances in their own countries and elsewhere. In recent years several Jewish populations in Western Europe, including some medium-sized and small communities, have been numerically reinforced by emigrants from the Soviet satellites, Islamic countries, and South America, *noshrim* from the USSR, and *yordim* from Israel.

In the previous sections of this article we have outlined the trend toward zero or negative population growth in Jewish Diaspora populations. When the external migration balance is negative, it necessarily intensifies any internal population decrease; when it is positive, it helps to compensate for the internal demographic decline, and may result in numerical increases for the particular Diaspora population concerned. Instances of this kind are well documented for several Jewries in Western Europe, Canada, etc. However, it should be realized that the latter instances are irrelevant for the evolution of world Jewry as a whole, as they are only transfers within the global Jewish framework; while some Jewries are thereby strengthened, others are weakened.

We have pointed above to South African Jewry as the only large Diaspora population which clearly had a natural increase up to 1970. However, the external migration balance of South African Jews is negative, and the migratory deficit has cancelled the effect which natural increase would otherwise have had on population size.

External migrations can influence a great variety of demographic and socio-economic characteristics. It is frequent, for example, for external migrants to include a larger share of young and middle-aged adults than the population in the country of origin and possibly also the country of destination. Consequently, a migratory surplus may counteract the aging of a Jewish population and temporarily improve its balance of natural movement. Conversely, a migration deficit operates not only to diminish the size of a Jewish population, but also to accentuate its aging, and thereby reduce the relative level of balance of internal change.[36]

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[36] The above information and reasoning about demographic trends among Diaspora Jews, as well as specific additional evidence, necessitate a downward revision of the accepted estimates of the number of Jews in several important countries and in the Diaspora as a whole.

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS OF JEWS IN ISRAEL

The demographic situation and trends of Jews in Israel present several striking contrasts to those prevailing among the overwhelming majority of Diaspora Jewries.

The total number of Jews in Israel has grown from 650,000 at the establishment of the State in 1948 to more than 3 million (2,959,000 at the end of 1975; 3,155,000 at the end of 1978). Consequently, Israel has at the present time the second largest Jewish population in the world. The Jews of Israel are unique in having turned from members of a small minority group in their previous countries of residence into the numerical majority and socially dominant population sector of a small but sovereign state. The growth of Israel's Jewish population has been achieved mainly through the immigration of 2.1 million Jews—and net immigration of about 1.8 million Jews—over the last 60 years, though natural increase has also made an important contribution to the growth of the country's population. As the magnitude of *aliyah* has been diminishing—in absolute numbers and especially per 1,000 Jews already living in Israel—natural increase has actually become the predominant source of population growth for Israel's Jews. Jews have come to this land, and especially to the independent State of Israel, vastly differing as to numbers and rates (per 1,000 of the respective Diaspora population) from the various geographical regions. In the Mandatory period, immigrants from Europe predominated;[37] since 1948 about half the immigrants have originated in Asia and North Africa. Most of the Jews of Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR), the Balkans, Asia, and North Africa have migrated to the State of Israel (Table 9).

By now slightly more than half of Israel's Jews are native-born; the Israeli-born constitute an absolute majority of those under the age of 30. Whereas at the foundation of the State the overwhelming majority of Israel's Jews were of European origin, by now the two major origin groups —Asian-North African and European—are about evenly matched.

The return to the soil has been a basic tenet of Zionist ideology, and there are about 700 rural settlements, each with below 2,000 Jewish inhabitants. Nevertheless, 91 per cent of Israel's Jews now live in urban localities. The metropolitan area of Greater Tel Aviv comprises more than 1,200,000 persons, or about 40 per cent of the country's total Jewish population, and is, after Greater New York, the second largest urban concentration of Jews in the world.

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[37] The European Jews predominated in absolute numbers, while the migration rate was considerably higher for Jews from Asia.

TABLE 9. JEWISH ALIYAH TO THE LAND OF ISRAEL,[a] BY REGION OF ORIGIN AND PERIOD

Region of Origin	1919–May 1948		May 1948—1977	
	In Thousands	Per 1,000 Diaspora Jews[b]	In Thousands	Per 1,000 Diaspora Jews[b]
Diaspora	483	33	1,611	154
USSR[c]	54	18	160	74
Eastern Europe (excl. USSR)[d]	294	55	538	717
Other countries in Europe	80	51	66	70
Asia (excl. Israel)	43	140	342	856
North Africa	3	8	400	645
Other countries in Africa[e]	1	15	18	148
U.S.A., Canada	7	2	42	8
Latin America	1	3	43	91
Oceania	0	4	2	51

[a] Gross number of immigrants, including subsequent remigrants.

[b] Immigrants to land of Israel during whole period per 1,000 of initial Diaspora population of each period (as estimated for 1925 and 1948, respectively).

[c] For most of period 1919–1948 according to boundaries before World War II, plus Baltic republics.

[d] Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Balkan countries; see note c.

[e] Mainly South Africa.

Sources for immigration figures: official statistics of Palestine and Israel.

In demographic terms, the integration of the various strands of Jews in Israel has made considerable headway. The Jews of European origin have set an example for those from Asia-Africa, as the former constitute a demographically advanced population—with low mortality and rather low fertility. However, the Jews of European origin have themselves undergone certain transformations in Israel which mark them off significantly, for the time being at least, not only from Diaspora Jews, but also from other populations in the developed countries.

Despite the bad health conditions of the Middle East, the Jews in Palestine, by the end of the Mandatory regime, had managed to place themselves among the most advanced populations of the world as far as average length of life was concerned. The mass influx of Oriental Jews in the first years of the State caused but a short and limited set-back; and the absorption of further waves of Oriental Jews resulted in the abrupt reduction of their previously high mortality, so that their mean length of life quickly soared to a level similar to that of European Jews in Israel. Both major origin groups of Israel's Jews enjoy, in international comparison, very high longevity. The crude death rate of all Israel's Jews is low because of a "younger" age composition than in other developed countries.

Unlike those in the Diaspora, European Jews in Israel have adopted virtually universal marriage—nearly all individuals of either sex marry within the procreative ages. Asian-African Jews continue in Israel their traditional mores to the same effect. Thus, near universal marriage has so far been characteristic of Israel's Jews. The marriage age of European Jews of either sex is considerably lower in Israel than in Europe. Among Oriental Jews, the previously very low marriage age for women has been raised. A convergence has occurred in the average and median ages at first marriage of the two origin groups; this applies to both sexes. These marriage patterns,[38] together with the rather low divorce rate and very low mortality, have the consequence that the average Israeli Jewess is married during a comparatively high proportion of the female reproductive life span. Moreover, next to no out-marrying of Jews with a non-Jewish partner takes place in Israel.[39]

While the fertility of Jews in Europe is insufficient for demographic replacement, the Jews born in Europe, or of European origin, who live in Israel have had in recent years a total fertility rate of about three children per woman, a net reproduction rate of approximately 1.5, and a natural increase of 1 per cent per annum. The rise of fertility in Israel from its previous low level in Europe can be ascertained statistically, thus disproving any conjecture that the higher fertility observed in Israel is decisively due to selective immigration of groups which had already been more fertile abroad. Jewish women in Asia-Africa, on the other hand, used to give birth to 6–7 children on average, though many of these children died at an early age. In Israel the fertility of the Asian-African born women has declined consistently and rapidly. By 1977 the total fertility of this group as a whole, i.e., irrespective of immigration period, had diminished to 3.4 children. There is thus strong convergence in the fertility patterns of both origin groups. In the first generation, i.e., among the persons born abroad, a moderate rise has taken place in the European group and a strong decrease in the Asian-African group; at present, the fertility levels of the two groups, which differed abroad by 4–5 children, are only about half a child apart. In the second and higher generations, i.e., among the Israeli-born, there is little differentiation in fertility according to origin; the fertility level attained by the Israeli-born of all origin groups has so far averaged around three children per woman. For the overall Jewish population of Israel the total fertility rate has also dropped to three (Table 10), while the crude birth rate has been near 2.5 per cent per annum.[40]

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[38] About 20 per cent of the Jewish marriages contracted in Israel unite partners one of whom belongs to the European and the other to the Asian-African origin group. There are many more unions of partners from different countries or *edot* within each of the two major origin groups.

[39] Some Jewish immigrants arrive out-married. If these families stay on in Israel, the non-Jewish spouse and/or the children will eventually become Jewish.

Of the above outlined transformations in the patterns of natural movement, those which have occurred among the Asian-African Jews in Israel can be viewed largely as a strong acceleration of trends that might have been anticipated, sooner or later, in their previous countries of residence (in keeping with the general demographic transitions in the developing countries). Such transitions would also have occurred rapidly if these Jews had migrated to a developed Diaspora country. It is the transformations among the European Jews in Israel which merit special attention. These transformations, particularly the fertility rise and the attainment of reproduction above replacement level, constitute reversals of the changes undergone by the respective Jewish populations in the Diaspora, and contrast, both in level and tendency, with the present trends of the general populations in the developed countries. This is a noteworthy indicator of socio-psychological

TABLE 10. TOTAL FERTILITY RATES OF ALL JEWISH WOMEN IN ISRAEL AND OF RECENT IMMIGRANTS, BY REGION OF BIRTH, 1951–1977

Year	Period of Immigration	Region of Birth			
		All Women	Israel	Asia-Africa	Europe-America
1951	Total	4.0	3.5	6.3	3.1
	From 1948			6.9	2.8
1956	Total	3.7	2.7	5.6	2.6
	From 1948			6.1	2.6
1961	Total	3.4	2.7	4.9	2.3
	From 1955			5.7	2.4
1966	Total	3.4	2.8	4.5	2.5
	From 1955			5.0	2.8
1971	Total	3.4	3.2	4.1	2.9
	From 1965			4.0	2.8
1975	Total	3.2	3.1	3.8	2.8
	From 1965			4.0	3.0
1977	Total	3.0	2.9	3.4	2.8
	From 1965			3.6	3.1

Source: official statistics of Israel.

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[40] Since 1977 there has been a small reduction.

forces operating among the Jews in Israel, and is important for the global balance of Jewish population dynamics.

Israel's Jews have a net reproduction rate of approximately 1.5, and a natural increase above 1.5 per cent per annum. Both these figures exceed by far the corresponding values in all large Diaspora populations (excepting the atypical case of Iran before the revolution). They also considerably surpass the corresponding values for the general populations of the developed countries. Moreover, Israel's Jews are virtually unaffected by out-marriage and alienation. Whatever their views in matters of religion or ideology, Israeli Jews remain Jews as part of the body politic. Consequently they do not sustain the demographic losses incurred on these counts in the Diaspora. Finally, Israel's Jews have a positive migration balance, as *olim* outnumber *yordim*. Thus the balances of both their natural movement and external migrations are positive, while the affiliative balance is very small and probably positive.[41]

GLIMPSES INTO THE FUTURE

In our analysis of recent demographic trends among Diaspora Jewry, we pointed to very low fertility and marked aging as principal factors liable to cause natural decrease under existing conditions. These factors will continue to be operative; low fertility, because this is the trend in all developed countries for the time being, and Jews have always been in the forefront of demographic transformations; intensified aging, because of the great proportion of late-middle-aged persons in Diaspora populations who will swell the ranks of the old in the not-too-distant future. The "effectively Jewish" population balance is further reduced, and the aging further enhanced, by assimilatory losses of many children from out-marriages and of alienated persons. These tendencies, too, are likely to intensify in the future.

Moreover, there is a strong element of suspended decline which will make itself felt in the future. Those out-married or very marginal Jews who do not have Jewish children lead, in the first instance, to a diminution in the number of effectively Jewish births and, subsequently, of Jews in the younger age brackets. When they themselves die without having reproduced themselves, the Jewish population will undergo a further reduction. Since out-marriages have become more frequent in recent decades and have often been contracted by young Jews, this delayed demographic effect will make itself increasingly felt toward the end of this century.

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[41] Mainly in consequence of non-Jewish members of Jewish immigrant families becoming Jews.

Official population projections for the Jews of Israel predict that they will reach about 4.5 million by the end of this century, assuming a very modest level of positive net migration (10,000 per annum). To the extent that net migration exceeds this low level, the number of Jews in Israel will grow more rapidly. If average net migration per annum should exceed 30,000, the projected figure of Jews in Israel at the end of this century will rise to above 5 million.

These projections have assumed a continuation of the empirically observed fertility levels among the European- and Israeli-born Jews in Israel. A major question relating to the future demography of Israel's Jews is whether, or how long, they will be able to maintain their not inconsiderable fertility in the face of the contrary trend in the developed countries of the world and in the Jewish Diaspora. To the extent that they do not do so, the above-mentioned projection will have to be reduced accordingly. At any rate, the Jews in Israel can be expected to remain virtually exempt from assimilatory losses.

The internal growth among Israel's Jews will for some time continue to offset the internal decrease in the Diaspora, and thus maintain approximately the size of world Jewry. But eventually, roughly around 1990, the total number of Jews in the world will start to decline. This decline will accelerate as the losses due to insufficient fertility, aging, and assimilation in the Diaspora increasingly outweigh the natural growth of Jews in Israel, despite the latter's rising proportion among world Jewry.

Appendix

TECHNICAL NOTES TO TABLES

Sources to Tables

JEWISH DIASPORA POPULATIONS

TABLES 2, 3, 4b, 4c, 5, 7, 8

Most of the data on Jews in these tables are based on the empirical age-sex distribution of an enumerated Diaspora population. The age distribution is epitomized in Table 7. For the indirect methods used to estimate vital statistics parameters from age-sex distribution, see below.

The sources for age-sex distribution and for any direct vital statistics measures of Jews in Diaspora countries are as follows: *United States:* National Jewish Population Study of 1970–1971, sponsored by the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds. So far data have been published mainly in AJYB (Volumes 1973--1978) and in a series of reports by CJFWF; see also the article by Bernard Lazerwitz, "An Estimate of a Rare Population Group—The U.S. Jewish Population," *Demography,* Vol. 15, No. 3, 1978. The published age-sex distribution included non-Jews in households defined as Jewish. An age-sex distribution of Jews only was obtained with the assistance of data on Jewishness at the time of the survey in each age-sex category.[1] Only data on persons self-identified as Jews appear in the tables. *Canada:* Official population censuses of 1961 and 1971 with data identifying Jews according to religion. *Sao Paulo (Brazil):* Enumeration of Jewish population sponsored by local Jewish federation. The enumeration was carried out in two stages: an incomplete census in 1968, and a sample of the not previously covered households in 1969. Some data from the first stage were published by H. Rattner.[2] Through the courtesy of the Sao Paulo Jewish federation, the Hebrew University received tabulations from both stages of the enumeration. The age-sex distribution used in the tables is an amalgamation of the results of the two stages.*Argentina:* Tabulations made at the Hebrew University from a copy of the computerized data file on Jews in Argentina's official population census of 1960.*South Africa:* Special tabulations on Jews from a 10 per cent sample of the official population census of 1970, made by the SA Department of Statistics at the request of the SA Jewish Board of Deputies. The estimated vital statistics parameters have been cross-checked with the results of the South African Jewish Population Study of 1974, a socio-demographic sample survey of the six major urban concentrations of Jews (carried out by A.A. Dubb and so far analyzed mainly by S. Della Pergola at the Hebrew University in a series of advance reports).*Australia:* Official population censuses of 1961 and 1971.*Greater Paris:* Socio-demographic sample survey of Jews, carried out in three stages —in 1972, 1974, and 1976—by the Groupe de Sociologie des Religions, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, and the Institute of Contemporary Jewry, Hebrew University. The project is directed by D. Bensimon and S. Della Pergola.[3] The final data are in the process of publication.*Brussels (Belgium):* Socio-demographic survey of the Jewish population utilizing the data of the official population census of 1961 for households in which one or more persons could, by various methods, be identified as Jews. The study was carried out by W. Bok.[4]*Netherlands:* Enumeration of Jews in 1966, undertaken by the Committee for Demography of the Jews in the Netherlands, reflecting the information available from Jewish-communal and municipal records (without direct canvassing of the individuals and households concerned).[5] Since World War II, Dutch official statistics, despite their otherwise high quality, have not been able to adequately identify and represent Jews (because of low reporting of Jewishness by Jews who fear misuse of official registration material, as happened during World War II). This is why Jewish-sponsored counts have become necessary in the Netherlands (the first was taken in 1954), and why we have not made use of the officially compiled data on age and vital events of the Dutch Jews.*Germany (Federal Republic):* Age distributions of Jews in Table 7 are from the official population censuses of 1961 and 1970. From the latter, only a 10 per cent sample tabulation is available. For this reason, and especially because of the great demographic instability of the Jewish inhabitants of West Germany, we have refrained from using indirect methods for estimation of vital statistics parameters. The data on Jewish births and deaths in Table 2 are taken from Jewish communal registration.*Switzerland:* Official population censuses of 1960 and 1970. The data on births and deaths of Jews (Table 2) are also taken from the official statistics of Switzerland, which reflect the religion of the newborn (i.e., effectively Jewish births).[6]*Italy:* Age-sex distribution in 1965 from socio-demographic sample survey of the Jewish population of Italy in that year, conducted by S. Della Pergola and E.F. Sabatello.[7] Data on births and deaths of Jews (Table 2) compiled by S. Della Pergola from Jewish communal records. Age-sex distribution in 1970 estimated by S. Della Pergola from the 1965 survey and up-dating information.*RSFSR (Russian Republic in Soviet Union):* A rough age distribution of Jews, who constituted 38 per cent of all Soviet Jews, was released in the official publications of the population census of the USSR in 1970. These data have been converted into age categories approximately comparable to those of other populations listed in Table 7. The level of birth and death rates is given in Table 2.[8] However, because of the crudity of the published census data, we have had to refrain from the further elaborations undertaken for other Diaspora populations. *Iran:* An age-sex distribution of Jews is available from the official population census of 1966. It has been emended in the higher ages because of obvious irregularities (Table 7). Because of the dissimilar yet insufficiently known level of mortality among Jews in Iran, compared to those of the previously mentioned countries, we have not presented any estimates of vital statistics parameters.

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[1] See F. Massarik "The Boundary of Jewishness—Some Measures of Jewish Identity in the United States," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. Della Pergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1973* (Jerusalem, 1977).

[2] H. Rattner, "Census and Sociological Research of the Jewish Community in Sao Paulo, 1968," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S. Della Pergola, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1969* (Jerusalem, 1973).

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[3] S. Della Pergola and D. Bensimon, "Sondage Socio-économique Auprès des Juifsen France; Résultats Préliminaires pour Paris," *Yod.,* Jan. 1976; and D. Bensimon, "Sondage Socio-économique Auprès des Juifs en France; Résultats Préliminaires pour la Banlieu Parisienne," *Yod.,* Oct. 1977.

[4] W. Bok, "Some Socio-demographic Characteristics of the Jewish Population in Greater Brussels—A Comparative Approach," in U.O. Schmelz, S. Della Pergola, and P. Glikson, (eds.), *Papers in Jewish Demography, 1977* (Jerusalem, 1979).

[5] See Ph. van Praag, *Demography of the Jews in the Netherlands* (Jerusalem, 1976).

TABLES 4, 4a

See the sources for the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia (unpublished data from the 1966 population census), Greater Paris, the Netherlands, and Italy listed above. The data in most of these sources were tabulated for (ever-)married women and have been converted to extend to all women.

The data for the U.S. in Table 4 and in the columns relating to 1971 in Table 4a have been taken from an article by S. Della Pergola, "Time

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[6] Unlike most other countries that distinguish religion in their birth statistics, where the religion of one or both of the parents is indicated.

[7] S. Della Pergola and E.F. Sabatello, "The Italian Jewish Population Study," in U.O. Schmelz, P. Glikson, and S.J. Gould, (eds.), *Studies in Jewish Demography, 1969–1971* (Jerusalem and London, 1975).

[8] See U.O. Schmelz, "New Evidence on Basic Issues in the Demography of Soviet Jews," *Jewish Journal of Sociology,* 1974.

Patterns of American Jewish Fertility," to be published in *Demography.* In Table 4a the data for 1973 and 1976 are from the U.S. National Survey of Family Growth, conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics. The figures for 1973 were published in the Center's *Advancedata,* No. 10 (August 12, 1977); those for 1976 were kindly provided by the Center.

The data on European immigrants to Israel during 1956–1961 in Table 4 have been taken from Israel's 1961 census (Vol. 32), so as to illustrate the situation then prevailing among Jewish women in Eastern Europe (excluding the USSR), whence most of those immigrants came.

TABLE 6

The data have been extracted from official statistics of weddings or counts of couples in official population censuses,[9] as well as from the Jewish sources listed above for the United States, the Netherlands, Italy, and South Africa.

The "Jewish centers" in Table 6 refer in the case of Canada to the provinces of Quebec and Ontario; in the case of Australia to the states of Victoria and New South Wales; and in the case of South Africa to Johannesburg, Capetown, and four other cities.

JEWS OF ISRAEL

The data for all Jews in Tables 1, 2, 3, 7, and 8 are taken from Israel's official statistics (they can all be found in, or computed from, various issues of the annual Statistical Abstract). The figures for Jews in Israel of European and Oriental origin have been derived from the official data on population and vital events according to birth region of foreign-born and father's birth region for Israeli-born by conjecturally dividing those Israeli-born whose fathers were also born in Israel.

Tables 9 and 10 are also based on official statistics of Palestine and Israel.

GENERAL POPULATIONS

All data are taken from official statistical publications of the various countries (censuses, vital statistics, statistical abstracts) or from the international compilations in various issues of the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook.*

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[9] The respective population counts include, besides the above-mentioned, the Swiss census of 1950 and the U.S. Current Population Survey of March 1957 (2nd release). The data on couples in the Canadian censuses identified Jews according to ethnicity.

For international compilations of data on mixed marriages of Jews, see Appendix to S. Della Pergola's *Jewish and Mixed Marriages in Milan, 1901–1968* (Jerusalem, 1972) and the same author's "Demographic Perspectives of Mixed Marriage," *Encyclopaedia Judaica Yearbook,* 1975–76.

Methods Used for Estimation of Vital Statistics Parameters of Jews in Tables 2, 3, and 8

GENERAL

Because of the serious lack of direct data on the vital statistics of contemporary Diaspora Jewries, we have had to resort, in the main, to indirect methods to obtain the estimates presented in Tables 2, 3, and 8. These methods rest essentially on two foundations: a) the age-sex distribution of a Diaspora Jewry, as empirically known from an enumeration (i.e., an official population census or a Jewish-sponsored survey); b) the fact that average length of life (i.e., life expectancy at birth) is high and roughly similar throughout the developed countries as well as in the few Jewish populations for which it can be ascertained. Therefore, life tables available for such populations can be used, in the absence of direct information, for rough estimations of deaths in other analogous populations (concerning particulars see below).

The estimates obtained for our statistical tables relate to the 5-year period (or the last two 5-year periods) prior to the enumeration in question. Also the comparative data for the respective general populations relate to the same reference periods, as stated in the tables.[10]

Since the ultimate basis for the vital statistics estimates is the Jewish population at the end of the 5-year period(s) considered, these estimates reflect the net result of any migratory and affiliative changes which occurred during that time.[11]

BIRTH RATE

The number of "effectively Jewish" births during the 5-year period preceding an enumeration can be estimated from the number of 0–4 years old Jews enumerated, plus an estimate of the newborn deceased up to the date of enumeration.[12] Through division by the average population of the

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[10] For Jewish enumerations extending over 2 years, the preceding 5-year period is indicated in the tables according to the later of the two years; e.g., 1967–71 for the U.S. (instead of 1966–67 to 1970–71). For Greater Paris, where the survey of Jews extended in stages over the years 1972–1976, the estimates relate to the 5-year period(s) prior to the time of enumeration (as indicated in notes to Tables 2, 3, and 8).

[11] Consequently these estimation methods are not fully applicable where such changes are relatively frequent. This is why we have not used them for Jews in Germany (Fed. Rep.).

[12] According to a suitable life table. See below.

5-year period, as obtained from a reverse projection,[13] an average annual crude rate of effectively Jewish births—per 1,000 of population—can be estimated (Table 2).

The per cent change in the number of effectively Jewish births (Table 3) was computed from the ratio between the number 0–4 and 5–9 years old, as enumerated in the Jewish population, accounting also for child mortality. Consequently this measure relates to the change in the average annual number of births between the two latest 5-year periods prior to the enumeration. Where the Jewish population size did not change much in the interval—as was the case in most Diaspora countries listed in Table 3—this measure approximates to the corresponding change in the effectively Jewish birth rate.

DEATH RATE

The number of Jewish deaths during the 5-year period preceding an enumeration is equal[14] to the size of the initial population (computed by reverse projection), plus the number of births, minus the size of the final population (as enumerated). Through division by the average population of the 5-year period, an average annual crude rate of Jewish deaths—per 1,000 of population—can be estimated (Table 2).

RATE OF NATURAL INCREASE OR DECREASE

This is the difference between the average annual crude rates of effectively Jewish births and Jewish deaths in the 5-year period preceding an enumeration. (See Table 2.)

FERTILITY RATIO

This is a rough measure of fertility (Table 3), indicating the number of 0–4 years old children per 1,000 women aged 15–44 years in a population. When applied to Jews (Table 3) it relates to effectively Jewish fertility.

The per cent change in the fertility ratio (Table 3) was computed for a narrower range of the women's fertile ages—only the most reproductive ages—so as to eliminate the influence of changing proportions of women in the less fertile ages. It shows the numerical relation between two ratios: 0–4 years old children per 20–34 years old women, relative to 5–9 years old children per 25–39 years old women. It thus reflects changes in average current fertility between the two latest 5-year periods prior to the enumeration.

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[13] Where necessary, the reverse projection started from a revised estimate of the size of the respective Jewish population.

[14] With the proviso concerning migratory and affiliative changes, as stated above.

NET REPRODUCTION RATE (NRR)

This is conceptually a refined measure of inter-generational replacement, but has been obtained for the Jewish populations in Table 8 by a very approximate method of estimation. This method consists of computing the numerical relation between the empirical fertility ratio and the analogous ratio among the hypothetical population reflected in a suitable life table. This procedure is based on the fact that, by definition, in the "stationary" population of a life table, NRR = 1.0.

TOTAL FERTILITY RATE (TFR)

The estimates of this indicator for Jewish populations (Table 3) have been derived from the NRR values. NRR considers only reproduction in the female line, and accounts for mortality. By adding estimates for male births (according to the rather constant sex ratio at birth) and for the relevant deaths (according to a suitable life table), the NRR estimates have been converted into those of TFR.

LIFE TABLES

The computations of rates of births, deaths, net reproduction, etc. from the mid-1950's to the early 1970's are based on the following: *U.S. Jews:* the life table of whites in the Middle Atlantic area (which includes New York) in the years 1959–1961, whose life expectancy at birth was 67.3 for males and 73.3 for females. Life expectancy of total whites in the U.S., especially males, changed little from the mid-1950's to the second half of the 1960's.[15] *Other Diaspora Jewries:* the life table of Israel's Jews in 1971, whose life expectancy was 70.6 for males and 73.8 for females. This life table is the most reliable one in existence for Jews. Life expectancy for Israeli Jewish males has been very high in international comparison. The use of this particular life table for the period since the late 1950's, therefore, may have resulted in a slightly low assessment of mortality and in an accordingly slightly high assessment of natural increase and NRR for some Jewish Diaspora populations to which it has been applied. This would have led to conservative estimates of some of the negative features of Jewish population dynamics in the Diaspora.

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[15] The life table proposed by J. Fauman and A.J. Mayer for U.S. Jews, on the basis of three local community surveys (see "Jewish Mortality in the U.S.," *Human Biology,* Vol. 41, 1969), was not used. Experimentation with it in reverse projections, starting from the age-sex distribution of Jews according to the NJPS of 1970–1971, showed that its high mortality rates in old age would have resulted in the "resuscitation" of so many old people in the backward projection that it would have implied a greater proportion of the old among the U.S. Jewish population in the past than at the time of the NJPS. This seemed demographically improbable.

RELIABILITY OF THE METHODS USED

The indirect and approximate methods here used are each familiar to demographers. Only their systematic application to the study of Diaspora Jewries is a new feature.[16]

The various methods used for deriving vital statistics parameters from empirical age-sex distributions are not equally accurate. The degree of accuracy is greatest for the estimation of births under conditions of very low child mortality, and smallest for NRR and TFR values if inferred from a relatively crude measure like the fertility ratio. We cannot expand here on this topic, but may state that these approximate methods will suffice for the ascertainment of levels of demographic behavior, which has been our aim in this article. Besides, in several instances it has been possible to cross-check the results of these indirect methods, under the concrete circumstances of Diaspora populations, against directly collected vital statistics data on Jews. Reasonable agreement has been found. Since writing this article, the author has also applied another indirect method for estimating TFR and NRR. The results have been similar.

Measures Presented in Tables 4, 4a, and 6

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN BORN PER WOMAN, BY AGE OF WOMEN

This is a retrospective measure of fertility, obtained from replies of women of various ages in an enumerated population about the number of (live-born) children to whom they have given birth. For Jewish women this refers to the full number of their births, irrespective of whether the children have themselves been Jews or not. In the enumerations the replies are usually obtained from married or ever-married women for the specific study of marital fertility. The respective figures, wherever possible, have been converted into averages of children born per total women of given age—by accounting for the other marital status categories as well. This gives a clearer picture of the replacement prospects of the population concerned, which issue we have wished to emphasize in Table 4.

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[16] Population models could not be used, because of the far-reaching demographic instability —vital, migratory, and affiliative—of Diaspora Jewries.

AVERAGE NUMBER OF CHILDREN EXPECTED PER MARRIED WOMAN

As ascertained from replies to a question in a survey. The expectations, especially of the young women, need not materialize.

MIXED MARRIAGES

Table 6 contains empirical data on the proportion of weddings, or of couples in the population, in which only one of the partners was declaredly Jewish. The proportion of mixed marriages has been measured a) per 100 respective Jewish individuals of each sex, i.e., Jews marrying or Jewish spouses in existing married couples among the population, and b) per 100 couples, with at least one Jewish partner, who have contracted new marriages or exist already in the population studied. Logically, the second measure always indicates a higher proportion of mixed marriages than the first.

Communal

The "Civil Judaism" of Communal Leaders

IN RECENT YEARS Jewish community federations and the United Jewish Appeal (UJA) have emerged as the major institutional foci for the development and expression of Jewish commitment among an important segment of American Jewish leadership. As a part of this process, the values and beliefs which underlie the work of these organizations have taken on the character of a Jewish "civil religion"—a system of symbols and meanings which relates the federation/UJA sphere of the American Jewish polity to a transcendent dimension and which provides thereby ultimate legitimation for its activities.[1]

An analysis of the institutional rhetoric of these organizations (in publications and speeches by major volunteer and professional leaders) indicates that the core of this "civil Jewish faith" is a commitment to Jewish group survival as a "sacred" value and a validation of Jewish existence as the fulfillment of a "mission" or "destiny" which calls for the exemplification by Jews of the ethical values of responsibility, justice, and compassion. More specifically, "civil Judaism" affirms eight major tenets: the unity and distinctiveness of the Jewish people; the resultant responsibility of each Jew and of the Jewish community collectively for the security and welfare of all Jews; the centrality of the state of Israel as symbol of this unity and mutual responsibility; the enduring value of the Jewish tradition and the importance of its perpetuation; the persistence of threats (both internal and external) to the survival of the Jewish people and tradition; *tzedakah,* understood both as philanthropy and more broadly as action on behalf of social justice and welfare, as a

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Note: An earlier version of this study was prepared for the Center for Jewish Community Studies. The author is grateful to Bernard Reisman, Daniel Elazar, Charles Liebman, and Steven M. Cohen for their helpful comments; to Ted Comet, Jack Mayer, Howard Charish, Avi Fox, Jay Jacobson, Barnett Labowitz, and other federation and UJA lay and professional leaders for their assistance in administering the questionnaire; and to Carleton College and Brandeis University for computer facilities and research funds.

[1] The growth in influence of Jewish federations is described in Daniel J. Elazar, *Community and Polity: The Organizational Dynamics of American Jewish Life* (Philadelphia, 1976). On Jewish "civil religion" see Jonathan Woocher, *"Civil Judaism" in the United States,* Center for Jewish Community Studies, 1978 and Jonathan Woocher, *"Civil Judaism": The Religion of Jewish Communities,* National Jewish Conference Center, 1979.

primary mandate of the Jewish value system; the virtue of active participation in the broader society and the compatibility of such participation with "good Jewishness"; and theological pluralism (the relative insignificance of classical theological concerns and the affirmation of individual conscience as ultimate arbiter in matters of religious practice, belief, and lifestyle).

This system of mutually reinforcing values, perceptions, affects, and prescriptions also reflects a particular *experience* of Jewishness, best understood in terms of the anthropologist Victor Turner's concept of "anti-structure."[2] The experience of Jewishness as "anti-structural" implies both a sense of Jewish existence as liminal, contingent, and marginal—i.e., as standing between and at the boundaries of normal social and historical categories—and a deep feeling of Jewish community—of a unity of Jewish destiny and experience which binds Jews together at a level beyond their social structural differentiations. The combination of "civil Jewish faith" and this "anti-structural" experience of Jewishness finds expression not only in ideology, but in the "rituals" of federation/UJA life—missions to Eastern Europe and Israel, campaign meetings and events (dinners, walkathons, etc.), retreats—which are devoted to inculcating and reinforcing the sense of Jewish unity, distinctiveness, and responsibility. As a system of Jewish affirmation, "civil Judaism's" boundaries are established by its functional role as an umbrella belief/value system (necessitating an avoidance of "partisan" positions on issues lying outside its areas of consensus), and by its implicit (and often explicit) acceptance of integration into the larger non-Jewish society and culture as a positive value alongside the promotion of Jewish group survival.

This portrait of "civil Judaism" as an institutional meaning system, though perhaps adequate for understanding its role in organizational life, cannot answer another important question: does this same system also shape the *personal* belief and value systems of the individuals who actively identify with community federations and the UJA? To what extent is "civil Judaism" an identifiable form (or component) of individual Jewish commitment? In the modern world, according to the sociologist Peter Berger, religious commitment in general has become bifurcated: it is expressed either in the private spheres of one's life (usually in the familial context) or at the level of public rhetoric ("civil religion"), generally in a diluted and personally inconsequential form.[3] As a Jewish species of "civil religion," "civil Judaism" does achieve consistent public articulation; but what is its reach into the "private" sphere of personal belief and how does it relate to the Jewish attitudes and behaviors of the individual Jews who participate in federation/UJA activities?

We can perhaps make a start toward answering these questions by examining some of the results of an empirical study of Jewish identity and commitment among participants in federation and UJA sponsored Leadership Development (LD) programs which was conducted in 1978 and 1979. The focus on LD participants is based on four considerations: the fact that these individuals have experienced some formal "socialization" into the institutional system; the potential impact these individuals may have on the character of the federation/UJA sphere and its values during the next several decades; the likelihood that many of these individuals will play a leadership role in American Jewish life in general at some point in the future; and the relative ease of access to this population. The primary aim of the study was to explore the role of the institutional "civil Jewish" meaning system in relation to the personal Jewish belief/value systems of these LD participants. This involved efforts to determine whether "civil Jewish" attitudes and orientations are in fact widely and strongly affirmed by these individuals, and how these attitudes are related to other dimensions of the individuals' Jewish beliefs and behaviors.

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[2] Victor Turner, *The Ritual Process* (Chicago, 1969), pp. 125–130.

[3] Peter L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion* (Garden City, 1967), pp. 128–134.

Method of the Study

The study employed a multi-section, closed-ended questionnaire asking about the respondents' Jewish activities, attitudes, and backgrounds, and about general personal and familial characteristics in several areas. Versions of the questionnaire were administered to two groups: a preliminary version was distributed to individuals attending the opening LD session at the 1978 General Assembly of the Council of Jewish Federations in San Francisco (henceforth called the "GA Group"); a revised and somewhat expanded version was distributed during the spring of 1979 to members of LD groups in several communities and to individuals participating in two regional Young Leadership retreats (henceforth called the "Communities Group"). The responses to these questionnaires were compiled and analyzed separately. The GA Group yielded 97 usable responses; the Communities Group 212. These groups do not represent a statistically valid sample of all LD participants. In both groups (and especially the GA Group), more committed and involved segments of the total LD population are probably somewhat over-represented.[4] All results should, therefore, be regarded as suggestive.

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[4] The response rate for the GA Group was approximately 40 per cent, and for the Communities Group slightly under 50 per cent. The Communities Group included several sub-groups, some of whom received the questionnaire through the mail and others at retreats or meetings. The response rates for these sub-groups ranged from approximately 25 per cent to over 80 per cent. Although no follow-up questioning of non-respondents was possible, it seems reasonable to assume a general respondent bias toward more "committed" LD participants. In light of studies indicating that there are perhaps some regional differences in Jewish identity patterns, it should also be noted that no regional breakdown on the GA Group is available and that the Communities Group consisted of approximately 60 per cent Midwestern and 40 per cent Northeastern LD participants. See Bernard Lazerwitz, "The Community Variable in Jewish Identification," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion,* December 1977, pp. 361–369.

General Characteristics of the Survey Population

Both of the groups surveyed were composed largely of young middle and upper-middle class individuals. The median age for both groups was in the mid-thirties.[5] Over 95 per cent of the respondents were American born, and approximately 85 per cent were married and living with a spouse. Over 85 per cent were college graduates, and more than half were employed either in business or one of the professions, with a large proportion of the remainder describing themselves either as "homemakers" or as "professional volunteers." Eighty-two per cent of the GA Group and 72 per cent of the Communities Group had at least one child living at home. Eighty per cent reported an income of greater than $25,000 a year for the household, and more than 40 per cent reported an income of greater than $50,000. In terms of political views, about a half described themselves as moderate and a third as liberal. The Communities Group had an approximately 3:2 female/male ratio, while the GA Group was nearly equally divided between men and women.

Jewish Background

The survey respondents were asked a number of questions about their Jewish backgrounds, dealing with familial Jewish identification and practice while they were growing up, Jewish educational experience, and childhood involvement in Jewish groups and activities. All but seven of the respondents in the two groups were born Jewish. Over 90 per cent reported that their families had belonged to a synagogue at some point during their childhood, and about 65 per cent indicated that their families regarded themselves as religious. Among the GA Group, 17 per cent of the families identified as Orthodox, 46 per cent as Conservative, and 35 per cent as Reform; for the Communities Group the respective percentages were 26 per cent Orthodox, 55 per cent Conservative, and 17 per cent Reform.[6]

The LD participants reported a number of Jewish practices as widely observed in their families during their childhood: 92 per cent attended a Seder on Passover; 90 per cent attended synagogue on the High Holidays; 89 per cent lit Hanukkah candles. Sabbath candles were lit in 59 per cent of the respondents' childhood homes; *tzedakah* was collected in 30 per cent; and 45 per cent of the respondents' families did not eat pork or shellfish at home. More than 80 per cent of the LD participants recalled that their parents had donated money to Jewish philanthropies or causes while they were growing up.

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[5] One of the groups included in the Communities Group was a Women's Division LD group which included a number of women over the age of 40 (the usual cutoff point for "Young Leadership" groups). Mean scores for those over and under 40 were compared on a number of key items. The comparison revealed almost no significant differences likely attributable to age itself. Thus it was decided to retain those over 40 in the total survey population. They constitute about 18 per cent of the Communities Group, and this should be kept in mind in interpreting the survey data.

[6] A comparison of these percentages with the denominational self-identifications of the respondents themselves (see Table 4) reveals a predictable decline in the percentage calling themselves "Orthodox," and relative stability in the ratio of "Conservative" to "Reform."

Over 90 per cent of those surveyed had some formal Jewish education (including 9 per cent in day schools and 71 per cent in afternoon schools). Fewer than three out of ten, however, described the quality of their Jewish education as either excellent or good. More than two-thirds of the respondents belonged to a Jewish youth group, and about half attended a summer camp with Jewish educational, religious, or cultural programming. Taken as a whole, 58 per cent of the LD participants described their upbringing as "strongly Jewish," 30 per cent as "somewhat Jewish," and only 12 per cent as "slightly Jewish" or less.

These figures cannot, of course, tell us all we might like to know about the qualitative dimensions of the Jewish commitments which the LD participants brought to their adulthood and federation/UJA involvement. They do tell us that, in the aggregate, the survey respondents come from homes and families with modest but significant levels of Jewish practice. The percentage of respondents who characterized their upbringing as strongly Jewish is well above that reported for those in the 30–49 years age group in the National Jewish Population Survey (NJPS) figures,[7] and more than double that reported for those age 20–29. While the data suggest that those recruited into and rising through federation/UJA Leadership Development programs are by no means drawn from among individuals with marginal Jewish backgrounds, they also indicate that a considerable range of backgrounds is encompassed within the total population of survey respondents.

Jewish Activity and Behavior

The survey questionnaire included an extensive section on the respondents' present Jewish activities and practices. As might be expected, the LD participants surveyed were active, by and large, in a number of areas (Table 1).

When one turns from organizational involvement and communally-oriented activities to personal ritual practices and attendance at religious services, the patterns of behavior reported by the survey respondents are more complex. As Table 2 indicates, the groups of LD participants surveyed encompass individuals with widely differing levels of participation in religious services.

As was noted with regard to the respondents' Jewish backgrounds, there is clearly a minimum level of commitment which is almost universally shared and which equates here with some synagogue attendance (almost certainly on the High Holidays, see Table 3). In contrast to these figures, 27 per cent of the respondents in the NJPS reported that they never attended religious services[8] and 36 per cent in the 1975 Boston area Jewish population study reported never attending or attending less

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[7] Fred Massarik, *Jewish Identity: Facts for Planning*, Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, 1974, p. 10.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

TABLE 1. JEWISH ACTIVITIES

Activity or Behavior	Percentage Engaged GA Group	 Communities Group
Synagogue membership	95	86
Membership in other Jewish organizations	97	92
Officer or board member	88	75
Subscribe to Jewish newspaper or periodical	94	83
Engaged in formal Jewish studies in past year	49	40
Contributed to federation campaign in past year	98	93
Solicited for campaign in past year	91	61
Engaged in political activity on behalf of Israel or Soviet Jewry in past year	88	62

TABLE 2. ATTENDANCE AT RELIGIOUS SERVICES

Number of Times Attended During Past Year	Percentage GA Group	 Communities Group
Never	1	1
Fewer than five	11	20
Five to ten	31	26
Ten to twenty-five	28	27
More than twenty-five	29	26

often than on the High Holidays.[8a] Beyond the threshold level, however, attendance at religious services among the LD participants ranged from minimal to quite substantial.

This picture of a widely shared "floor" level of religious observance and diversity of practice beyond this level is confirmed when one examines the reported practices of the respondents on a broad range of observances (Table 3).

Again, several interesting comparisons can be made between these figures and those reported for other Jewish populations surveyed in recent years. There can be little question that, as a group, the LD participants generally maintain levels of practice greater than those of a random sample of their Jewish peers (as reported in the NJPS and Boston studies). The percentages of respondents in this survey

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[8a] Floyd J. Fowler, *1975 Community Survey: A Study of the Jewish Population of Greater Boston*, (Boston, 1977), p. 57.

TABLE 3. OBSERVANCES CURRENTLY PRACTICED BY RESPONDENTS

Ritual or Observance	Percentage Practicing	
	GA Group	Communities Group
Lighting Sabbath candles	88	71
Reciting Kiddush on Sabbath	80	56
Not riding on Sabbath	2	6
Attending a Seder on Passover	100	95
Not eating bread during Passover	89	81
Using special dishes during Passover	46	33
Fasting on Yom Kippur	88	85
Fasting on Tisha B'Av	6	9
Lighting Hanukkah candles	100	95
Exchanging gifts during Hanukkah	97	90
Building a Sukkah	37	23
Attending synagogue on the High Holidays	99	98
Attending synagogue on most Sabbaths	28	33
Praying daily	8	11
Keeping two sets of dishes for meat and dairy	36	31
Not eating pork or shellfish at home	46	49
Not eating non-Kosher meat outside the home	12	12
Having a mezuzah on the door of the home	98	92
Collecting tzedakah at home	52	46

observing the Sabbath, Passover, Hanukkah, and dietary laws in some fashion are roughly comparable to those of synagogue Havurah members as reported by Bernard Reisman.[9] Of the 19 practices listed, 9 were observed by more than half of both the LD groups surveyed (and more than four-fifths of the GA Group), and the average number observed was more than 10 among members of the Communities Group and 11 among the GA Group members. This amounts to a substantial consensus on minimum levels of religious observance, which among the GA Group in particular now includes not only High Holiday, Hanukkah, and Passover observance, but some form of Sabbath ritual as well. One might note in addition that, with the exception of *kashrut* observance (where residual practice in previous generations may have been a factor), the percentage of LD participants surveyed observing a particular ritual practice is in each instance greater (and for some rituals substantially greater) than the percentage of the respondents' families reported as observing that practice while the respondents were children.

We should not, of course, exaggerate the levels of ritual observance manifested by these LD participants. The percentage of respondents who would qualify as normatively Orthodox or even Conservative in their practice is quite small, and the patterns of observance as a whole follow the well-established lines of selection detailed by Marshall Sklare,[10] emphasizing the periodic, the child-centered, and the culturally compatible and redefinable rituals. Nevertheless, the data taken as a whole do suggest that a "civil norm" of Jewish observance is widely endorsed by the LD participants which, in their personal lives, is comparable to what has emerged on the public level of federation/UJA practice. There is good reason to believe that just as federations and other polity institutions have come to adopt *kashrut* observance and some measure of Sabbath observance as normative for their public activity, so too have the LD participants come to regard a minimal level of personal ritual practice as essential to the expression and maintenance of their Jewish identification, even apart from a traditional religious motivation.[10a] There is also reason to believe, at least on the basis of impressionistic evidence, that this "civil norm" is expanding to embrace more of the traditional set of rituals. Some empirical evidence for this proposition may perhaps be found by comparing the levels of observance reported for the two different groups of LD participants studies. In several areas—notably Sabbath observance, building a Sukkah, and use of special Passover dishes—significantly greater numbers of the GA Group report observance. This is not due (apparently) to the presence within this group of a higher percentage of individuals identifying themselves as traditional in orientation. Indeed, in terms of denominational self-identification, the Communities Group has a somewhat larger percentage of "traditionally-minded" (Table 4). In addition, levels of parental religious practice were generally slightly higher for the Communities Group.

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[9] Bernard Reisman, *The Chavurah: A Contemporary Jewish Experience* (New York, 1977), p. 209.

TABLE 4. RESPONDENTS' DENOMINATIONAL SELF-IDENTIFICATION

Denominational Category	Percentage Identifying	
	GA Group	Communities Group
Orthodox/Traditional	4	8
Conservative/Reconstructionist	50	56
Reform	37	23
Other	9	11

The most plausible explanation for the higher levels of observance among the GA Group is their greater involvement in the institutional system (see Table 1), and resultant exposure and commitment to the expanding "civil norm."[11] We shall comment more extensively below on the possible relationships between "civil Jewish" ideology, communal involvement, and personal religious activity. At this point it is sufficient to note that the LD participants surveyed are by no means divorced from personal religious observance, and that, indeed, there is some reason to suspect that they are, as a group, embracing higher levels of practice, perhaps commensurate with their levels of communal activism. At the same time, it seems clear as well that whatever "civil norm" does exist falls well short of incorporating the full range of traditionally normative observances, and that beyond the consensual norm, considerable diversity of observance and non-observance is the rule among the survey respondents.

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[10] Marshall Sklare, *America's Jews* (New York, 1971), p. 114.

[10a] Cf. the observation of Daniel Elazar: "After three hundred years of secularization and assimilation there is strong evidence that a revived concern with Jewish tradition is leading to its restoration as a vital norm. While different groups will be entitled to define 'Jewish tradition' in various ways, identification with that tradition and acceptance of the responsibility for maintaining, fostering, and extending it seem to be reemerging as central norms in Jewish life, embraced by all Jewish organizations and enforced by them." *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

Jewish Attitudes, Values, and Beliefs

In order to explore the central question of whether the LD participants surveyed do in fact manifest in their personal Jewish attitudes and orientations the characteristic elements of "civil Judaism" as these are articulated institutionally, the respondents were asked to indicate their agreement or disagreement (using a standard five point Likert scale) with a series of statements dealing with a broad range of Jewish and religious attitudes.

Taken as a whole, their responses to the statements provide an affirmative answer; they clearly indicate that the institutional meaning system which we have termed "civil Judaism" *is* a part of the personal Jewish belief and value systems of a large majority of the LD participants surveyed. The key elements of that faith, as listed above, are almost without exception overwhelmingly endorsed by the survey respondents. The LD participants evidently do feel a powerful sense of Jewish unity —all express pride in the achievements of their fellow Jews, and all but a handful consider a threat against Israel a threat against all Jews. A large majority also regard Jews and Judaism as in some way distinctive: nearly 65 per cent deny that Jewish values are basically the same as those of all religions, and more than three-quarters acknowledge a "special" Jewish responsibility to work for justice in the world. This sense of Jewish unity and distinctiveness is linked (logically and emotionally) to the conviction that Jewish survival is critically important (99 per cent agree, and 96 per cent strongly agree, that there must always be a Jewish people) and that Jews are indeed responsible for one another's well-being (96 per cent endorse this proposition, and 90 per cent say that they "feel bad" when they see Jews who do not take an interest in Jewish life).

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[11] One other area where this norm is apparently becoming evident is in practices with regard to Jewish education. As might be expected, all but two of the respondents with children over six reported that their children had received or were receiving some form of Jewish education. What was less expected was the percentage of respondents reporting that at least one child had attended or was attending a Jewish day school: 26 per cent among the Communities Group and 43 per cent among the GA Group.

Alongside this concern for the survival of the Jewish people and the acceptance of Jewish interdependence and mutual responsibility, the LD participants surveyed also place great value on the continuity of and engagement with the Jewish tradition: 90 per cent believe that the Jewish people could not survive without Jewish religion; a similar proportion regard Jewish education as the best means of insuring Jewish survival; nearly all feel that Jewish observance is a good way to strengthen the family; and more than three-quarters affirm that their own personal fulfillment is linked to the "Jewishness" of their patterns of living.

The commitment of the LD participants to Jewish physical and spiritual survival is matched by their sense that these remain endangered. Three-quarters of the respondents regard Jewish survival in history as in some sense a "miracle." More than 80 per cent do not believe that the world is yet ready to permit Jews to live in peace. 85 per cent see assimilation as the greatest threat to Jewish survival today. We find, therefore, that both dimensions of the "anti-structural" experience of Jewishness referred to above are indeed manifested among a large proportion of the LD participants surveyed in this study: the bonds of Jewish unity and commonality are deeply felt, and so too is the contingency of Jewish existence.

The ethos of "civil Judaism" at the institutional level focuses on the mandate of *tzedakah,* of service to one's fellows and the pursuit of justice. Here too the survey respondents generally endorse the institutional value system. As noted above, more than three-quarters affirm that Jews have a special responsibility to work for justice in the world. Among the Communities Group, nearly 80 per cent believe that Jews should always strive to be exemplary in their actions, and 75 per cent regard the measure of a Jew's life as his/her contribution to others. Over 60 per cent of both groups see helping others as the single most important principle of Judaism. These responses not only indicate a strong commitment to ethical activism as a key Jewish value, but also provide a clue to why the LD participants regard Jewish survival as so important: they see the Jewish contribution to humanity as irreplaceable. (Nearly 60 per cent of those surveyed view the Jewish contribution to modern civilization as greater than that of any other people.) Thus, the two primary mandates of "civil Judaism"—survival and service—are linked by a single perception of a Jewish "mission" or "destiny."

We have noted above that all of the elements of "civil Jewish" commitment are regarded as fully compatible with both active participation in the broader non-Jewish society and a considerable measure of intra-Jewish theological diversity and even agnosticism. The first of these assertions has in the past represnted a cardinal tenet of "civil Jewish faith," but there is every reason to believe that it coexists with real feelings of ambivalence about the relationship of Jewishness and Americanness, of group survival and socio-cultural integration.[12] The survey responses provide evidence of this ambivalence, reaching to the level of ultimate loyalties and identifications, but also of the enduring power of the classical "civil Jewish" affirmations. The LD participants surveyed clearly did not manifest a rejection of their American identities, or a sense that one cannot be both a good Jew and a good American. (Fewer than a quarter feel that it is difficult to be a good Jew living in the United States; less than 10 per cent believe that to be a good Jew one should move to Israel; and more than 70 per cent agree that by being better Jews, Jews will also be better Americans.) Yet 85 per cent, as we have seen, regard assimilation as the major current threat to Jewish survival, and responses to other questions in the survey reveal that intermarriage and the alienation of youth from Jewish life are widely regarded as among the most critical problems confronting the American Jewish community. The presence of real ambivalences regarding ultimate identifications is indicated graphically in the fact that 70 per cent of the survey respondents claim that they feel more emotion listening to Hatikvah than to the Star-Spangled Banner and that a majority reject the proposition that an American Jew owes his/her primary loyalty to the United States. Further, while all but a handful of the LD participants are glad to be Americans, only 54 per cent are strongly so, compared with 86 per cent who strongly assert that they are glad to be Jews.

It would not be useful to exaggerate the significance of these ambivalences. As we have seen, the sense of basic compatibility between "being Jewish" and "being American" remains strong among the LD participants. In part this reflects the fact that on a practical, behavioral level, the interpretation most of the respondents place upon the "demands" of Jewishness is not self-segregating or even substantially disruptive of "normal" American behavioral patterns. On an ideological level as well, the respondents do not for the most part recognize Jewish commitment as incompatible with some of the fundamental canons of modernity. An overwhelming majority of those surveyed accept individual conscience as the ultimate arbiter of the type of Jewish life one should lead (86 per cent) and believe that Judaism must be flexible in adapting itself to changing conditions (83 per cent).

Still, the awareness that Jewish survival—*the* "sacred" value of the "civil Jewish faith"—is endangered by the process of assimilation means that the marriage between Jewishness and Americanness must always be charged with some tension, and thus with the potential for ongoing redefinition. Such a redefinition, placing greater emphasis on particularist and survivalist activities by the Jewish organizations, seems to be underway. On a personal level, the expanding "civil Jewish" norm of ritual practice discussed above is likely part of this process. That the survey respondents do see a need for deepening their own ties to Jewish tradition (as a means of promoting Jewish survival) is indicated by the fact that approximately 80 per cent of those responding regard their own present levels of Jewish practice and knowledge as insufficient. (Whether this verbal acknowledgment translates into actual changes in behavior is another question, but the widespread enthusiasm with which programs emphasizing Jewish learning and practice have been greeted by LD participants provides some indication that the commitment may not be purely verbal.)

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[12] Charles Liebman, *The Ambivalent American Jew* (Philadelphia, 1973).

All that we have pointed to thus far constitute elements of the "civil Jewish" consensus. In one area, however, "civil Judaism" is deliberately non-consensual—with regard to theological issues and most particularly the question of the authoritativeness (as opposed to value) of the Jewish tradition. Beyond the minimal levels of practice and commitment we have noted, "civil Judaism" does not seek to impose norms on personal religious beliefs and behavior. The responses of the LD participants surveyed demonstrate why this atheologism and pluralism are sustained—there is in fact no consensus to articulate. Statements dealing with personal religious experience, divine revelation of the Torah, eternal life, the purposiveness of suffering, and even whether a good Jew must believe in God produced a wide range of responses, including substantial numbers of "not sures." This reflects not only diversity, but also a relatively low salience of such matters for many of the respondents. With respect to the authority of traditional Jewish law, there is similar disagreement. Two-fifths of those surveyed agree that Jewish law should serve as the authoritative guide for Jewish behavior and belief, but over half disagree. Likewise, while over 40 per cent believe that a Jew should try to observe even those practices whose rationales he/she does not understand, a slightly greater percentage disagree.

What all this means is not that theological or other religious orientations are unrelated to "civil Jewish" affirmations (we will briefly explore some of these relationships below), but rather that despite diversity on a number of potentially significant religious questions, these LD participants *do* agree substantially on another set of Jewish values and beliefs which forms a shared system of meanings validating and significating the specific institutional activities and concerns of Jewish federations and the UJA. The question remains, however, whether this "civil Jewish" meaning system is in fact religious if it excludes so much of Judaism's "religious" content from its explicit affirmations. In this context it is important to note that there is one classical Judaic theological affirmation which does appear to enjoy wide, if not universal, support among the LD participants surveyed: the chosenness of the Jewish people. Arthur Hertzberg has discussed with great insight the central significance of this proposition—its affirmation, repudiation, and reinterpretations—for the entire course of modern Judaism, and has noted that despite the grave difficulties it has posed for theologians, the doctrine remains alive among the people as a whole, and even among many so-called Jewish "secularists."[13] The central claims of "civil Judaism"—Jewish unity and distinctiveness, the importance of Jewish survival, the

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[13] Arthur Hertzberg, *Being Jewish in America* (New York, 1979), pp. 12–19.

Jewish "mission"—would seem almost to beg for grounding in the doctrine, or at least the sense, of "chosenness." Yet, as Hertzberg also notes, the assertion of chosenness remains at least mildly scandalous intellectually. Thus, the fact that 63 per cent of the survey respondents explicitly affirm that Jews are the chosen people (and only 18 per cent actually disagree) can be interpreted to buttress the contention that "civil Judaism" is grounded in a "religious" conviction—the conviction that Jewish existence is not only humanly, but transcendentally, significant.

Relationships Among Various Dimensions of Jewish Commitment

The data presented thus far suggest that the LD participants surveyed do for the most part endorse the tenets of "civil Judaism." However, they leave unanswered a series of questions about the internal coherence of this faith and the relationships between affirmation of its tenets and other Jewish orientations and behaviors. It must be noted at the outset of any attempt to answer these questions that there is no warrant for arguing that "civil Judaism's" tenets are in any way unique to it. On the contrary, most can be well supported from within a classical Judaic religious position. Thus, we would expect a positive correlation between endorsement of the "civil Jewish faith" and other dimensions of Jewish commitment. The questions we are most interested in have to do with the nature, patterns, and strength of these relationships.

In order to explore these issues, the survey responses[14] were used to create several indices measuring different dimensions of both attachment to "civil Judaism" and other aspects of Jewish identity and commitment. Five of these indices were attitudinal: they measured strength of affective attachment to the Jewish people (ATTACHIN); endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos (CIVJUDIN); positive orientation toward Jewish religion and practice (PRACTICIN); affirmation of transcendent reality (experiential and doctrinal) (TRANSCIN); and acceptance of the authoritativeness of traditional Jewish norms (TRADITIN).[15] The first three measure orientations which lie within the framework of the "civil Jewish faith" as we have defined it (and indeed, the mean scores on these indices were high), while the latter two measure attitudinal and experiential dimensions which fall outside the "civil Jewish" consensus (though certainly not outside the scope of a classical Judaic commitment). In addition to these attitudinal indices, four others were developed from the questionnaire responses: they measured level of present ritual observance

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[14] For this portion of the study, only the responses from the Communities Group were employed in the statistical analysis.

[15] These indices were created by factor analyzing the responses to the 50 attitudinal statements (using principal component factoring with a varimax rotation). Twenty-one variables were selected for inclusion, and these were refactored to determine the final composition of each index. The index score was created by summing the scores on each item (with sign change if necessary). The indices are unweighted and unstandardized, and should be regarded, therefore, as rough measures subject to further statistical refinement.

(OBSERVIN); degree of involvement in Jewish communal activities and organizations (COMMUNIN); Jewish knowledge (KNOWLIN); and level of Jewish ritual observance in the respondent's family while he/she was growing up (FAMILIN).[16] Although the nine indices developed are all only rough measures and do not cover the full range of Jewish identity dimensions suggested by Himmelfarb, Lazerwitz, and others,[17] they do provide a useful starting point for examining the questions of internal coherence and interrelationships among the dimensions of Jewish commitment raised above.

Table 5 gives the Pearson correlation coefficient matrix for all of the indices developed in the study.

The most notable conclusion to emerge from even a cursory examination of this matrix is that *all* dimensions of positive Jewish background, orientation, or commitment are positively correlated with one another, and many (recalling the limitations of the indices employed) at what appear to be quite significant levels statistically. Although Jewish identity is multi-dimensional, its dimensions are generally mutually reinforcing, whether they be dimensions of behavior, traditional belief, or "civil Jewish" commitment.

Beyond this reaffirmation of what a number of recent studies have indicated, several other relationships revealed in the matrix deserve comment.

The three attitudinal dimensions which were seen as tapping elements of the "civil Jewish" meaning system (ATTACHIN, CIVJUDIN, PRACTICIN) do indeed correlate highly with one another. The strength of these relationships (particularly in light of the generally high scores of the respondents on these indices) supports the claim that "civil Judaism" is a relatively coherent and systematic set of affects, values, beliefs, and norms.

The strength of adherence to "civil Jewish" attitudes—and especially a positive orientation toward Jewish religion and practice—does appear (at least at first glance) to be linked to strength of traditionalist and/or transcendentalist

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[16] These are simple additive indices computed as follows: Scores on the indices of current and childhood familial observance (OBSERVIN and FAMILIN) are the number of rituals checked on the lists included on the survey questionnaire (see Table 3 for the current observance list; the childhood familial observance list included 13 of those items). Scores on the Jewish knowledge index (KNOWLIN) are taken from an 18-item true/false test included on the questionnaire covering Jewish history, literature, customs, and communal life. One point was given for a correct answer, one deducted for an incorrect answer, and none for a response of "don't know." The items included on the communal involvement index (COMMUNIN) are: extent of synagogue activity; membership in other Jewish organizations; service as an officer or board member; subscribing to a Jewish periodical; contributing to the local federation/UJA campaign; soliciting contributions for the campaign; political activity on behalf of Israel or Soviet Jewry; and total hours spent per week on Jewish activity. Some weighting of the items was done to reflect differential levels of commitment involved in particular activities.

[17] Harold Himmelfarb, "Measuring Religious Involvement," *Social Forces,* June 1975, pp. 606–618; Bernard Lazerwitz, "Religious Identification and Its Ethnic Correlates," *Social Forces,* December 1973, pp. 204–220.

TABLE 5. CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INDICES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. ATTACHIN	×								
2. CIVJUDIN	.430*	×							
3. PRACTICIN	.337*	.461*	×						
4. TRANSCIN	.149	.286*	.390*	×					
5. TRADITIN	.234*	.246*	.407*	.474*	×				
6. OBSERVIN	.337*	.333*	.313*	.351*	.433*	×			
7. COMMUNIN	.300*	.395*	.308*	.209*	.294*	.500*	×		
8. KNOWLIN	.201	.231*	.181	.017	.223*	.499*	.418*	×	
9. FAMILIN	.201	.225*	.093	.071	.206*	.381*	.278*	.236*	×

* $p \leq .001$

orientation(s). This confirms the suspicion that "civil Judaism," though often articulated as a meaning system in its own right, cannot be *entirely* divorced empirically from other elements of Jewish faith and experience which are not part of its own consensual language of affirmation. Although most of the LD participants surveyed scored high in "civil Jewish" commitment, those who also scored high in transcendental and traditionalist attitudes tended to score higher.

The non-attitudinal dimensions of present Jewish identity—ritual observance, communal activism, and Jewish knowledge—are very strongly intercorrelated. Here again, the holistic character of Jewish self-expression finds confirmation. Communal involvement is far less an alternative to personal religious behavior among the respondents than it is its complement. This finding among a largely "committed" population of LD participants thus replicates on a smaller scale what Steven M. Cohen has discovered in his analysis of the Boston Jewish community: private Jewish living and public Jewish involvement go hand in hand.[18]

In addition to attitudes being linked to attitudes and behaviors to behaviors, there are substantial correlations between the scores on the attitudinal and the behavioral indices. Here the question can be raised of whether it is possible to postulate a set of causal relationships. The data themselves do not permit this, but impressions based on extensive contacts with LD participants would tend to indicate that for many the relationships have been reciprocal; i.e., attitudes both modify and are modified by behavior, and the patterns of commitment (and change in commitment) do tend to embrace both personal and communal, "civil Jewish" and "extra-consensual" dimensions of Jewish self-expression.

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[18] Steven M. Cohen, "Trends in Jewish Philanthropy," AJYB, Vol. 80, 1980, pp. 29–51.

While the matrix of correlation coefficients presented in Table 5 is useful in establishing some of the fundamental patterns of interrelationship between "civil Jewish" and other dimensions of Jewish identity, these patterns emerge even more clearly when we are able to isolate the independent impact of one identity dimension on another (i.e., examining the relationship between scores on any two of the indices while holding those on all other indices constant). This can be approximated through the use of a series of regression equations, with each index in turn serving as the "dependent" variable of all of the others. Although the results must be treated with some caution, and are too complex to present in full, several further insights emerge from this analysis which are worth noting.

The equations confirm the close linkage among the three "civil Jewish" identity dimensions. Of all the dimensions, endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos is the one with the strongest independent relationship to both attachment to the Jewish people and positive orientation toward Jewish religious practice.

On the other hand, the equations also call into doubt the apparent relationship between a traditionalist orientation and both attachment to the Jewish people and endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos. All three of these attitudinal dimensions are independently related to a positive orientation to religious practice, and, to varying extents, scores on the three indices measuring these dimensions are related to the levels of personal and communal behavioral expression of Jewish commitment. It does appear, however, that the ethnic and ethos components of the "civil Jewish" faith are manifested virtually independently of traditionalist commitment, and can serve as an alternative motivating or rationalizing factor for Jewish self-expression.

The relationship of the other non-"civil Jewish" attitudinal dimension measured —transcendental orientation—to the "civil Jewish" dimensions is somewhat more complex. While transcendental orientation seems to have no direct correlation with attachment to the Jewish people, it is positively related to endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos (a point whose possible significance we shall note below).

When positive orientation toward Jewish religion and practice (PRACTICIN) is treated as the "dependent" variable, all four of the other attitudinal variables continue to show independent positive correlations with it. Observance, communal involvement, and Jewish knowledge, however, appear to have no independent correlation with such an orientation. This would seem to imply that a positive orientation toward religion and religious practice is not a generative attitudinal factor in its own right, but a by-product of a strong "civil Jewish" (ethnic attachment + activist ethos) and/or traditionalist-transcendentalist orientation.

In the regression equations, traditionalism and transcendentalism as such have low independent correlations with level of communal involvement. Ritual observance, however, remains the single strongest independent correlate of communal activism (with level of Jewish knowledge second, and endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos third). Thus, attitudes in general—and especially attitudes relating to theological questions or the authoritative character of Jewish tradition—seem considerably less significant in producing or supporting a high level of communal activity than do personal patterns of religious observance and Jewish knowledge, however these are ideologically rationalized. The ideological rationale for communal involvement articulated within the "civil Jewish" ethos is not unrelated to such activity (according to the data), but a holistic pattern of behavioral expression is the primary correlate of high levels of communal participation and leadership.

The potential impact of a traditionalist/transcendentalist commitment on communal involvment would appear to lie in the fact that these orientations *are* linked to levels of Jewish knowledge and observance. The primary challenge, therefore, for those seeking to enhance overall Jewish commitment within a "civil Jewish" framework is to find ways to inspire greater behavioral expression of Jewish commitment. The activist ethos of "civil Judaism" (CIVJUDIN) is not itself strongly correlated with levels of personal observance (though it is with communal involvement). Strong affective attachment to and identification with the Jewish people (ATTACHIN), on the other hand, *is* linked to ritual observance (though less strongly than traditionalism or transcendentalism). These relationships may help to illuminate the distinction between a purely philanthropic rationale for Jewish communal activism (characteristic, perhaps, of some leaders in previous decades) and the fuller "civil Jewish" commitment more characteristic today, in which activism on both the communal and personal levels is a form of self-expression growing out of a deep sense of identification with Jewish peoplehood and destiny.

Conclusion

Much of what has been offered here, particularly in the final portions, must be regarded as tentative conclusions concerning the shape and dynamics of "civil Judaism" and its place within a broader taxonomy of contemporary Jewish identity and commitment. The results of the study of LD participants do appear to justify our stating with some confidence that the system of values, affects, and beliefs which serves as the *institutional* rationale for the activities of the federation/UJA sphere of the American Jewish polity also plays a prominent role in defining the *personal* Jewish commitments of many of the activists in that sphere. The tenets of "civil Judaism" command widespread support among the population surveyed. They appear to constitute a coherent and mutually reinforcing set of attitudes and sensibilities. Finally, the strength with which these tenets are held and felt is related to the levels of both communal involvement and personal religious behavior of the respondents. From the data we cannot say whether "civil Judaism" is more a motivator or a rationalizer of these behavioral commitments (it is probably both), but it is clearly not an ideology of Jewish affirmation unrelated to other forms of Jewish self-expression.

On the other hand, the study data also appear to indicate that "civil Judaism" is not merely a by-product of other attitudinal complexes. To be sure, strength of "civil Jewish" affirmation is, as we have emphasized, related to a variety of other measures of overall Jewish commitment (such as denominational self-identification). But the widespread endorsement of "civil Jewish" values and beliefs across denominational lines[19] renders any effort to depict it as analytically indistinguishable from other expressions of Jewish identity and commitment suspect. It is certainly clear that affirmation of "civil Judaism's" tenets is not dependent upon a specific theological or religious-experiential orientation.

Hovering over this entire discussion is the question which must be addressed once more: is there anything genuinely religious about the "civil Judaism" we have discovered, anything to link it to a genuine experience and perception of transcendence? Or is "civil Judaism," after all, an amalgam of ethnic attachment and ethical concern which finds expression in nominally religious forms?[20] On one level, we can perhaps respond by suggesting that the empirical links in the data between strength of "civil Jewish" (ethnos and ethos) affirmation and other measures of religious belief and behavior are themselves indicators of the underlying character of "civil Judaism" which ought not to be lightly dismissed. But we can go beyond this, and turn again to the more explicit (though by no means definitive) signals in the survey responses that the "civil Jewish" meaning system—and especially its ethos of mutual support and exemplary responsibility—*is* tied to a perception of Jewish existence as transcendentally significant. One such possible signal is the correlation noted above between endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos and affirmation of transcendental reality. A second is the positive correlation between assent to the proposition that Jewish survival is a "miracle" and scores on both the index of affective attachment to the Jewish people ($r=.14$, $p=.02$) and that of endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos ($r=.13$, $p=.03$). Finally, and in light of the arguments made above, most significantly, we can point to the strong correlation between acceptance of the proposition that Jews are the chosen people and affirmation of the

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[19] Although denominational self-identification does correlate with all of the measures of Jewish commitment, its lowest correlation is with endorsement of the "civil Jewish" ethos ($r=.14$, $p=.024$).

[20] It might be argued that this question does not deserve the prominence we have given it: "civil Judaism" is what it is, regardless of how we categorize it. We would suggest, however, that whether a meaning and symbol system is genuinely "religious" in character—i.e., whether its ultimate referent is transcendental—does make a difference in its capacity to embrace the full range of human experience and aspiration, to avoid becoming idolatrous, and to respond and evolve as history unfolds. For a "Jewish" meaning system, loss of contact with the religious referents and substance of the Judaic symbol system means an impoverishment of both depth and scope. Thus, we would argue, the question of the "religious" character of "civil Judaism" —though probably unanswerable empirically—is not idle. It may well be critical in the long run in determining the vitality and direction of its evolution and its place within the framework of modern Jewish history as a whole. See Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York, 1957) and Eugene Borowitz, *The Mask Jews Wear* (New York, 1973).

"civil Jewish" ethos (r=.42, p=.001), and to the slightly lower, but still strong, correlation between belief in Jewish "chosenness" and strength of attachment to the Jewish people (r=.27, p=.001). The strength of these relationships would seem to indicate that the key sentiments and norms of "civil Judaism" do reflect a validation of Jewish existence in terms of a concept which does not easily fit into a "secular" worldview, but which does resonate with millennia of Jewish religious experience.

If we are correct in identifying the concept of "Jewish chosenness" as the "theological" linchpin of the "civil Jewish" faith, there are additional potential implications worth exploring. Although "chosenness" seems to be essentially an historical-ethical concept within the "civil Jewish" meaning system, in classical Judaic theology it is linked directly to the acceptance of the discipline of Torah, i.e., to expression in the ritual-legal sphere as well.[21] We may, therefore, be warranted in speculating whether the development of a "civil Jewish" norm of observance, as noted above, might also be linked—at some point in its evolution, if not presently —to the consciousness and ethos of "chosenness." The "turn inward" which has been noted among some Jews in recent years—expressed in an intensified focus on intra-communal concerns and personal religious experience, and a de-emphasis on social activism—appears to be manifested among more than a few of the LD participants surveyed. This turn need not, however, be seen as a repudiation of the basic tenets of "civil Judaism," but rather as a reinterpretation expressive of a different sense of what the "special destiny" of the Jewish people implies and how it is to be realized. In this variant of the "civil Jewish" faith, the ethos of responsibility and exemplification shifts its focus from (if we may borrow the terminology of the tradition) *tikkun olam* (repairing the world) to being a *goy kadosh* (holy nation). A synthesis of these two thrusts—the traditional philanthropic-activist orientation of the federations and UJA with the newer emphasis on enhancing the Judaic quality of communal and personal life—would be welcomed by many as a further realization of the potential of the "civil Jewish" faith as a genuinely religious meaning system.

The religious character and expression of "civil Judaism" has implications in another area as well—the relationship of its adherents to the State of Israel and Israeli Jews. For the past 35 years federation and UJA activities have been dominated by concern for Israel's creation, survival, security, and welfare—so much so that they have at times been accused of displacing God and Torah entirely from a place of prominence in Jewish life. There can be no question that the LD participants surveyed in this study have a deep commitment to Israel—financial support for Israel remains their number one communal priority, and the Arab-Israeli conflict their number one basis for communal anxiety. But the State of Israel is far from being the sum and substance of their religion or their Jewish commitment. Israel is a vital symbol, but not necessarily an irreplaceable one. Whereas over 90 per cent of the respondents agree that the Jewish people could not survive without Jewish religion, only 56 per cent regard the State of Israel as similarly critical. We have seen, too, that despite strong emotional ties, barely one in ten of these LD participants believes that to be a good Jew one must live in Israel, and fewer than half indicate that they would be happy if their children settled there. Even more striking, perhaps, is the fact that a third of these prospective leaders agree with the claim that American Jews devote too *much* attention to Israel and not enough to their own community.

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[21] See Eugene B. Borowitz, "The Chosen People Concept as It Affects Life in the Diaspora," *Journal of Ecumenical Studies,* Fall 1975, p. 554.

For the most part, then, the survey respondents could not be regarded as Zionists in any strict sense, nor is their Jewish commitment narrowly Israel-focused. Israel is important because it plays a central symbolic role within the "civil Jewish" meaning system. Observation of other federation/UJA activists suggests that Israel is important because it is seen as a link to the Jewish past; as a vehicle for the continuity of the Jewish tradition; as an expression of the revitalization and empowerment of the Jewish people in the modern world; as a testimony to the unity of all Jews; and as a progressive force in such areas as education, science and technology, and social welfare. These are, it should be noted, largely the same aspirations which these Jews hold for themselves and for the American Jewish community. The State of Israel is also, as many have recognized, the positive symbol in the myth of death and rebirth which structures the contemporary Jewish understanding of Jewish, especially recent Jewish, history. This myth, and its translation into the sense of the perpetual endangerment of the Jewish people, hanging between death and life, is central to the entire "civil Jewish" faith. Thus, what American "civil" Jews support so vigorously is a mythically potent Israel, but one which, correspondingly, acquires its powerful hold on the attentions of these Jews by virtue of a myth and meaning system which transcends its own reality.

Two possible conclusions flow from this analysis. One is that to the extent that the reality of Israel diverges from the meaning which "civil Judaism" assigns to the State and its people, and/or to the extent that other Jewish realia (e.g., ritual observance, Jewish education, or the American Jewish community itself) can assume similar symbolic functions, identification with the State of Israel may become less central for the adherents of the "civil Jewish" faith. For those disturbed by this possibility, however, another presents itself, because, though the "real" Israel may not correspond precisely to its image among American Jews, it is engaged in its own quest for self-definition in mythico-religious terms. Israel too, as Charles Liebman and others have shown,[22] is evolving its own Jewish "civil religion" out of the data of recent history and the repertoire of traditional Jewish symbols. Should American Jews and Israeli Jews, both evolving Jewish "civil religions," succeed in bringing them into dialogue with one another, with the realities of the contemporary Jewish experience, and with the classical sources and substance of Judaic faith, the stage might be set for a new and deeper identification of one community with the other.

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[22] Charles S. Liebman, "Myth, Tradition, and Values in Israeli Society," *Midstream,* January 1978, pp. 44–53; Daniel J. Elazar, "The New Sadducees," *Midstream,* August–September 1978, pp. 20–25.

This study clearly has only begun the process of trying to locate and interpret "civil Jewish" faith as a dimension of American Jewish identity and religious commitment. The study of "civil Judaism" must go on to address other issues—the demographic and sociological characteristics of its adherents; the patterns of Jewish upbringing and experience associated with commitment to its values and beliefs; and its relationship to specific policy and program preferences. If we are correct in the assertion that "civil Judaism" has emerged as a powerful modern Jewish meaning system, and one which continues to show signs of dynamism in its evolution, then ongoing study of its character and course of development is worthwhile. The data of this study indicate that a generation of American Jewish communal leadership is being shaped by its tenets and its definition of the meaning and demands of Jewish existence. Whether "civil Judaism" will prove to be a vehicle for insuring the Jewish continuity its adherents seek, remains to be seen. Certainly, however, the efforts of those who embrace its tenets will be an important part of the Jewish history of our time.

JONATHAN S. WOOCHER

Demographic

Jewish Population in the United States, 1980

THE NUMBER of persons in Jewish households* for 1980 is estimated at 5,920,900, a modest increase over the previous figure of 5,860,900. The South and West continue to show gains. This year they comprise 31.1 per cent of the total, compared with 28.5 four years ago. The largest increase was reported (based on a formal population study) by Los Angeles. Other communities showing gains of 2,000 or more are Atlanta, Ft. Lauderdale, Las Vegas, San Diego, and Tucson. The Northeast and Northcentral states account for 68.9 per cent, down from 71.4 four years ago. This trend is expected to continue, as many of the older cities in these regions have not fully reported their population losses.

The U.S. Census Bureau identifies Jews as a religious rather than an ethnic group. Since there is no question on religion in the decennial census, this source provides no data for Jewish population estimates.

The community estimates listed in Table 3 are provided primarily through an annual survey of local Jewish federations. There is variation with regard to the accuracy of the figures. While some communities conduct formal population studies, others estimate roughly on the basis of lists of known Jewish households. Several federations have indicated that their reported estimates are actually dated, but these communities are reluctant to revise their figures without undertaking formal studies. Other communities show fluctuations from year to year. A case in point is Denver, which reported a significant increase in 1979, but which this year reverted to the 1978 estimate pending a planned population study.

In Florida some communities have a problem estimating their population count because of seasonal residents. Such residents may be counted twice, once in the Florida community and again in the original home community to which they return for part of the year. Ft. Lauderdale has indicated that next year it plans to revise its estimate on the basis of a more limited inclusion of seasonal residents.

*Most Jewish communities estimate their population size by multiplying the number of families with the average size of household. A result of this procedure is to include, as a consequence of intermarriage, non-Jews living in households with one or more Jews. The 1970 National Jewish Population Study estimated the per cent of non-Jews in "Jewish households" as 7.4. For a fuller discussion of this, see AJYB, Vol. 75, 1974–75, pp. 296–299.

Approximately five per cent of the total Jewish population resides in non-federated communities. The process of contacting all such communities, through questionnaires sent to synagogues, begun in 1978, was completed this year. Follow-ups to non-responding localities will continue next year.

National, regional, and state totals, shown in Tables 1 and 2, are derived by summing the local community estimates. While these totals are presented, it should be emphasized that they are reported only as estimates. State totals exclude duplicate listings and out-of-state figures, where a community extends across state boundaries. Communities with less than 100 Jews (not shown in Table 3) are also included, as is an estimate for unreported Jews (generally in areas having no local synagogue). The latter figure is put at 25,000, or less than one-half of one per cent of the national total. This figure is calculated by doubling the number of Jews in communities reporting less than 100 Jewish residents.

The New York City metropolitan area figure, currently estimated at more than one-third the total Jewish population of the United States, represents the greatest source for potential modification of the national total. The estimate cited in Table 3—1,998,000—is that given in the 1970 National Jewish Population Study. It includes the city proper and three suburban counties. As stated in last year's article, the city proper has probably experienced significant Jewish population loss. The magnitude of the population shift to New York City suburbs and to areas outside Greater New York is unknown. The problem is further compounded by lack of current estimates for areas contiguous with metropolitan New York, i.e., Rockland County in New York State and Bergen County in New Jersey. Finally, the extent to which probable New York City losses are offset by immigration of Soviet Jews and Israelis is also unknown. The latter group is difficult to define, and probably includes a large temporary resident population. The New York Federation of Jewish Philanthropies is planning to sponsor a study, hopefully to be conducted in 1981, which would provide a more accurate population count than is now available.

ALVIN CHENKIN
MAYNARD MIRAN

APPENDIX

TABLE 1. JEWISH POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1980

State	*Estimated Jewish Population*	*Total Population**	*Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total*
Alabama	8,835	3,769,000	0.2
Alaska	960	406,000	0.2
Arizona	41,285	2,450,000	1.7
Arkansas	3,395	2,180,000	0.2
California	753,945	22,694,000	3.3
Colorado	31,765	2,772,000	1.1
Connecticut	102,035	3,115,000	3.3
Delaware	10,000	582,000	1.7
District of Columbia	40,000	656,000	6.1
Florida	454,880	8,860,000	5.1
Georgia	34,610	5,117,000	0.7
Hawaii	5,625	915,000	0.6
Idaho	505	905,000	0.1
Illinois	266,385	11,229,000	2.4
Indiana	23,485	5,400,000	0.4
Iowa	8,215	2,902,000	0.3
Kansas	10,755	2,369,000	0.5
Kentucky	11,585	3,527,000	0.3
Louisiana	16,340	4,018,000	0.4
Maine	6,800	1,097,000	0.6
Maryland	185,915	4,148,000	4.5
Massachusetts	249,455	5,769,000	4.3
Michigan	90,200	9,207,000	1.0
Minnesota	34,990	4,060,000	0.9
Mississippi	3,200	2,429,000	0.1
Missouri	71,790	4,867,000	1.5
Montana	645	786,000	0.1
Nebraska	7,905	1,574,000	0.5
Nevada	17,200	702,000	2.5
New Hampshire	4,480	887,000	0.5
New Jersey	442,765	7,332,000	6.0
New Mexico	7,155	1,241,000	0.6
New York	2,140,690	17,648,000	12.1

State	*Estimated Jewish Population*	*Total Population**	*Estimated Jewish Per Cent Of Total*
North Carolina	13,240	5,606,000	0.2
North Dakota	1,085	657,000	0.2
Ohio	144,670	10,731,000	1.3
Oklahoma	6,065	2,892,000	0.2
Oregon	10,835	2,527,000	0.4
Pennsylvania	419,730	11,731,000	3.6
Rhode Island	22,000	929,000	2.4
South Carolina	8,660	2,932,000	0.3
South Dakota	595	689,000	0.1
Tennessee	16,765	4,380,000	0.4
Texas	72,545	13,380,000	0.5
Utah	2,300	1,367,000	0.2
Vermont	2,465	493,000	0.5
Virginia	59,360	5,197,000	1.1
Washington	18,385	3,926,000	0.5
West Virginia	4,340	1,878,000	0.2
Wisconsin	29,750	4,720,000	0.6
Wyoming	310	450,000	0.1
U.S. TOTAL	5,920,890**	220,099,000	2.7

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

*July 1, 1979, resident population. Total population, including Armed Forces overseas, was 220,584,000. Total civilian population was 218,497,000. (Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports,* Series P.25, No. 870 & No. 876.)

**Exclusive of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which reported Jewish populations of 1,800 and 510, respectively.

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. JEWISH POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1980

Region	*Total Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*	*Jewish Population*	*Per Cent Distribution*
Northeast:	49,002,000	22.3	3,390,420	57.3
New England	12,291,000	5.6	387,235	6.5
Middle Atlantic	36,711,000	16.7	3,003,185	50.7
North Central:	58,406,000	26.5	689,825	11.7
East North Central	41,287,000	18.8	554,490	9.4
West North Central	17,118,000	7.8	135,335	2.3
South:	71,550,000	32.5	949,735	16.0
South Atlantic	34,976,000	15.9	811,005	13.7
East South Central	14,105,000	6.4	40,385	0.7
West South Central	22,470,000	10.2	98,345	1.7
West:	41,142,000	18.7	890,910	15.0
Mountain	10,673,000	4.8	101,165	1.7
Pacific	30,468,000	13.8	789,745	13.3
TOTALS	220,099,000	100.0	5,920,890	100.0

N.B. Details may not add to totals because of rounding.

TABLE 3. COMMUNITIES WITH JEWISH POPULATIONS OF 100 OR MORE, 1980 (ESTIMATED)

State and City	*Jewish Population*
ALABAMA	
*Anniston	100
*Birmingham	4,000
*Dothan	205
*Gadsden	180
*Huntsville	550
*Mobile	1,200
*Montgomery	1,625
Selma	210
*Tri-Cities[a]	150
Tuscaloosa	315
ALASKA	
*Anchorage	600
*Fairbanks	210
ARIZONA	
*Phoenix	29,000
*Tucson	12,000
ARKANSAS	
*Fayetteville	120
*Ft. Smith	160
Hot Springs (incl. in Little Rock)	
*Little Rock	1,820
*Pine Bluff	175
Southeast Arkansas[b]	140
Wynne-Forest City	110
CALIFORNIA	
*Alameda & Contra Costa Counties	28,000
Antelope Valley	375
Bakersfield (incl. in Kern County)	
El Centro	125
Elsinore	250
*Eureka	250
Fontana	165
*Fresno	2,500
Kern County	850
Lancaster (incl. in Antelope Valley)	
*Long Beach	13,500
*Los Angeles Metropolitan Area	503,000
Merced	100
Modesto	260
*Monterey	1,500
*Oakland (incl. in Alameda & Contra Costa Counties)	
Ontario (incl. in Pomona Valley)	
*Orange County	40,000
*Palm Springs	4,800
*Pasadena (also incl. in Los Angeles Metropolitan Area)	2,000
*Petaluma	800
*Pomona Valley[c]	3,500
*Riverside	1,200
*Sacramento	5,700
*Salinas	350
San Bernardino	1,900
*San Diego	32,500
*San Francisco	75,000
*San Jose	15,000
*San Luis Obispo	450
*San Pedro	300
*Santa Barbara	3,800
*Santa Cruz	1,000
*Santa Maria	200
Santa Monica	8,000
*Santa Rosa	750
Stockton	1,050
*Sun City	800
Tulare & Kings County (incl. in Fresno)	
Vallejo	400
Ventura County	5,000
COLORADO	
*Colorado Springs	1,000
*Denver	30,000
Pueblo	375
CONNECTICUT	
*Bridgeport	18,500
Bristol	250
Colchester	525
*Danbury (incl. New Milford)	3,500
*Greenwich	2,200
*Hartford (incl. New Britain)	23,500
Lebanon	175
Lower Middlesex County[d]	125
Manchester (incl. in Hartford)	
*Meriden	1,400
*Middletown	1,300
Milford (incl. in New Haven)	
*Moodus	150
*New Haven	20,000
*New London	3,360
Newtown (incl. in Danbury)	
*Norwalk	4,000
*Norwich	2,500
Putnam	110
Rockville (incl. in Hartford)	
*Stamford	12,000
*Torrington	450
*Valley Area[e]	700
Wallingford	440

State and City	*Jewish Population*
*Waterbury	3,200
Westport	2,800
*Willimantic	400
Winsted	110
DELAWARE	
*Wilmington (incl. rest of state)	10,000
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	
*Greater Washington[f]	160,000
FLORIDA	
*Boca Raton-Delray	15,000
*Brevard County	1,000
*Daytona Beach	1,200
*Fort Lauderdale	75,000
Fort Myers	300
Fort Pierce	270
*Gainesville	1,000
*Hollywood	55,000
*Jacksonville	6,000
Key West	170
*Lakeland	800
Lehigh Acres	125
*Miami	225,000
*Orlando	12,000
*Palm Beach County (excl. Boca Raton)	35,000
*Pensacola	725
Port Charlotte	150
*Sarasota	6,200
St. Augustine	100
*St. Petersburg (incl. Clearwater)	9,000
*Tallahassee	1,000
*Tampa	8,500
GEORGIA	
*Albany	525
*Athens	250
*Atlanta	27,500
*Augusta	1,500
Brunswick	120
*Columbus	1,000
Dalton	235
Fitzgerald-Cordele	125
*Macon	900
*Savannah	2,600
*Valdosta	145
HAWAII	
*Hilo	100
*Honolulu	5,000
*Kona	100
*Maui	200
IDAHO	
*Boise	120
ILLINOIS	
Aurora	400
*Bloomington	125
*Champaign–Urbana	1,500
*Chicago Metropolitan Area	253,000
Danville	240
Decatur	450
East St. Louis (incl. in So. Ill.)	
*Elgin	830
*Galesburg (incl. in Peoria)	
*Joliet	800
*Kankakee	260
*Peoria	2,000
*Quad Cities[g]	2,000
*Quincy	200
Rock Island (incl. in Quad Cities)	
Rockford	1,025
Southern Illinois[h]	950
*Springfield	1,250
Sterling-Dixon	110
*Waukegan	1,200
INDIANA	
Anderson	105
Bloomington	300
*Elkhart (incl. in South Bend)	
*Evansville	1,200
*Ft. Wayne	1,350
Gary (incl. in Northwest Indiana–Calumet Region)	
*Indianapolis	11,000
*Lafayette	600
Marion	170
Michigan City	400
Muncie	175
Northwest Indiana–Calumet Region[i]	5,000
*Richmond	110
Shelbyville	140
*South Bend	1,900
*Terre Haute	450
IOWA	
Cedar Rapids	330
Council Bluffs	245
Davenport (incl. in Quad Cities, Ill.)	
*Des Moines	3,500
Dubuque	105
Fort Dodge	115
*Iowa City	750
Mason City	110
Muscatine	120
Ottumwa	150
*Sioux City	1,050
*Waterloo	50

State and City	Jewish Population
KANSAS	
Topeka	500
*Wichita	1,200
KENTUCKY	
*Lexington	1,400
*Louisville	9,200
Paducah	175
LOUISIANA	
*Alexandria	760
*Baton Rouge	1,150
Lafayette	600
*Lake Charles	250
*Monroe	550
*New Orleans	10,600
*Shreveport	1,600
MAINE	
Augusta	215
*Bangor	1,500
Biddeford-Saco (incl. in Portland)	
Calais	135
*Lewiston-Auburn	700
*Portland	3,500
*Waterville	300
MARYLAND	
*Annapolis	2,000
*Baltimore	92,000
*Cumberland	265
Easton Park Area[j]	100
Frederick	400
*Hagerstown	275
*Hartford County	500
*Montgomery County[f]	70,000
*Prince Georges County[f]	20,000
*Salisbury	300
MASSACHUSETTS	
*Amherst	750
*Athol	110
*Attleboro	200
*Beverly	1,000
*Boston (incl. Brockton)	170,000
*Brockton	5,200
*Fall River	1,780
*Fitchburg	300
*Framingham	16,000
*Gardner	100
*Gloucester	400
Great Barrington	105
Greenfield	250
*Haverhill	1,650
Holyoke	1,100
*Hyannis	1,200
*Lawrence	2,550
*Leominster	750
Lowell	2,000
*Lynn (incl. Peabody)	19,000
Medway (incl. in Framingham)	
Milford (incl. in Framingham)	
Mills (incl. in Framingham)	
*New Bedford	3,100
Newburyport	280
North Berkshire	675
*Northampton	700
*Peabody	2,600
*Pittsfield	1,685
*Plymouth	500
*Salem	1,150
Southbridge	105
*Springfield	10,000
Taunton	1,200
Webster	125
*Worcester	10,000
MICHIGAN	
*Ann Arbor (incl. all Washtenaw County)	3,000
Battle Creek	245
*Bay City	650
*Benton Harbor	650
*Detroit	75,000
*Flint	2,395
Grand Rapids	1,500
Iron County	160
Iron Mountain	105
*Jackson	375
*Kalamazoo	700
*Lansing	1,800
Marquette County	175
Mt. Clemens	420
*Mt. Pleasant	100
*Muskegon	235
*Saginaw	550
*South Haven	100
MINNESOTA	
Austin	125
*Duluth	900
Hibbing	155
*Minneapolis	23,200
*Rochester	240
*St. Paul	9,250
*Virginia	100
MISSISSIPPI	
*Biloxi-Gulfport	100
*Clarksdale	160
*Cleveland	180
*Greenville	500
*Greenwood	100
*Hattiesburg	180
*Jackson	750
*Meridian	135
Natchez	140
Vicksburg	260

State and City	Jewish Population
MISSOURI	
*Columbia	350
*Joplin	115
*Kansas City	20,000
Kennett	110
Springfield	230
*St. Joseph	480
*St. Louis	60,000
MONTANA	
*Billings	160
NEBRASKA	
*Lincoln	800
*Omaha	6,500
NEVADA	
*Las Vegas	16,000
Reno	1,200
NEW HAMPSHIRE	
*Claremont	130
*Concord	350
*Dover	425
Keene	105
*Laconia	150
*Manchester	2,500
*Nashua	450
*Portsmouth	1,000
NEW JERSEY	
*Atlantic City (incl. Atlantic County)	11,800
Bayonne	8,500
Bergen County[k]	100,000
*Bridgeton	375
*Camden[l]	26,000
*Carteret	300
Elizabeth (incl. in Union County)	
*Englewood (also incl. in Bergen County)	10,000
*Essex County[m]	95,000
Flemington	875
Gloucester County[n]	165
Hoboken	500
*Jersey City	5,200
Metuchen (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Millville	240
*Monmouth County	32,000
*Morris-Sussex Counties[o]	15,000
Morristown (incl. in Morris County)	
*Mt. Holly	300
Newark (incl. in Essex County)	
New Brunswick (incl. in Raritan Valley)	
North Hudson County[p]	7,000
*North Jersey[q]	33,500
*Northern Middlesex County[r]	19,000
*Ocean County	12,000
*Passaic-Clifton	7,600
Paterson (incl. in North Jersey)	
Perth Amboy (incl. in North Middlesex County)	
Plainfield (incl. in Union County)	
*Princeton	2,600
*Raritan Valley[s]	18,000
Salem	230
*Somerset County[t]	6,000
Somerville (incl. in Somerset County)	
Toms River (incl. in Ocean County)	
*Trenton	8,500
*Union County	39,500
*Vineland[u]	3,335
*Wildwood	425
Willingboro (incl. in Camden)	
NEW MEXICO	
*Albuquerque	6,500
Las Cruces	100
*Los Alamos	240
Santa Fe	300
NEW YORK	
*Albany	13,500
Amenia	140
Amsterdam	595
*Auburn	315
*Batavia	165
*Beacon	315
*Binghamton (incl. all Broome County)	4,000
*Brewster (incl. in Danbury, Ct.)	300
*Buffalo	21,000
Canandaigua	135
*Catskill	200
Corning	125
Cortland	440
*Dunkirk	150
*Ellenville	1,450
*Elmira	1,400
*Geneva	300
*Glens Falls	360
*Gloversville	535
Herkimer	185
*Highland Falls	105
Hudson	470
*Ithaca	1,000
Jamestown	185
*Kingston	2,500
*Liberty	2,100

State and City	*Jewish Population*
Loch Sheldrake-Hurleyville	750
Monroe	400
*Monticello	2,400
Mountaindale	150
New York City Metropolitan Area	1,998,000
New Paltz	150
Newark	220
*Newburgh-Middletown	4,900
*Niagara Falls	1,200
Norwich	120
*Olean	140
*Oneonta	175
Oswego	100
Parksville	140
Pawling	105
*Plattsburg	275
Port Jervis	560
*Potsdam	175
*Poughkeepsie	4,900
*Rochester	21,500
Rockland County	25,000
*Rome	205
*Saratoga Springs	500
*Schenectady	5,400
Sharon Springs	165
South Fallsburg	1,100
*Syracuse	11,000
*Troy	1,200
*Utica	2,250
Walden	200
Warwick	100
Watertown	250
White Lake	425
Woodbourne	200
Woodridge	300
NORTH CAROLINA	
*Asheville	1,000
*Chapel Hill-Durham	1,850
*Charlotte	3,300
*Fayetteville (incl. all Cumberland County)	500
*Gastonia	220
Goldsboro	120
*Greensboro	2,000
*Hendersonville	105
High Point	400
*Raleigh	1,375
Rocky Mount	110
*Whiteville Zone	160
*Wilmington	500
Winston-Salem	440
NORTH DAKOTA	
*Fargo	500
Grand Forks	100
OHIO	
*Akron	6,500
*Canton	2,560
*Cincinnati	21,500
*Cleveland	75,000
*Columbus	13,000
*Dayton	6,000
East Liverpool	290
*Elyria	275
Hamilton	560
*Lima	290
Lorain	1,000
*Mansfield	600
*Marion	150
*Middletown	140
New Philadelphia	140
Newark	105
Piqua	120
Portsmouth	120
*Sandusky	150
*Springfield	340
*Steubenville	405
*Toledo	7,500
*Warren	500
*Wooster	200
*Youngstown	5,200
Zanesville	350
OKLAHOMA	
Muskogee	120
*Oklahoma City	2,000
Oklahoma City Zone	190
*Tulsa	2,700
OREGON	
Corvallis	140
*Eugene	1,500
*Portland	8,735
Salem	200
PENNSYLVANIA	
Aliquippa	400
*Allentown	4,980
*Altoona	1,200
Ambridge	250
Beaver	115
*Beaver Falls	350
Berwick	120
*Bethlehem	960
Braddock	250
*Bradford	150
Brownville	150
*Butler	350
Carbon County	125
*Carnegie	100
Central Bucks County	400
*Chambersburg	340
Chester	2,100
Coatesville	305
Connellsville	110
Donora	100

State and City	*Jewish Population*
Easton	1,300
Ellwood City	110
*Erie	930
Farrell	150
Greensburg	300
*Harrisburg	4,750
*Hazleton	625
Homestead	300
*Indiana	135
*Johnstown	450
Kittanning	175
*Lancaster	1,800
*Lebanon	425
Lock Haven	140
*Lower Bucks County[y]	18,000
McKeesport	2,000
Monessen	100
Mt. Pleasant	120
New Castle	400
*New Kensington	560
Norristown	2,000
North Penn	200
*Oil City	165
Oxford-Kennett Square	180
*Philadelphia Metropolitan Area	295,000
*Phoenixville	340
*Pittsburgh	50,000
*Pottstown	700
Pottsville	500
*Reading	2,800
Sayre	100
*Scranton	4,000
*Sharon	330
*State College	450
Stroudsburg	410
*Sunbury	200
*Uniontown	290
Upper Beaver	500
*Washington	325
Wayne County	210
West Chester	300
*Wilkes-Barre	4,000
*Williamsport	415
*York	1,600
RHODE ISLAND	
*Providence (incl. rest of state)	22,000
SOUTH CAROLINA	
*Charleston	3,200
*Columbia	2,300
*Florence	350
Greenville	600
Orangeburg County	105
*Spartanburg	295
Sumter	190
SOUTH DAKOTA	
*Sioux Falls	120
TENNESSEE	
*Chattanooga	1,750
Johnson City[z]	210
*Knoxville	1,350
*Memphis	9,000
*Nashville	3,700
Oak Ridge	240
TEXAS	
*Amarillo	300
*Austin	2,100
Baytown	300
*Beaumont	400
Brownsville	160
*Corpus Christi	1,030
*Dallas	20,000
De Witt County[aa]	150
*El Paso	5,000
*Ft. Worth	3,000
*Galveston	620
*Houston	28,000
*Laredo	420
*Longview	185
*Lubbock	350
*McAllen	295
*North Texas Zone[bb]	100
Odessa	150
Port Arthur	260
*San Antonio	6,500
Texarkana	100
*Tyler	450
*Waco	750
*Wharton	170
Wichita Falls	260
UTAH	
Ogden	100
*Salt Lake City	2,200
VERMONT	
Bennington	120
*Burlington	1,800
*Rutland	350
*St. Johnsbury	100
VIRGINIA	
*Alexandria (incl. Falls Church, Arlington County, and urbanized Fairfax County)[r]	30,000
Arlington (incl. in Alexandria)	
*Charlottesville	800
*Danville	180
Fredericksburg	140
Hampton (incl. in Newport News)	
*Harrisonburg	115
Hopewell	140
*Lynchburg	275
Martinsville	135

State and City	Jewish Population
*Newport News (incl. Hampton)	3,000
*Norfolk (incl. Virginia Beach)	11,000
*Petersburg	600
*Portsmouth (incl. Suffolk)	1,100
*Richmond	10,000
*Roanoke	800
Williamsburg	120
*Winchester	110
WASHINGTON	
Bellingham	120
Bremerton (incl. in Seattle)	
*Seattle	16,000
*Spokane	800
*Tacoma	750
WEST VIRGINIA	
*Bluefield-Princeton	250
*Charleston	1,150
*Clarksburg	205
*Huntington	450
*Morgantown	200
*Parkersburg	155
Weirton	150
*Wheeling	650
WISCONSIN	
*Appleton	250
*Beloit	120
*Eau Clair	120
*Fond du Lac	100
*Green Bay	350
*Kenosha	250
*Madison	3,000
*Manitowoc	115
*Milwaukee	23,900
*Oshkosh	150
*Racine	405
*Sheboygan	250
*Superior	165
Waukesha (incl. in Milwaukee)	
*Wausau	155
WYOMING	
*Cheyenne	255

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*Denotes estimate submitted within the last three years.

[a] Florence, Sheffield, Tuscumbia.

[b] Towns in Chicot, Desha, Drew Counties.

[c] Includes Alta Loma, Chino, Claremont, Cucamonga, La Verne, Montclair, Ontario, Pomona, San Dimas, Upland.

[d] Centerbrook, Chester, Clinton, Deep River, Essex, Killingworth, Old Lyme, Old Saybrook, Seabrook, Westbrook.

[e] Ansonia, Derby-Shelton, Oxford, Seymour.

[f] Greater Washington includes urbanized portions of Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, Maryland, Arlington County, Fairfax County (organized portion); Falls Church, Alexandria, Virginia.

[g] Rock Island, Moline (Illinois); Davenport, Bettendorf (Iowa).

[h] Towns in Alexander, Bond, Clay, Clinton, Crawford, Edwards, Effingham, Fayette, Franklin, Gallatin, Hamilton, Hardin, Jackson, Jasper, Jefferson, Jersey, Johnson, Lawrence, Mascoupin, Madison, Marion, Massac, Montgomery, Perry, Pope, Pulaski, Randolph, Richland, St. Clair, Saline, Union, Wabash, Washington, Wayne, White, Williamson Counties.

[i] Includes Crown Point, East Chicago, Gary, Hammond, Munster, Valparaiso, Whiting, and the Greater Calumet region.

[j] Towns in Caroline, Kent, Queen Annes, Talbot Counties.

[k] Allendale, Elmwood Park, Fair Lawn, Franklin Lakes, Oakland, Midland Park, Rochelle Park, Saddle Brook, Wykoff also included in North Jersey estimate.

[l] Includes Camden and Burlington Counties.

[m] Includes contiguous areas in Hudson, Morris, Somerset, and Union Counties.

[n] Includes Clayton, Paulsboro, Woodbury. Excludes Newfield; see Vineland.

[o] See footnote (m).

[p] Includes Guttenberg, Hudson Heights, North Bergen, North Hudson, Secaucus, Union City, Weehawken, West New York, Woodcliff.

[q] Includes Paterson, Wayne, Hawthorne in Passaic County, and nine towns in Bergen County. See footnote (k).

[r] Includes Perth Amboy, Metuchen, Edison Township (part), Woodbridge.

[s] Includes in Middlesex County, Cranbury, Dunellen, East Brunswick, Edison Township (part), Jamesburg, Matawan, Middlesex, Monmouth Junction, Old Bridge, Parlin, Piscataway, South River, Spottswood, in Somerset County, Kendall Park, Somerset; in Mercer County, Hightstown.

[t] Excludes Kendall Park and Somerset, which are included in Raritan Valley.

[u] Includes in Cumberland County, Norma, Rosenheim, Vineland; in Salem County, Elmer; in Gloucester County, Clayton, Newfield; in Cape May County, Woodbine.

[v] Estimate based on the 1970 National Jewish Population Study. Includes the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens, Staten Island, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester Counties.

[w] Elizabethtown, Fairmont, Jacksonville, Lumberton, Tabor City, Wallace, Warsaw, and Loris, S.C.

[x] Towns in Alfalfa, Beckham, Cadelo, Canadian, Cleveland, Custer, Jackson, Kingfisher, Kiowa, Lincoln, Logan, Oklahoma, Payne, Roger Mills, Tillman, Washita Counties.

[y] Bensalem Township, Bristol, Langhorne, Levittown, New Hope, Newtown, Penndel, Warington, Yardley.

[z] Includes Kingsport and Bristol (including the portion of Bristol in Virginia).

[aa] Includes communities also in Colorado, Fayette, Gonzales, and La Vaca Counties.

[bb] Denison, Gainesville, Greenville, Paris, Sherman, and Durant (Oklahoma).

World Jewish Population

THERE ARE NO PRECISE DATA on Jewish population in the various countries. The figures presented below represent the best possible estimates for 1979. They are based on local censuses, communal registration figures, and data obtained from a special inquiry conducted in spring 1980. Fifty-eight questionnaires were sent to major Jewish bodies in selected countries requesting information on: a) the number of Jews in the country, including nationals and refugees; b) the figures for principal cities; c) the source of the data and the method used in arriving at the estimate. Responses were received from 20 countries.[1]

The figures are of varying degrees of accuracy, and are subject to substantial margins of error. They will be revised when more accurate data become available. In the tables below, figures obtained from 1980 inquiry are indicated by an "x".

DISTRIBUTION BY CONTINENTS

The estimated world Jewish population at the end of 1979 was 14,527,150. Of the total number, about 6,800,000 (47 per cent) lived in the Americas, some 4,102,000 (29 per cent) in Europe, including the Asian parts of Turkey and the USSR, and over 3,330,000 (22 per cent) in Asia. Only about 173,000 (1.5 per cent) remained in Africa, and 72,000 (0.5 per cent) were in Australia and New Zealand.

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[1] Australia: Executive Council of Australian Jewry; Bolivia: Circulo Israelita; Canada: Council of Jewish Federations; Chile: Comite Representativo de la Collectividad Israelita de Chile; Finland: The Jewish Community of Helsinki; Gibraltar: Managing Board of the Jewish Community; Honduras: Comunidad Hebrea de Tegucigalpa; Ireland: Jewish Representative Council of Ireland; Jamaica: The United Congregation of Israelites; Kenya: Nairobi Hebrew Congregation; Netherlands: Netherlands-Israelitisch Kerkgenootschap; Norway: Det Mosaiska Trossamfund; Singapore: Jewish Welfare Board; Spain: Jewish Community of Spain; Sweden: Judiska forsamlingen; Turkey: Chief Rabbinate of Turkey; United Kingdom: The Board of Deputies of British Jews; Uruguay: Comite Central Israelita del Uruguay; Yugoslavia: Federation of Jewish Communities in Yugoslavia; Zimbabwe: Central African Jewish Board of Deputies.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF JEWISH POPULATION BY CONTINENTS, 1979

Continent	*Number*	*Per Cent*
Europe (including Asiatic USSR and Turkey)	4,102,350	29.0
America (North, Central, and South)	6,839,560	47.0
Asia	3,339,810	22.0
Africa	173,430	1.5
Australia and New Zealand	72,000	0.5
TOTAL	14,527,150*	100.0

*Because sources and dates were not always identical, there may be discrepancies between figures given in the tables below and those in other sections of this volume.

Various estimates have been put forward for the Jewish population of the Soviet Union, the United States, Argentina, and France. If the lower estimate were accepted in each case, the total world Jewish population would be smaller by about one million than the estimate offered here.

Europe

Of the approximately 4,102,000 Jews in Europe, some 2,790,000 were in the Communist area, including 80,000 in Hungary, some 45,000 in Rumania, about 12,000 in Czechoslovakia, and 6,000 in Poland. Students of Jewish population disagreed on the number of Jews in the USSR (see the article on the Soviet Union in this volume). About 1,300,000 Jews lived in non-Communist countries. France, with some 650,000, was the largest Jewish community in Western Europe. (Other sources estimated the French Jewish population as being 550,000.) Great Britain had 410,000; Belgium, 41,000; Italy, 41,000; and Germany (including both East and West Germany), 38,000.

TABLE 2. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN EUROPE, BY COUNTRIES, 1979

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Albania	2,670,000	300
Austria	7,510,000	13,000
Belgium	9,850,000	41,000
Bulgaria	8,810,000	7,000
Czechoslovakia	15,250,000	12,000
Denmark	5,120,000	7,500
Finland	4,750,000	1,000[x]
France	53,480,000	650,000
Germany	78,800,000	38,000[b]
Gibraltar	30,000	600[x]
Great Britain	55,820,000	410,000[x]

Greece	9,440,000	6,000
Hungary	10,700,000	80,000
Ireland	3,370,000	1,900[x]
Italy	56,910,000	41,000
Luxembourg	360,000	1,000
Malta	350,000	50
Netherlands	14,030,000	30,000[x]
Norway	4,070,000	900[x]
Poland	35,440,000	6,000
Portugal	9,870,000	600
Rumania	22,070,000	45,000
Spain	37,180,000	12,000[x]
Sweden	8,290,000	17,000[x]
Switzerland	6,330,000	21,000
Turkey	44,310,000	24,000[x,c]
USSR	264,110,000	2,630,000[c]
Yugoslavia	22,160,000	5,500[x]
TOTAL		4,102,350

[a] United Nations Statistical Office, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, and other sources, including local publications.

[b] Includes West Germany, East Germany, and both sectors of Berlin.

[c] Includes Asian regions of the USSR and Turkey.

[x] Reply to 1980 inquiry.

North, Central, and South America

The number of Jews in the United States, including all persons living in Jewish households, was estimated at about 5,920,000 (see the article "Jewish Population in the United States" in this volume). Some demographers disagreed with this figure and suggested an estimate one quarter million smaller. Canada had about 305,000 Jews, and Central and South America some 575,000. The Jewish population in Argentina was estimated to be 300,000, but some local observers considered this figure as too low.

TABLE 3. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN NORTH, CENTRAL, AND SOUTH AMERICA AND THE WEST INDIES, BY COUNTRIES, 1979

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Canada	23,690,000	305,000[x]
Mexico	69,380,000	37,500
United States	220,100,000	5,920,890
Total North America		6,263,390
Barbados	270,000	70
Costa Rica	2,190,000	2,500

Cuba	9,850,000	1,500
Curacao	150,000	700
Dominican Republic	5,280,000	200
El Salvador	4,350,000	350
Guatemala	6,620,000	2,000
Haiti	4,920,000	150
Honduras	3,560,000	200[x]
Jamaica	2,160,000	350[x]
Nicaragua	2,640,000	200
Panama	1,880,000	2,000
Trinidad	1,130,000	300
Total Central America and West Indies		10,520
Argentina	26,730,000	300,000
Bolivia	5,430,000	750[x]
Brazil	118,650,000	150,000
Chile	10,920,000	30,000[x]
Colombia	26,360,000	12,000
Ecuador	8,080,000	1,000
Paraguay	2,970,000	1,200
Peru	17,290,000	5,200
Surinam	380,000	500
Uruguay	2,910,000	50,000[x]
Venezuela	13,520,000	15,000
Total South America		565,650
TOTAL		6,839,560

[a] See Table 2, note[a].
[x] See Table 2, note[x].

Asia, Australia, and New Zealand

The Jewish population of Asia was over 3,330,000. Of this figure, 3,254,000, or approximately 97 per cent, were in Israel, the second largest Jewish population center in the world. There were 70,000 Jews in Iran and 8,000 in India. It was difficult to ascertain the precise impact of events in Iran and Lebanon on the number of Jews in these countries as well as in Syria.

The Jewish population of Australia was estimated at about 67,000, and that of New Zealand at 5,000.

TABLE 4. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN ASIA, BY COUNTRIES, 1979

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Afghanistan	15,490,000	200
Burma	32,910,000	50[x]

China	945,020,000	30
Cyprus	620,000	30
Hong Kong	4,710,000	250
India	650,980,000	8,000
Indonesia	148,470,000	100
Iran	35,510,000	70,000
Iraq	12,330,000	450
Israel	3,867,000	3,254,000
Japan	115,870,000	400
Lebanon	3,090,000	400
Pakistan	76,770,000	250
Philippines	47,720,000	200
Singapore	2,360,000	450[x]
Syria	8,350,000	4,500
Yemen	5,790,000	500
TOTAL		3,339,810

[a] See Table 2, note[a].
[x] See Table 2, note[x].

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND, 1979

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Australia	14,420,000	67,000[x]
New Zealand	3,110,000	5,000
TOTAL		72,000

[a] See Table 2, note[a].
[x] See Table 2, note[x].

Africa

The Jewish population of Africa stood at about 173,000, including some 118,000 in South Africa. Events in Zimbabwe had a substantial impact on the number of Jews there, bringing it down to some 1,960. An estimated 22,000 were in Ethiopia. The Jewish communities of the Maghreb were very small—some 22,000 in Morocco, 7,000 in Tunisia, and about 1,000 in Algeria. Egypt had 400 Jews and Libya 20.

TABLE 6. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION IN AFRICA, BY COUNTRIES, 1979

Country	*Total Population*[a]	*Jewish Population*
Algeria	19,130,000	1,000
Egypt	40,980,000	400

Ethiopia	30,420,000	22,000
Kenya	15,320,000	450
Libya	2,860,000	20
Morocco	19,470,000	22,000
Republic of South Africa	26,130,000	118,000
Zimbabwe	7,140,000	1,960[x]
Tunisia	6,200,000	7,000
Zaire	27,940,000	200
Zambia	5,650,000	400
TOTAL		173,430

[a]See Table 2, note[a].
[x]See Table 2, note[x].

COMMUNITIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION

The largest Jewish community was in the United States, followed by Israel and the Soviet Union. Together they accounted for some 82 per cent of the world Jewish population. France, Great Britain, Canada, and Argentina had Jewish communities of 300,000 or over. Brazil had a Jewish population of 150,000, while that of South Africa stood at 118,000. The balance of the countries had Jewish communities of less than 100,000 each.

TABLE 7. COUNTRIES WITH LARGEST JEWISH POPULATION

Country	*Jewish Population*
United States	5,920,000
Israel	3,254,000
Soviet Union	2,630,000
France	650,000
Great Britain	410,000
Canada	305,000
Argentina	300,000

TABLE 8. ESTIMATED JEWISH POPULATION, SELECTED CITIES

City	*Jewish Population*
Adelaide	1,600
Amsterdam	15,000[x]
Ankara	500[x]
Antwerp	13,000

Athens	2,800
Auckland	1,500
Barcelona	3,000[x]
Basel	2,300
Belgrade	1,500[x]
Berlin (both sectors)	6,000
Bern	800
Birmingham	6,000[x]
Bogota	5,500
Bombay (and district)	6,970
Bordeaux	6,400
Brisbane	1,200[x]
Brussels	24,500
Bucharest	40,000
Budapest	65,000
Calcutta	300
Cape Town	25,650
Cochin	500
Copenhagen	7,000
Durban	5,990
Florence	1,400
Geneva	3,250
Glasgow	13,000
Goteborg	1,600[x]
Guatemala City	1,500
Haifa	210,000
Helsinki	800[x]
Istanbul	20,000[x]
Izmir	2,500
Jerusalem	290,000
Johannesburg	57,500
Kiev	170,000
Kobe	80
La Paz	500[x]
Leeds	18,000
Leningrad	165,000
Lima	5,000
Lisbon	550
Liverpool	6,500
London (greater)	260,000[x]
Luxembourg	850
Lyons	20,000

Madrid	3,000[x]
Malaga	1,500[x]
Malmo	1,930[x]
Manchester (greater)	35,000
Manila	300
Marseilles	65,000
Melbourne	32,000[x]
Mexico, D.F.	32,500
Milan	9,000
Montevideo	48,000
Montreal	100,000[x]
Moscow	285,000
Nice	20,000
Oslo	675
Ottawa	8,500[x]
Paris	300,000
Perth	3,200
Plovdiv	1,000
Porto Alegre	12,000
Prague	3,000
Rabat	2,500
Recife	3,000
Rio de Janeiro	55,000
Rome	10,000
Salisbury	1,100[x]
Salonika	1,300
San Jose	2,500
Santiago	28,000[x]
Sao Paulo	75,000
Sarajevo	1,090[x]
Sofia	4,000
Stockholm	5,000[x]
Strasbourg	12,000
Subotica	220[x]
Sydney	26,500[x]
Teheran	50,000
Tel Aviv-Jaffa	394,000
Tokyo	320
Toronto	120,000[x]
Toulouse	18,000
Trieste	1,200
Vancouver	14,000[x]

Valparaiso	4,000
Vienna	9,000
Wellington	1,500
Warsaw	4,500
Winnipeg	18,000[x]
Zagreb	1,030[x]
Zurich	6,150

*For cities in the United States, see Table 3 of section, "Jewish Population in the United States" in this volume.

[x] See Table 2, note[x].

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